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Planning systems for economic development have been adopted by many 
countries (in more or less sophisticated forms) as a means of formalising 
national objectives, allocating scarce resources to achieve those 
objectives, and judging the relative merits of development policies.
Recent literature in development economics stresses that 'economic 
development' involves more than achieving a satisfactory growth of 
conventionally measured per capita incomes: it also requires a reduction 
in unemployment and a reduction in the degree of inequality of income 
distribution. The challenge laid down to planners by the new development 
economics is to incorporate explicit mechanisms for dealing with these 
issues in their planning frameworks. This thesis sets out to contribute 
to this task by providing an analysis of certain key conceptual issues 
and relationships involved in equity-oriented planning. It is divided 
into four parts.
The first part distils from international empirical evidence certain 
key relationships commonly associated with economic development which 
appear to affect income distribution in a systematic manner. It is 
argued that the significant relationships so identified can be built 
into the design of a development planning framework for individual 
countries in which concern for income distribution is given high priority. 
Among the key relationships significantly affecting variations in inequality 
across countries, two which stand out are the structural pattern of 
employment (in particular, the proportion of the workforce engaged in 
agriculture) and demographic factors (in particular, the fertility rate).
It has been argued in the past that rapid growth is inconsistent with 
reducing the degree of income inequality. However, this is shown to be 
not necessarily the case. What seems to be more important is the type 
of growth generated and the distribution of the benefits.
In part two the patterns of demographic change and employment in the 
case of Fiji are studied. It is shown that the structure of employment 
and underemployment in Fiji is such that a concerted effort to create new 
employment opportunities in rural areas is required in order to achieve 
significant progress towards reducing the overall degree of income inequality. 
It is also shown that continuing efforts are required to reduce the rate 
of population growth by lowering fertility rates, in order to reduce the 
pressure of population on land in rural areas and limit the rate of growth 
of the workforce to the growth of new employment opportunities.
In the third part the focus shifts to the criteria for judging the 
relative merits of plans and evaluating their outcomes. The value 
judgements involved in defining an equality-preferring social welfare 
function are discussed by drawing on modern welfare economics literature.
The status of the Gini index as an appropriate indicator of inequality is 
examined with reference to an empirical estimation of inequality in Fiji.
It is reaffirmed that the nationwide degree of income inequality in Fiji 
is primarily determined by large differences between average rural and 
urban income levels.
In part four the problem of a potential conflict between the twin 
objectives of growth and reduced inequality is addressed by using a static 
semi-closed input-output model of the Fiji economy. The model provides 
consistent output and employment responses to alternative patterns of 
consumer demand based upon alternative simulated income distribution 
patterns. A distinction is drawn between consistent solutions and feasible 
solutions, the latter requiring the imposition of supply constraints which 
are absent from the simulations reported in this analysis. The results 
indicate that a modest redistribution of income in Fiji, leading to a 
more even income distribution, would be consistent with higher aggregate 
employment, output and income levels, and need not reduce the rate of 
growth of the national income.
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PREFACE
When the foundations of the theory are discussed 
in print, one gets the impression that the author is 
impatient - impatient to get on with the job of reaching 
ambiguous conclusions. A serious economist hardly likes 
to be caught at the trivial occupation of discussing 
foundations. (Little (1950) pp.3-4).
It will be argued in this thesis that an important prerequisite to 
the building of equity-oriented planning models is an assessment of the 
fundamental conceptual issues involved. The foundations of model building 
consist firstly of the identification of the key relationships and how 
they work, and secondly, of the identification of measurable attributes 
of these key relationships and the processing of the data. The study was 
motivated by an interest in relationships associated with the effects of 
economic growth on income distribution, and the effects of income 
redistribution on economic growth. The important conceptual problems 
that affected the preparation of data are those associated with the 
concept and measurement of employment and the degree of income inequality. 
A number of authors have shown that it is possible to construct a planning 
model within which known feasible policies can alter the distribution of 
income among households with predictable effects upon employment 
opportunities and output growth, and that in such models these effects 
may in turn react upon income distribution and reinforce the initial 
change. One of the best examples of this is the BACHUE model (I.L.O. 
(1973)). Despite the thought which has gone into the building of such 
models, the profession remains far from a consensus about the above 
mentioned relationships and conceptual problems. There is therefore a 
useful contribution to be made in sorting out these fundamental issues.
The following provides a broad picture of the approach used and the 
main conclusions. Part I of the thesis, consisting of the first three 
chapters, is an empirical study of the relationships between income 
distribution and economic growth based upon international evidence. The
setting of the problem is outlined in the introduction to Chapter One, 
where it is established that conventional development theory suggests a 
conflict between the goals of rapid economic growth and reduced income 
inequality. The empirical evidence analysed in Chapter Two suggests 
that this is not necessarily the case. On the contrary, rapid growth of 
per capita income offers the potential for improving the income share of 
the poor. Aside from the rate of growth of per capita income there are 
forces commonly associated with economic development in the long term 
which are shown to have a significant effect on inequality of income 
distribution. Two of the most important influences on inequality are 
found to operate through the structure of employment and through 
demographic factors. These and other conclusions from the empirical 
study of international variations in inequality are explained in Chapter 
Three. It is argued that certain of these relationships which are 
responsive to policy intervention in the long term should form the 
cornerstone of development planning frameworks in individual countries 
where distributional considerations have high priority.
Thereafter the empirical analysis is confined to the case of Fiji 
with detailed studies of demographic change (Chapter Four), employment 
structure (Chapter Six) and income distribution (Chapter Eight) in that 
country. Each of these chapters has an introduction and a summary 
section to provide the reader with the essential features of the argument. 
It is shown that income inequality in Fiji is primarily associated with 
the wide gap between average income levels in urban areas on one hand 
and rural areas on the other. This rural-urban income gap, combined 
with rapid growth of the workforce and consequent population pressure 
on land in rural areas, has induced a high rate of rural-to-urban 
migration. Under such circumstances it is argued that an equity-oriented 
planning framework would need to give considerable attention to the
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creation of new income-earning opportunities in rural areas.
Two fundamental theoretical problems had to be addressed before the 
empirical analysis for Fiji could be satisfactorily interpreted. The 
first was the problem of the concept and measurement of employment and 
underemployment in developing countries in general. Chapter Five is 
devoted to an analysis of this problem. It is argued that the concept 
of employment in developing countries is different from that in developed 
countries and therefore requires different methods of analysis and 
approaches to measurement. This theoretical analysis forms the basis 
of the empirical analysis of employment in Fiji in Chapter Six.
The second theoretical problem was associated with the measurement 
of the degree of income inequality. Indices of inequality are often 
presented as measuring the degree of inequality in some objective sense. 
Yet it has been shown that different indices register different 
sensitivities to income transfers between rich and poor, and so certain 
ethical judgements are embodied in any attempt to measure the degree of 
income inequality. Analysis of this problem leads naturally to the 
evaluation of inequality in a social welfare function - that is, to 
making these ethical judgements explicit for the purpose of ordering 
alternative social states and ultimately of evaluating the outcomes of 
alternative development plans. These issues are the subject of Chapter 
Seven which has an introduction and a summary section to draw together 
the threads of this part of the argument.
The question of how income redistribution would affect the structure 
and growth performance of an economy is largely an empirical one. 
Different effects have been reported in case studies of different 
countries, some on the basis of historical observations and some on the 
basis of numerical simulations. In Chapter Nine it is shown that the 
simulated effects of income redistribution from rich to poor households
in the Fiji economy would result in a higher level of aggregate 
employment, higher levels of industry outputs (particularly in industries 
serving domestic consumer demand) and a higher level of household 
disposable income. In addition, it is suggested that this would not 
necessarily reduce the rate of growth of national income. The results 
of the simulated redistributions are reported in detail from page 298.
It should be noted that there are important questions which remain 
unanswered here and which limit the scope of the study. These questions 
relate to (i) specific policies to achieve the desired distribution of 
income, (ii) inter-temporal consistency of the desired effects, and 
(iii) the effects of supply constraints as a determinant of the technical 
feasibility of redistributive policies. The reason that these questions 
are regarded as falling beyond the scope of this thesis is that they 
relate primarily to technical (and also political) problems in the design 
of an actual model, and not to the fundamental relationships which 
equity-oriented plans ought to address and which I am trying to explain. 
The design of an actual model depends very much on the specific uses to 
which it will be put (i.e. on the questions asked of it) and on the 
feasible policy alternatives that are open to particular governments.
My current work in the National Planning Office of Papua New Guinea is 
providing me with a valuable opportunity to extend some of my earlier 
research on the design of planning models, and in particular dynamic 
input-output models, in response to specific problems based upon the 
conceptual foundations which this thesis argues are very important.
In my analysis of the foundations of equity-oriented planning 
frameworks I have used analytical techniques which for the most part 
are conventional, but they have been applied in combinations which 
support stronger conclusions than similar studies. This is the case, 
for instance, in Chapter Two which uses factor analysis as a preliminary
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screening device to identify important relationships for study using 
regression analysis. Similarly, Chapter Four combines standard demographic 
projection techniques with statistical analysis and empirical information 
to identify variables in population forecasting which are important for 
the thesis. In Chapter Nine the solution to a static input-output 
consistency model is appraised for macroeconomic feasibility with the 
aid of a conventional resource-gap test. For present purposes this 
provides an adequate assessment of the direction and relative magnitude 
of the potential effects of income redistribution on the Fiji economy.
Fiji had a number of attractions as a case study and as a basis for 
the exposition of some general propositions. Reduction of income 
inequality is accorded a high priority by the Government of Fiji. In 
recent development plans the inequality problem in Fiji has been 
identified as being primarily associated with differences in average 
income levels between urban and rural areas. The approach of the 
Government to this problem is to direct resources into rural development 
and I have argued that this is a sound approach, especially with regard 
to the creation of new income earning opportunities in rural areas.
Many observers of the political economy of Fiji regard the income 
distribution question in that country as being bound to the racial 
distribution of economic opportunities between the indigenous Fijians, 
Indo-Fijians (descendants of Indian immigrants), and the small European/ 
Chinese group.
The picture that emerges is roughly that of a three- 
tier society in which the European/Chinese group 
manages and operates the large corporations and 
institutions, often on behalf of foreign owners. The 
Indians own and operate most of the medium to small- 
scale enterprises, including most of the commercial 
farming, whilst the Fijians own most of the land and 
are still very heavily engaged in a non-monetary, but 
affluent, subsistence sector. All are well off by 
comparison with many similar groups in other lands of 
the less-developed world. (Fisk (1970) p.42).
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I have sought to provide an analysis which is rather more general, 
relating to differences between households only in respect of their 
income levels. As such it is hoped that the analysis will be useful 
not only to planners and students in Fiji but also in other countries 
where the organisation of society is different.
In the course of my research for this thesis I visited Fiji on two 
occasions. While there I was fortunate to have some discussions with 
officials in the Central Planning Office and the Bureau of Statistics, 
and to travel on the main island of Viti Levu. My supervisor, Dr. Shamsher 
Ali, himself a citizen of Fiji, provided valuable background information 
in many interesting discussions. I would like to thank these people for 
broadening my understanding of Fiji. I would also like to acknowledge 
the assistance given to me by several people at the University of 
Wollongong. Professor K.A. Blakey, joint supervisor with Dr. S. Ali, 
and Mr. R.G. Castle gave very valuable comments on earlier drafts of the 
thesis. I would like to record my appreciation to them for allowing me 
the freedom to pursue my own interests and ideas. I would also like to 
thank Dr. A.M. McGregor for helpful comments on the regression analysis 
in Chapter Two, and Professor M.G.A. Wilson for guidance with the 
demographic analysis in Chapter Four. Professor W.P. Hogan of Sydney 
University suggested the data sensitivity test which resulted in the 
Appendix to Chapter One and which enhanced the confidence in the results 
of the regression analysis. Subhan Ali provided assistance with the 
mathematical proofs in the Appendix to Chapter Seven and had an important 
influence on the development of my interest in mathematical approaches 
to economic problems. I owe an intellectual debt to the rich field of 
research made available through the auspices of the International Labour 
Organisation's World Employment Programme. My early interest in this 
subject was very much influenced by the reports of several I.L.O. country
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employment missions. The discussion of the theoretical issues here 
argued to be important has drawn particularly on work by Professor A.K. 
Sen. Muriel Inglis typed the text of the dissertation under difficult 
conditions and to her I owe a special debt of gratitude. I would also 
like to thank my wife, Narelle, for typing some earlier papers and most 
importantly for her unfailing encouragement during the course of my 
studies. Last but not least I would like to thank my parents for the 
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PART I
Income Distribution and Economic Development
1 .
CHAPTER 1
Income Distribution Changes in the Course 
of Economic Growth: an Overview
1.1 Introduction
Modern theories of economic development for low-income 
countries contain a clear implication that the degree of inequality 
in the size distribution of income will increase in the early 
stages of growth.1 For example, in the dual economy models of 
Lewis (1955) and Fei and Ranis (1964) the process of growth 
involves drawing factors of production away from the large 
traditional sector v/here per capita income is near subsistence 
and labour productivity is low, and employing them in the modern 
sector where profits and labour productivity are relatively high. 
The link between intersectoral disparities in average income per 
head and the inequality in the nationwide size distribution of 
income may be forged by considering the latter as a weighted 
average of the degree of inequality in each sector. Intrasectoral 
inequality is assumed to be greater in the modern sector than in 
the traditional sector. Thus disparities between the two sectors 
in average income per head, and the degree of inequality in the 
nationwide size distribution of income, should both increase and 
continue to do so until the productivity of labour in the 
erstwhile traditional sector begins to rise towards that of the 
modern sector.
The "stages of growth" thesis due to Rostow (1971) similarly 
predicts increasing inequality as an expected consequence of
1 The terminologies of "economic development", "inequality in the 
size distribution of income", "growth" are treated elsewhere in 
the thesis in detail.
2.
growth. He defines the "take-off" as a period in the economic 
history of a country during which new industries expand rapidly, 
generating profits which in large measure are reinvested, and 
stimulating further expansion through multiplier effects (backward 
and forward linkages). The whole process of expansion in the 
modern sector yields higher income in the hands of those who save 
at high rates and place their savings at the disposal of 
investment-oriented modern sector activities.
The fundamental importance of the processes of saving and 
capital accumulation as the major determinants of the rate of 
growth is common to both types of theories. It is not difficult 
to see why the mainstream of thought in development economics in 
the 1950's and 1960's considered a relatively high degree of 
income inequality to be an unavoidable feature of "successful" 
development. The argument was based on the supposition that rich 
households tend to save a much higher proportion of their income 
than do poor households, and that the household sector is 
relatively more important in developing countries than in developed 
countries (vis-a-vis the corporate and government sectors) as a 
source of investible finance. This; implies that the more skewed 
is the household income distribution in favour of the rich, the 
higher will be the savings rate for given levels of national 
income, and the faster will be the rates of capital accumulation 
and growth.
A high degree of overall inequality was not by itself thought 
to be inconsistent with raising the standard of living of the 
poorer groups. On the contrary, most Western observers were 
content with the conjecture that the poor would be better off in 
the long run consuming a given proportion of a rapidly growing
3.
national income, and receiving certain "trickle-down" benefits.
In the dual economy models, for example, rapid growth of the high 
productivity urban sector generates demand for rural products for 
consumption and intermediate use, as well as employment 
opportunities for an increasing flow of migrants. Many economists 
also took for granted the possibility of large-scale public 
transfers to the poor by taxation of high urban incomes to provide 
rural services such as health, education, transport and electrif­
ication. However, the conventional wisdom of the 1950's and 
1960's failed to recognise that rapid rises in aggregate income 
would have the potential to further entrench certain vested 
interest groups, and to permit some governments with weak fiscal 
and transfer systems only to pay lip service to redistribution to 
the poor, and that the high savings of the rich may be in 
unproductive forms, unhelpful for economic development.
The hypothesis that income distribution tends to become 
more unequal in the early stages of growth was supported by such 
empirical evidence as did exist in the 1960's. This evidence was 
primarily due to Kuznets' (1963) study in which he demonstrated 
the appearance of an inverted-U-pattern in the degree of inequality 
against the level of per capita national income from a cross­
section sample of eighteen countries. That is, that income 
inequality, which is relatively low in low-income countries, 
tends to rise as we scan the spectrum of developing countries with 
successively higher per capita incomes, and becomes less unequal 
only when we reach economies that are among the most advanced.
Several more recent studies using larger samples have 
supported the generalised inverted-U-pattern. Adelman and
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Morris (1973) analysed a sample of forty-three developing 
countries and noted that their findings were broadly in line with 
Kuznets' earlier hypothesis. Paukert (1973) expanded the 
Adelman-Morris sample to fifty-six countries and demonstrated a 
similar pattern. Ahluwalia (1976) used source data from a 
compilation of income distributions by Jain (1975) for a sample of 
sixty countries in a multivariate regression analysis and 
demonstrated a statistically significant quadratic relationship 
of inequality with per capita income level.
The first half of the 1970's also witnessed the publication 
of many case studies of the determinants of changes in income 
inequality for particular countries. Among those for Latin 
American countries one may list the studies by Weisskoff (1970), 
E.C.L.A. (1971), Fishlow (1972), Langoni (1973), Foxley and 
Munoz (1974), Wells (1974). Studies of Asian countries include 
Oshima (1970), Sundrum (1972), Alamgir (1974),
Arndt (1975), Wada (1975), Renaud (1976). Almost all of these 
studies cite intersectoral disparities in average income as being 
a very important determinant of the overall degree of inequality.2 
Different authors have indicated other influences which assumed 
varying degrees of importance in particular cases. These include
2 Very broadly, this means that if the difference in average per 
capita income between traditional and modern sectors is not 
very great, then the overall degree of inequality in the 
nationwide size distribution of income tends to be low in 
relation to countries where intersectoral disparities are great. 
The issue is rather more complex than this, however, depending 
inter alia upon the distribution of income and employment 
opportunities between industries within the modern sector, upon 
land reforms in the traditional agricultural sector, and so on. 
These and other issues are considered later. Although it would 
add little to the thesis to examine each case study in detail, 
some pertinent remarks on these studies are found in the 
literature survey by Cline (1975).
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demographic changes, shifts in the structure of production within 
the modern sector, and changes in labour force characteristics 
such as the distribution of education and skills. These influences 
will be treated in more detail in the next Chapter.
There are two features of this recent research which are 
particularly important for the purposes of my study. The first 
concerns the wide variability in income distribution patterns 
across countries which the inverted-U hypothesis alone does not 
explain, but which may be better explained with additional 
reference to the many other relationships which have been found to 
be important. In seeking to account for this observed variability 
using multiple regression analysis, this study is similar in 
method to that by Ahluwalia (1976), although there are some 
important differences in the results. Each of the literature 
surveys by Reder (1969), Cline (1975) and Sahota (1978) shows that 
no single adequate theoretical framework exists for analysing 
the relationship between economic growth and the distribution of 
income. Cline (1975) concludes that an eclectic approach to 
income distribution theory for developing countries is appropriate. 
In the absence of a properly integrated theoretical framework, it 
is necessary first of all, to consider certain very general 
specifications of relationships which have been shown to be 
important by various researchers, secondly to define measurable 
variables that represent these relationships, and thirdly to 
attempt to simplify the empirical data into sets of key relation­
ships which are manageable and which provide the basis for 
formulating more rigorous hypotheses. This is the main subject 
of Chapter 2.
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The second feature derives from the conclusion by Adelman 
and Morris (1973), and echoed in certain case studies (notably 
those for Brazil by Fishlow (1972) and Langoni (1973)), that not 
only does the relative position of the poorer groups tend to 
decline in the early and middle stages of growth, but their 
absolute position also tends to deteriorate as a direct consequence 
of a complex of structural changes that typically accompany 
economic growth. Adelman and Morris further concluded that there 
is neither an automatic nor even a likely trickling down of the 
benefits of economic growth to the poorest groups in developing 
countries, and that only for the most socio-economically advanced 
of these countries was the reduction in inequality from the 
expected inverted-U-pattern significant. Paukert (1973) has noted 
that the particular method of analysis of variance used by 
Adelman and Morris is not appropriate for analysing a non-linear 
relationship between income inequality and the level of economic 
development because it is aimed at assessing only the relative 
importance of several different factors influencing inter-country 
differences in income distribution. Cline (1975) has similarly 
criticised the Adelman-Morris study because of their "indirect 
and misleading" methodology. He noted that a more direct test of 
the hypothesis would consider the regressions reported by Adelman 
and Morris in an appendix to their book, none of which shows a 
statistically significant decline in absolute income level for the 
poorest groups as per capita national income rises. Therefore 
it is important to re-examine the available evidence on the 
relationship between inequality and the complex of structural 
changes that are typically associated with economic development.
7.
The use of cross-section data for these purposes is dictated 
by the lack of sufficient time-series data on income distribution 
in developing countries. This may seem to imply a belief that 
valuable generalisations can be derived from a dynamic interpret­
ation of cross-section results: that is, in the process of 
growth, a typical developing country will share characteristics 
with other countries at similar successive levels of development. 
However, in order to avoid any excessively deterministic set of 
presumptions it must be stressed that the generalisations which 
are discussed in this chapter and the next should be regarded as 
hypotheses that merit further investigation in the context of 
individual country experiences. While the cross-section results 
show relationships which are important for developing countries 
in general, particular results will have different degrees of 
importance in different countries depending on the circumstances 
of those individual countries.
Another difficulty arising from the lack of adequate time- 
series data on income distribution (as well as some cross-section 
data) can be described by drawing a distinction between, on one 
hand, those changes in the size distribution of income which can 
properly be attributed to shifts in the production structure that 
typically accompany the economic growth process in developing 
countries (say, over the past generation), and on the other hand, 
those characteristics which are more appropriately attributable to 
the organisation of institutional arrangements in developing 
countries and to their historically determined patterns of wealth
8.
distribution and relative factor endowments.3 Clearly the latter 
are important considerations in discussions of income inequality.
For example, Chenery et. al. (1975) have designed a model to 
consider how both the lack of access to income-earning opportunities 
and the lack of physical and human capital prevent the poorest 
groups in developing countries from participating fully in the 
growth process. Because of lack of data, however, it was not 
possible in this study to consider variables relating to the 
organisation of institutional relationships or the distribution of 
income-generating capital. Accordingly the analysis concentrates 
upon changes in income distribution associated with shifts in the 
structure of production in the course of economic growth.
1.2 Income distribution data
The recent publication of a compendium of income distribution 
estimates for eighty-one countries by Jain (1975) provides an 
opportunity to examine international variations in income 
inequality and to evaluate the hypothesis of a systematic 
relationship between the distribution of income and forces which 
typically accompany economic growth. It is necessary first of all 
to mention the caveats on the quality and comparability of such 
data. These problems are discussed by several researchers in this 
field (Kravis (1960), Kuznets (1963), Oshima (1970), Jain (1975), 
Ahluwalia (1976)) but usually very little is done about them.
3 This distinction is made most succinctly by Sundrum (1974), but 
was touched on by Kuznets (1963) in the introduction to his 
paper. It may be noted at this point that the paper by 
Sundrum (1974) was very illuminating as a reference for 
organising the aspects of inequality which are relevant to 
this study.
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It is often suggested that sample surveys from which income 
distribution data are drawn may be designed on the basis of an 
inadequate sampling frame. For example, if the most recent 
national census is ten years old and there has been substantial 
internal migration in the interim period, then a survey designed 
on the basis of the census will not reflect the true population 
distribution. The concept of "income" is itself difficult to 
define and measure, since high income groups typically understate 
their true income because of fears of tax liabilities, and low 
income groups in developing countries typically produce much of 
their own consumption which is difficult to value. Further, 
different groups often face different prices for purchased 
commodities so that money income differentials do not accurately 
reflect real income differentials. Different surveys solicit 
information on the basis of a number of alternative accounting 
units including, for example, households, income recipients, 
members of the economically active population, and so on. There 
are important problems of portability of such definitions across 
national borders. Clearly the concept of a "household" is very 
different in developed countries from the appropriate concept of 
"household" in developing countries. Similarly the difficulties of 
conceptualising and enumerating the "economically active population" 
in developing countries are attested by the vast literature on 
the subject.
In the compilation of income distribution estimates used as 
source data for this study (Jain (1975)) the unit of account varies 
from survey to survey and from country to country. At first a 
group of thirty-five countries was selected based on the "household"
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as the unit of account, and twenty-six countries with distributions 
based on "income recipients" - a total of sixty-one country income 
distributions. Of these, twelve countries had data based on both 
units of account, and so the distributions for these countries 
which permitted the least unexplained variation in the preliminary 
regression runs (the basis of Chapter 2) were accepted: six were 
accepted from each unit of account. A further six countries were 
excluded because comparable data to measure the other variables in 
the study (as discussed in Chapter 2) were not available. The 
final sample thus consisted of forty-three countries - thirty 
developing countries and thirteen developed countries.
It was found that the range of values of each decile income 
share was larger for income-recipient-based-distributions than for 
household-based-distributions. It was also found that the mean 
income share of the richest decile was larger (and the mean income 
share of the lower deciles correspondingly smaller) for income- 
recipient-based-distributions than for household-based-distributions. 
The sources of these differences can be explained by the occurrence 
of more than one "income recipient" in many of the "households" 
at the low end of the income scale which would, ceteris paribus, 
tend to even out the degree of inequality otherwise observed on 
the basis of individual income earners. These differences have 
been consistently ignored by other researchers in this field and 
no attempt was made to improve the comparability of the 
distributions on these grounds. This may be justified by 
recalling that the definitions of a "household" and of an "income 
recipient" themselves vary from country to country, and from 
time to time within any given country. Correcting the raw data
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for such variations would be impracticable. Moreover, anv 
additional precision gained by considering only those distributions 
based nominally upon one particular unit of account would be 
trivial under such circumstances, and may even jeopardise the 
drawing of statistical inferences by reducing the sample size.
It was decided, therefore, to make cautious use of the available 
data.
There were also more fundamental welfare implications 
involved in drawing international comparisons of income inequality. 
For example, it is possible that two Lorenz curves for two 
different countries may cross one another, yet still give the 
same value of the Gini index: one curve is closer to the 
egalitarian line at the low end of the income scale, and the 
other is closer to the egalitarian line at the high end of the 
income scale.4 The difficulty in this problem is reduced in this 
chapter and the next by considering explicitly the different 
groupings that comprise the income scale (low, middle and high 
income groups), and not an aggregative index of inequality.
The thirty developing countries and thirteen developed 
countries chosen for the sample are ranked in Table 1.1 by the 
level of per capita gross domestic income in the year of the 
given distribution survey. Gross domestic income (GDY) is a 
national accounting aggregate taken from the World Bank (1976).
It is based upon the more familiar gross domestic product (GDP) in
4 This problem is discussed in Atkinson (1970), and is the subject 
of a later chapter in the dissertation, where it is discussed in 
terms of the relative aversion from inequality of a nation-state 
and the relative weights attached to equal absolute income 
transfers at different ends of the income scale.
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TABLE 1.1
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME FOR 43 COUNTRIES RANKED BY PER CAPITA 
GROSS DOMESTIC INCOME* IN THE YEAR OF THE DISTRIBUTION SURVEY
PER PER
CAPIT* CAPIT** LOW LOW MID TOP GINI
GDY $ GDP $ 20% 40% 40% 20% RATIO
COUNTRY (YEAR) 
Under $200
Indonesia (1971) 64 250 6..8 17..3 30.,7 52.,0 .4625
Malawi (1969) 66 157 5. 7 15..0 32..1 52.,9 .4696
Bangladesh (1967) 84 - 7.9 19,.6 38..1 42.,3 .3420
Tanzania (1967) 87 157 5..1 13..5 30..8 55.,7 .5033
India (1964) 87 308 5.,5 15..5 32..6 51.,9 .4668
Sri Lanka (1970) 92 378 6.,9 17..8 37..3 44..9 .3771
Thailand (1962) 121 278 5. 7 13..2 29..3 57.,5 .5103
Kenya (1969) 131 385 3..9 9..5 23..6 66..9 .6368
Pakistan (1970) 151 361 8..0 20..2 38..0 41..8 .3362
Egypt (1965) 198 581 4..6 14..1 37..5 48..4 .4337
Group I Average: 108 317 ■1 15..6 33..0 51..4 .4538
$201-$400
Rep. Korea (1970) 229 1018 7..1 17..7 37,.8 44..5 .3719
Philippines (1971) 238 520 3..9 11..9 34..1 54..0 .4941
Tunisia (1970) 264 320 4..2 11..4 33,.1 55,.5 .5019
Honduras (1968) 270 444 1 . 6 6,.4 28..3 65..3 .6188
Ivory Coast (1970) 294 340 3..9 10,.6 30,.9 58,.5 .5342
Colombia (1970) 332 755 2..9 10..0 30,.5 59,.5 .5615
Fiji (1968) 336 668 4..0 12,.1 35,.5 52,.4 .4600
Malaysia (1970) 353 692 3..3 11,.3 33,.5 55..2 .5131
Turkey (1968) 362 763 2..9 9,.4 30,.0 60,.6 .5679
Brazil (1970) 396 800 2..8 8,.1 24,.6 67,.3 .6465
Group II Average: 308 632 3. 10,,9 31..8 57,.3 .5270
$401-$1000
Costa Rica (1971) 507 838 5,.4 14,.6 35,.0 50,.4 .4445
Mexico (1969) 594 1158 4..2 10,.2 26..6 63,.2 .5827
Gabon (1968) 598 791 3.,2 8,.5 24,.0 67,.5 .6439
Chile (1968) 662 1265 4.,8 13,.0 31,.2 55,.8 .5065
Barbados (1970) 666 1110 6..8 18..6 37,.4 44..0 .3690
Uruguay (1967) 683 1465 4..4 14,.2 38,.3 47..5 .4279
Panama (1970) 693 952 4..1 13,.8 36..9 49..3 .4483
Spain (1965) 706 1280 6.,0 16,.5 38,.0 45,,5 .3930
Argentina (1961) 781 1586 5.,1 14,.4 31,.4 53..9 .4895
Venezuela (1962) 943 1679 3..3 9,.6 31,.4 59,.0 .5445
Group III Average: 683 1212 4. 13,.3 33,.0 53,.6 74850
Over $1000
Finland (1962) 1520 2334 2,.7 11,.7 37,.9 50,.4 .4729
Netherlands (1967) 1891 3161 4,.0 13,.7 37 .0 49,.3 .4493
Norway (1963) 1911 2631 4,.7 17 .1 41 .9 41,.0 .3622
U.K. (1968) 1949 3592 6 .6 18,.5 41 .2 40 .3 .3385
Japan (1972) 1950 2619 8 .2 20 .9 39,.8 39,.3 .3106
France (1962) 1955 2449 2,.3 10,.0 35 .3 54 .7 .5176
New Zealand (1970) 2060 3133 4,.9 16 .7 41,.3 42 .0 .3708
Australia (1968) 2254 3837 7..1 20 .0 41 .1 38 .9 .3185
Denmark (1966) 2462 3306 5 .4 16 .9 40,.9 42 .2 .3673
F.R. Germany (1970) 2574 3255 5,.9 16 .4 38 .0 45 .6 .3939
Canada (1965) 2902 4179 6,.7 19 .0 41 .0 40 .0 .3333
Sweden (1970) 3737 4006 5,.2 16 .2 39,.7 44 .1 .3872
U.S.A. (1970) 4428 5411 4,.8 15,.3 38 .9 45 .8 .4074
Group IV Average: 2430 3378 5,.3 16 .3 39 .5 44,.1 .3869
Source: Income shares for various percentiles are derived from Jain 
with the exception of Fiji (1968) for which data is derived from a Lorenz 
curve fitted to data from M. Ward The Role of Investment in the Development 
of Fiji, Cambridge U.P., 1971. The Lorenz curve for Fiji was estimated 
using the same technique as Jain uses (Kakwani-Podder method).
*Gross domestic income in $US (1967-69 prices). Conversion by exchange rates 
from World Tables 1976
**GDP predicted by physical indicators correlated with real per capita 
product estimates obtained by repricing.
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national currency units, converted into U.S. dollars using official 
exchange rates, corrected for variations in the terms of trade, 
and expressed in constant prices of 1967-69. The second column of 
figures in Table 1.1 shows estimates of real per capita GDP which 
were obtained using a technique described in the Appendix to this 
chapter. These figures are used in Chapter 2 to test the 
sensitivity of the results to an alternative specification of 
per capita purchasing power. The remaining columns in Table 1.1 
summarise relevant information on income distribution. The shares 
of income accruing to the poorest 20% of income earners (i.e. the 
ninth and tenth deciles of the income distribution), the poorest 
40% (i.e. the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth deciles), the 
middle 40% (here taken to be the third, fourth, fifth and sixth 
deciles), and the richest 20% (i.e. the first and second deciles) 
of the income scale for each country are shown. The Gini ratio is 
also listed as a summary indicator of the overall degree of 
inequality, but this is for illustrative purposes only and does 
not enter the analysis later on. As is well known by researchers 
using Lorenz curves, it is difficult to measure sufficient 
variation in the income share of the poorest decile in an income 
distribution. Analysing variations in the income share of the 
poorest quintile is as close as we can come for providing 
generalisations about those experiencing worst poverty. There is 
considerable variation at the top end of the distribution scale 
(say, for the richest 5% of income recipients), but consideration 
of the richest 20% is sufficient for present purposes.
The ll-pattern of inequality variation in the course of 
development, postulated by Kuznets, may be revealed by dividing
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the developing countries in Table 1.1 into three groups of ten 
countries each (by per capita gross domestic income:- under $200, 
$201-$400, $401-$1000), and letting the developed countries form 
a fourth group, and then calculating the unweighted group averages 
of each income share column. In particular the information in 
Table 1.1 shows :
(1) The income shares accruing to the richest percentiles of the 
population confirm Kuznets' hypothesis that the ineguality 
in less developed countries is primarily associated with 
concentration of income in the hands of the rich. For 
example, the top 20% of the population in very low income 
countries (group 1) typically receive about 50% of the 
national income.
In group II countries the richest quintile accounts for 
much more than 50% and typically as much as 60% of income.
For group III countries the average share of the top 
quintile is still high at about 54%. The average for the 
developed countries of group IV is 44% and for some of these 
the top quintile receives less than 40% of national income.
(2) This pattern is mirror-reversed when one considers the 
lowest percentiles of the distributions. For example, the 
lowest 40% of income earners receive on average 15.6% of 
income in group I countries, 10.9% in group II, 13.3% in 
group III, and 16.3% in group IV. Kuznets, however, thought 
that there was not much difference in relative income shares 
at the low end of the scale, and the information in Table 1.1 
would appear to be at variance with this. Rather it would 
seem to be the case that both the high and the low income 
groups conform to the U-pattern of change overall.
(3) The group averages for the share of the middle 40% of income 
recipients in Table l.T confirm Kuznets' findings of no 
significant difference for the developing countries at either 
early or middle levels of development. Typically the middle 
40% accounts for only 30% of the total income in developing 
countries, but for very close to 40% of total income in the 
developed countries.
The overall patterns evident in Table 1.1 should not be 
permitted to distract our attention from the wide variations in 
inequality between countries at similar levels of development.
For instance, within group I, contrast the extremely high degree 
of inequality of Kenya and Tanzania on one hand, with the low 
inequality of Pakistan and Sri Lanka on the other. South Korea 
appears to be very much out of place in group II, and among 
developing countries generally, with her remarkably low degree of 
inequality. Conversely, France appears to be an exception in 
group IV with her relatively high degree of inequality. The 
inverted-U-pattern does not explain all of the variation in the 
degree of inequality occurring during the course of economic 
development. The following chapter assesses the relative strength 
of additional aspects of the nexus between income distribution 
and development.
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APPENDIX: Per capita income comparisons: '
In the previous section it was noted that the measurement 
error associated with international comparisons of economic 
phenomena is not trivial and that most researchers simply state 
the appropriate caveats on their results in view of this problem.
It has been noted in section 1.1 that the U-shaped relationship 
between inequality and economic development is widely acknowledged, 
and the level of per capita income is often taken as a fair 
indicator of the level of development of a country. It is 
therefore necessary to take the problems associated with 
international comparisons of per capita income levels very 
seriously. In particular the conversion of per capita GDP by 
official exchange rates has been criticised as methodologically 
unsound for certain purposes (Barlow (1977)). Fortunately it is 
possible to consider the sensitivity of the results presented below 
to different estimates of per capita income.
Conceptually the best method for comparing real per capita 
product levels in different countries is the technique of 
repricing developed by Gilbert and Kravis (1954) and Kravis (1976). 
Because of the extensive work required in the collection of data, 
repricing estimates are not available for most countries.
Beckerman and Bacon (1966) have shown that very high cross-section 
correlations may be obtained between repricing estimates of real 
per capita product on one hand, and various non-monetary 
indicators of output on the other (e.g. energy consumption, cement 
production). The regression equations based on such physical 
indicators may then be used to predict real per capita product for 
those countries and years for which the repricing estimate is not 
available. This approach has been shown by Barlow (1977) to be a
17.
desirable "second-best" procedure and unbiased as compared with 
exchange conversion. Barlow showed that GDP conversions lo U.S. 
dollars using official exchange rates are almost always less than 
the appropriate repricing estimates, and that the mean error of 
estimation using exchange conversion is twenty-five percent.
On the other hand, as regards the predicted real output from 
physical indicators, half of those estimates were above the 
appropriate repricing estimate and half were below it, with a 
mean absolute error of sixteen percent.
Those countries for which comparable repricing estimates of 
real per capita GDP are available for 1970 are listed in Table A.l. 
The indices (U.S.A. = 100) shown for the developed countries and 
for India and Kenya are given by Kravis (1976). The inclusion of 
the indices for the Latin American countries provided by 
Salazar-Carillo (1977) means that the data are more representative 
of the complete income range than were any earlier studies based 
only on developed countries.
Table A.2 lists a selection of non-monetary indicators which 
have been used as explanatory variables in a regression analysis 
using repricing GDP estimates as the dependent variable. The 
first six physical indicators are flow variables and the remainder 
are stock variables. Ordinary least squares regressions were 
calculated for many different combinations of the physical 
indicators, in a search for that combination leaving the least 
unexplained variation in real per capita GDP data listed in 
Table A.l (i.e. maximum adjusted R2) but subject to the condition 
that the regression coefficients be statistically significant 
at the 5% level. Both the linear and the double-logarithmic 
(constant elasticity) functional forms were tested.
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TABLE A.1
REAL PER CAPITA PRODUCT FOR 21 COUNTRIES (1970) 
ESTIMATED BY REPRICING (INDEX: U.S.A. = 100)





















West Germany 75 3659
United States 100 4878
Sources: Kravis (1976), Salazar-Carillo 0977)
TABLE A.2
LIST OF NON-MONETARY INDICATORS USED AS EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
IN REGRESSIONS ON REAL PER CAPITA PRODUCT ESTIMATES OBTAINED 
BY REPRICING (21 COUNTRIES, 1970)
XI Per capita energy consumption in kilograms of coal equivalent per year
X2 " H protein supply in grams per day
X3 II II electricity consumption in kilowatt hours per year
X4 1 " newsprint consumption in kilograms per year
X5 H " steel consumption in kilograms per year
X6 " 1 cement production in tonnes per year
X7 Per 1000 population - number of doctors
X8 1 " " number of hospital beds
X9 1 II " number of radio receivers
X10 " II " number of passenger cars
Xll 1 II " number of telephones
X12 " " " number of commercial vehicles
X13 II " number of motor vehicles (X10 + X12)
Data Sources: World Bank (1976)
Note: XI and X3 were not both included in the same test equation; similarly 
X7 and X8; similarly X10, X12, X13.
TABLE A.3
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR PHYSICAL INDICATORS OF GDP 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: REAL PER CAPITA PRODUCT ESTIMATED
BY REPRICING (21 COUNTRIES; 1970)
4(a) Linear form - standardised coefficients only (R2 )
GDP = 0.450X1 + 0.203X2 + 0.421X5 (.959)
(5.2) (3.4) (4.8)
GDP = 0.222X2 + 0.347X4 + 0.508X5 (.941)
(3.1) (3.7) (5.2)
4(b) Double logarithmic form - standardised coefficients only (R2 )
log GDP = 0.1951ogX2 + 0.5751ogX4 + 0.2921og X5 (.948)
(2.7) (5.6) (3.3)
log GDP = 0.6231ogX1 + 0.1361ogX2 + 0.2731ogX4 (.970)
(5.6) (2.4) (2.5)
Note: t =0.05 (17 d.f.) = 1 .74
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The most satisfactory predictors of real per capita product 
for the twenty-one countries listed in Table A.l were XI (energy 
consumption), X2 (protein supply), X4 (newsprint consumption) and 
X5 (steel consumption). That is to say, these variables taken 
together in certain combinations provided statistically significant 
regression coefficients and least unexplained variation in the 
dependent variable. The best regression results are shown in 
Table A.3. Only standardised regression coefficients (sometimes 
called "beta weights") are shown with their associated t values 
in brackets underneath. Beta weights facilitate the comparison of 
the effects of variables that have different units of measurement 
(e.g. kilograms per year, grams per day). Regression results that 
are not statistically significant are not reported here, neither 
are they reported in Chapter 2 unless the qualitative 
interpretation of the relationships is altered. Note that the 
intercept term in equations expressed in standardised coefficients 
is redundant, although the unstandardised regression coefficients 
with the intercept term were used to calculate predicted real 
per capita income. The last equation in Table A.3, the double 
logarithmic form using XI, X2 and X4 (energy consumption, protein 
supply, and newsprint consumption) as explanatory variables, was 
the equation used to calculate real per capita product estimates 
for the forty-two countries shown in the second column of Table 1.1. 
These estimates were in turn used as an alternative approximation 
of GDP to the estimates obtained by official exchange conversions 
in regressions on income shares (Chapter 2).
The above procedure does not remove all of the measurement 
error associated with estimates of per capita income levels.
The conceptual problems, sampling problems and response problems
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mentioned in section 1.2 remain as caveats on the data. If the 
appropriate repricing estimates of real per capita GDP were 
available for all countries and for each year then the known 
downward bias introduced into international comparisons of per 
capita GDP by official exchange rate conversion to U.S. dollars 
could be removed. However, in the absence of the appropriate 
repricing estimates of real per capita GDP, the above procedure is 
an apparently acceptable and desirable "second best" approach to 
removing some of the error of international comparisons using 
exchange rate conversion. The high adjusted R2 (0.970), and the 
satisfactory statistical significance of the coefficients in the 
predicting equation in Table A.3, are indeed encouraging in this 
respect.
It will be shown later that the regression results explaining 
variation in income shares (Chapter 2) are not greatly affected by 
using alternative estimates of real per capita income (and also of 
the growth rate of per capita income). It will then be argued that 
the use of the procedure outlined in this Appendix as a sensitivity 
test on the regression results is justified by reducing the force 
of criticism directed at the database of this study.
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CHAPTER 2
Econometric Analysis of International Variations in 
Income Distribution 
2.1 Selection of variables
In the previous chapter it was shown that there is a 
considerable amount of variation between countries in observed 
income inequality. It is possible to account for a large 
proportion of this variation using multivariate techniques with 
variables chosen to reflect aspects of the inequality problem 
about which economists have speculated in recent years. In addition 
to the inverted-U hypothesis, these include the effects of 
demographic transition, changes in the pattern of education, and 
shifts in the structure of employment and production associated 
with dualism. 1 The selected variables are shown in italics in this 
section and are listed on the left of Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
The level of development can be approximated in a global sense 
by the logarithm of real per capita income, with a quadratic term 
in this variable being introduced to accommodate the inverted-U 
hypothesis. The logarithmic transformation implies the additional 
hypothesis that increments of income share accruing to a particular 
group are linearly related to successive proportional increases in 
per capita income, not to absolute dollar increases in average 
income level. It thus serves also to collapse the high range of 
incomes in the sample, which includes developed countries with 
nominal per capita incomes twenty times as high as the low income 
countries.
1 These aspects of income inequality in developing countries are 
discussed succinctly by Sundrum (1974). A more detailed 
appreciation of their effects in particular circumstances has been 
gleaned from examination of the case studies listed in Chapter 1 , 
as well as other references cited there.
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The rate of growth of real per capita income over the ten 
gears preceeding each country's income distribution observation
is included as an explanatory variable in the regressions, in 
order to indicate whether the speed of growth (as opposed to the 
level of development) has any significant effect on observed 
inequality. In the regressions using the level of per capita 
income estimated by exchange rate conversion (that is, 
equations (a), (b), (d) and (e) in each of Tables 2.3-2.6), the 
ten-year growth rate variable was calculated as the average annual 
growth of real per capita gross domestic income in 1967-69 prices 
by exchange rate conversion. However, in those equations using real 
per capita income predicted from physical indicators (that is, 
equations (c) and (f) in each of Tables 2.3-2.6) the ten-year 
growth rate variable was calculated from real per capita GDP series 
in the currency of each country. This provides an additional test 
of sensitivity to alternative data specifications which is 
consistent with the alternative estimates of the level of real 
per capita income as discussed in the Appendix to Chapter 1.
It should also be noted that since income distribution observations 
are recorded for different years for different countries in the 
sample, the fixed ten-year growth effect will be complicated by 
a variety of international cyclical effects for different 
countries.
Two other variables were included in view of the importance 
of the processes of saving and capital accumulation to economic 
growth as noted in Chapter 1. These were the investment rate, 
calculated as the share in GDP of gross domestic investment 
averaged over the period 1965-1973, and the savings rate, 
calculated as the national average savings rate in the year of
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the distribution survey.
Demographic influences would also seem to be important in 
discussions of income inequality. The aggregate growth rate of 
total population should be positively associated with increased 
inequality because a higher rate of growth of the labour force 
implies a slower rise (or even a decline) in the productivity of 
labour, the most important income source for low income groups 
that typically own little capital. It has also been suggested 
that the "demographic transition" in the course of development 
affects different groups at different stages. In particular, 
reduced birth rates occur last in poorest groups of the population, 
so that income per capita in poor households responds very slowly 
to income transfers to such households because of population 
pressure. High dependency ratios also have implications for the 
sources of national savings and for capital accumulation. When 
high birth rates result in a relatively large proportion of the 
population being too young to join the workforce, the labour income 
accruing directly to the services of the working-age population 
must satisfy higher aggregate consumption than otherwise. If this 
effect falls more than proportionately upon the low income groups, 
their potential for accumulation of assets to raise their income 
level would be reduced, thus perpetuating a large degree of 
inequality. The demographic variables used in the analysis are 
the population growth rate, the crude birth rate, and the 
non-working-age population as a proportion of total population
(i.e. population aged 0-15 years and over 65 years), all estimated 
for the year of the income distribution survey.
Education, on the other hand, is expected to have implications 
for inequality almost diametrically opposed to those of population
2 4 .
growth. In particular the extent and quality of education is an 
important determinant of the skills in the workforce. Greater 
access to education is expected to reduce those income differentials 
that derive from skill differentials (i.e. within labour's share 
of national income), as well as improving overall labour 
productivity and the total wage share of national income (which 
is more evenly distributed than capital income). Data on the 
educational attainments of the working age population are not 
readily available except for estimates of the adult literacy rate. 
Two other education related variables, current primary school 
enrolment ratio, and secondary school enrolment ratio, are 
introduced as indicators of the ease of access to education at 
the respective levels in each country.
Several variables reflecting different aspects of the 
production structure were also considered. The income distribution 
within the agricultural sector is generally thought to be more 
egalitarian than that in the non-agricultural sector. Since the 
nationwide distribution is a composite of both these sectoral 
distributions, variations in the relative share of agricultural 
output in gross domestic product might be expected to account for 
some of the variation in inequality in the sample. This variable 
is averaged over the period 1968-1973. Other relevant aspects of 
dualism are measured by the proportion of total population living 
in urban areas, and the share of total workforce engaged in 
agriculture, both estimated in the year of the distribution survey. 
If the government sector is a significant contributor to total 
current consumption expenditure, this is likely to reflect high 
levels of social services, education and public health funding, 
which might tend to promote lower inequality. A suitable indicator
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of the extent of government activity in the economy is the share of 
government sector final consumption expenditure in GDP, averaged 
over the period 1965-1973. Finally, many developing economies are 
dominated by a few primary exporting industries. This aspect of 
production structure is estimated for the sample by the product of 
two ratios: the share of GDP accounted for by commodity exports, 
and the share of total commodity exports accounted for by the 
largest three export items. This gives a measure of the extent to 
which a developing economy is dominated by the commodity 
concentration of a country's exports, and is averaged over the 
period 1965-1973.
2.2 Factor Analysis
Like multiple regression analysis, factor analysis begins 
with the computation of a matrix of correlation coefficients for 
the set of variables considered relevant to the study. 2 However, 
there is no "dependent variable" or "explanatory variables" in 
a factor analysis - the correlations between variables are simply 
interpreted as associations without specifying the direction of 
causation. Accordingly, the income distribution shares accruing 
to different groups are not included in the factor analysis 
because it is variations in these that are to be "explained".
2 This section discusses the approach of factor analysis in some 
detail, particularly as compared with regression analysis, 
because economists typically are unfamiliar with factor analysis 
and the results of this section depend on an appreciation of 
its methodological purpose. It is assumed that no such 
discussion is necessary for regression analysis.
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Two factor analyses were conducted, one for the sample of thirty 
developing countries, and the other for the combined sample of 
forty-three developing and advanced countries. The results are 
shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 respectively.
Initial factors were extracted using the principal factoring 
method with iteration. This involves "reducing" the set of 
relevant variables to a smaller set of independent factors by 
replacing the main diagonal of the correlation matrix with 
estimates of the proportion of total common variance in the 
sample accounted for by each variable. That is, we assume that 
only some portion of a variable is involved in the patterning of 
variables into the common factors, and that if we remove the 
common source of variation the remaining correlations between 
variables will vanish. The estimates of common variance accounted 
for are known as the "communality" of a variable (analogous to R2 
in regression analysis) and may be improved upon by an iterative 
process before the extraction of principal factors. The "factors" 
may therefore be interpreted as "source variables" accounting for 
many of the observed inter-relations in the data.
The relative importance of each factor may be ascertained
by adding up the squared factor loadings of each variable and
dividing by the number of variables. This gives the proportion
of total variance in the sample accounted for by each respective
factor. 3 The criterion adopted for selecting the number of
3 Since all the variables are normalised in computations, the 
variance of each variable is one. Thus the total variance in 
the data equals the number of variables in the set. The 
variance accounted for by each factor is the sum of squared 
factor loadings in the initial factor matrix (equal to the 
respective eigenvalues of the vector factor). Thus the 
proportion of total variance accounted for by each factor is 
obtained by dividing its eigenvalue by the number of variables.
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TABLE 2.1
FACTOR ANALYSIS (30 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES)
PRINCIPAL FACTORS VARIMAX ROTATED FACTORS COMM
FI F2 F3 F4 FI F2 F3 F4 hi*
Log of per cap. income .90 .30 .07 .01 -.12 .42 .28 .900
Urban population .70 .36 -.56 -.10 .77 .00 .19 O s T .937
Agric. workforce -.89 .07 .27 -.25 -.95 .21 .02 T S F .938
Agric. value added -.87 -.28 -.07 .00 -.77 .13 .41 -.26 .839
Primary enrolment .73 .14 .16 .01 .61 -.18 .39 .12 .570
Secondary enrolment .73 -.34 .04 .37 .72 -.30 .12 -.39 .777
Adult literacy rate .79 .03 -.20 .28 .86 -.09 .04 -.02 .748
Population growth -.40 .77 -.19 .23 T8t> .05 .31 .847
Crude birth rate -.82 .43 -.02 .03 rT65] .63 .12 .14 .864
Non-working age pop. -.60 .45 .04 .65 -.24 .92 .02 -.29 .992
Income growth 10 yrs. .30 .07 .49 -.05 .11 -.15 -.03 .341
Investment rate .32 .40 .55 -.04 .15 .09 .72 .15 .574
Savings rate .32 .58 -.03 -.46 .18 .03 r m .656
Export concentration .16 .16 .58 .02 .00 .00 rS7* .385
Govt, expenditure .10 -.15 .35 .26 .06 -.03 -.37 .221
%  of variance 41.6 14.7 13.1 3.5
Cumulative %  var. 41.6 56.3 69.3 77.8
TABLE 2.2
FACTOR ANALYSIS (43 COUNTRIES DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING)
PRINCIPAL FACTORS VARIMAX ROTATED FACTORS COMM
FI F2 F3 F4 FI F2 F3 F4 hi2
Log of per cap. income .95 .00 .14 .10 .82 -.40 .34 -.04 .939
Urban population .75 -.20 .44 -.18 .85 -.06 .08 -.31 .837
Agric. workforce -.93 .25 -.17 -.07 -.85 .44 -.10 .14 ‘ .955
Agric. value added -.91 -.04 -.22 -.17 -.84 .32 -.31 -.05 .911
Primary enrolment .64 .14 .18 .29 .61 -.21 .27 .24 .545
Secondary enrolment .88 -.14 -.13 -.01 .60 K 5 9 J .26 -.20 .819
Adult literacy rate .83 -.09 .20 .02 .77 -.30 .21 -.12 .746
Population growth -.71 .17 .59 -.04 -.20 T S F -.26 .18 .833
Crude birth rate -.94 .15 .23 -.05 .70 -.28 .16 .956
Non-working age pop. -.85 .01 .30 .18 -.43 .61 -.44 .32 .844
Income growth 10 yrs. .36 .47 -.21 -.05 .05 .04 .392
Investment rate .59 .74 -.05 -.10 .28 -.06 .91 .07 .909
Savings rate .68 .40 .11 -.27 .48 -.05 .66 -.21 .713
Export concentration -.25 .36 .04 .68 -.13 .09 I -79Ì .648
Govt, expenditure .32 -.22 -.19 .40 .21 -.49 -.12 T 7 T .347
%  of variance 56.2 10.7 8.7 8.0
Cumulative %  var. 56.2 66.8 75.6 83.5
factors to be extracted was that each principal factor account 
for at least as much of the variance as one variable, in this 
case 6 .6 6 % . In Table 2.1 the first factor FI accounts for 41.6% of 
total variance, the second factor F2 for 14.7%, the third factor 
F3 for 13.1% and the fourth factor F4 accounts for only 8.5% of the 
variance. Together the four principal factors in Table 2.1 account 
for almost 78% of the total variance in the data for the developing
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countries. On the other hand, in Table 2.2, the four principal 
factors account for 83.5% of the total variance in the data on the 
same variables for the combined sample of developed and developing 
countries. The first principal factor FI accounts for 56% of the 
total variance alone, with the other three factors contributing 
11%, 9% and 8% respectively.
However, these principal factors alone are rarely useful in 
the search for a simpler structure with which to interpret the 
observed variability in the data. To this end the factors are 
rotated into a terminal solution. The rotated factor matrices 
shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 are mathematically equivalent to their 
corresponding principal factors, but they provide a solution which 
is much more informative. There are several methods of rotation 
which may be used. The most appropriate for present purposes 
(and also the most widely used) is called "varimax" rotation.
This method emphasises the simplification of the description of a 
factor in terms of the original variables so that the rotated 
factors are statistically independent of one another (i.e. there 
is no problem of multicollinearity among the rotated factors).
The factor loadings in a varimax rotated factor matrix are 
the correlation coefficients between each variable and each factor, 
and can be used to describe the composition of each variable in 
terms of the hypothetical factors. For example, referring to 
Table 2.1, the communality (ĥ -2) of the variable logarithm of per 
capita income is the sum of the squared factor loadings.
h2 (log per cap. income) = (.80)2 + (-.12)2
+ (.42)2 + (.28)2 = .900
(with small error due to rounding). The most important factor for
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this variable is Factor 1 which accounts for 64% of the variation 
in per capita income level in the sample of developing countries. 
The other factors are not regarded as significant for per capita 
income level since their factor loadings are less than .45 (they 
account for less than twenty percent of the variance of the 
variable). Each of the other variables may be interpreted 
similarly. Those that load significantly on only one factor are 
said to have a "factoral complexity of one" (i.e. they are 
regarded as being "factor pure"). However, the interpretation of 
variables that load significantly on more than one factor in a 
rotated solution is more complicated because such variables are 
regarded as measuring more than one theoretical dimension.
Since the direction of causation in a factor analysis is 
not specified, the factor loadings in a varimax rotated factor 
matrix may also be used to describe the composition of each (as 
yet unnamed) factor in terms of the variables with which it 
associates significantly. In this respect the rotated factors 
in Table 2.1 are broadly similar to those in Table 2.2, although 
there are some differences in detail.
Thus, Factor 1 may be designated the "dualism and education 
factor" with strong negative factor loadings on the agricultural 
workforce and agricultural value added variables (alSO the 
crude birth rate - a complex variable) as well as strong positive 
factor loadings on the logarithm of per capita income, the urban 
population share, primary and secondary school enrolment rates 
and the adult literacy rate. This indicates that it is more 
difficult statistically to separate the effects of dualism from 
those of education than it is to separate (say) demographic 
influences or growth rate influences from either of the former two
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(although too much should not be made of this because the first 
factor tends to load heavily on several variables in any factor 
analysis).
Factor 2 is clearly interpreted as the "demographic factor", 
with high positive loadings on the population growth rate, the 
crude birth rate, and the non-working age population. For the 
case of Table 2.2 which includes developed countries, the emergence 
of the secondary school enrolment rate as a complex variable with 
a significant negative loading on the demographic factor may be 
explained with reference to the known effects of education in the 
spread of birth control programmes.
Factor 3 may be interpreted as the "growth factor" with 
significant positive loadings on the investment rate and on the 
income growth rate in both Tables 2.1 and 2.2. For the developing 
country case (Table 2.1), the export concentration ratio would 
appear to be significantly associated with the rate of economic 
growth; whereas in Table 2.2 including developed countries the 
export concentration ratio is relegated to the least important 
factor and the savings rate is associated significantly with the 
rates of investment and growth. Intuitive reasons for this switch 
are not difficult to construct, but once again too much should 
not be made of shifting coalitions of variables between minor 
factors. Government expenditure does not appear to be statistically 
significant in accounting for the variance in the data in Table 2.1. 
Its weak association in Table 2.2 with the demographic factor 
might be explained in terms of higher education and health 
funding in developed countries.
It is sometimes useful to extend this use of factor analysis 
by computing factor scores for each observation in the sample.
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The factor scores are composite variables which by definition are 
independent (not subject to problems of multi collinearity) and 
which may be used as explanatory variables in a regression 
analysis - in this case to predict changes in income shares 
accruing to different groups in the income distribution. This 
procedure yielded results which were generally not significant and 
which are not reported here. The reason for the poor results in 
the regressions using factor scores may be traced to the complexity 
of the varimax rotated factors shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. It is 
more useful to apply regression analysis to sets of well-defined 
variables, and this is done in the next section.
Statistically significant associations between particular 
variables may be deduced from judicious scanning of the correlation 
matrix. The use of factor analysis has strengthened our hand in 
this respect by establishing statistically the associations of 
certain variables into common factors in the development process, 
as well as establishing the statistical independence of some of 
these factors from the others. For instance, the influence of 
the rate of growth may be considered as being separable in a 
statistical sense from that of demographic transition in the 
course of development, and this in turn may be separable from the 
dualistic structure of production. The confidence with which the 
regression analysis is approached is in this respect considerably 
enhanced by the factor analysis results.
3 2 .
2.3 Multiple Regression Analysis 
2.3.1 Regressions for low income groups:
In this section the income shares accruing to the low income 
groups are treated as dependent variables whose variation across 
a sample of countries may be accounted for by particular 
explanatory variables chosen from the list in the previous section. 
Many of the variables used in the factor analysis are highly 
correlated, measuring aspects of the development process that 
typically go hand in hand. This is obvious for variables used to 
measure different aspects of the same factor. In order to reduce 
as much as possible the problems of multicollinearity in the 
explanatory variables, therefore, the first step is to select one 
variable to represent each of the key relationships previously 
identified (not necessarily one for each factor), and to find 
the combination which explains the maximum variation in the income 
shares for each group.
Five variables were found to be the most significant set for 
the poorest 20% and the poorest 40% (called LOW 20 and LOW 40, 
respectively, for convenience) - these were: the logarithm of 
per capita income, the proportion of workforce engaged in 
agriculture, the growth rate, the crude birth rate, and the 
primary school enrolment rate. The regression results for these 
five variables on each of the two low income groups are shown in 
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 respectively. In each equation shown in 
these tables the first row of coefficients are standardised 
coefficients (beta weights) which facilitate the comparison of 
variables with different units of measurement. Non-standardised 
regression coefficients are shown in the second row, with their 
associated t-values in brackets below them. The tables also
33.
show values for R2 (adjusted for degrees of freedom) and F-values 
for the equation as a whole on the right hand side. 4
Consider equations 3(a) and 4(a). These show the regression 
results of the five above mentioned explanatory variables on the 
income shares of the low income groups (LOW 20 and LOW 40 
respectively) for the sample of thirty developing countries from 
Table 1.1, where the logarithm of per capita income is computed 
from the exchange rate conversion to $U.S. of gross domestic 
income, and where the average annual growth rate is computed from 
a ten year series of gross domestic income by exchange conversion. 
Qualitatively the results shown in equations 3(a) and 4(a) are 
the same, with quantitative differences in the size of the 
standardised coefficients being quite small. Equations 3(a) and 
4(a) indicate that some 64°/ and 71% respectively of the variation 
in income shares LOW 20 and LOW 40 for the developing countries 
is accounted for by the five explanatory variables chosen. Each 
of the coefficients is statistically significant, with very strong 
negative influences exerted by the logarithm of per capita income 
(3 # -1.1 in both equations) and the agricultural workforce share 
(3 = -0.77 in equation 3(a) and 3 = -0.87 in equation 4(a)).
The crude birth rate and the primary school enrolment rate both 
exert equally strong negative influences as each other with beta 
weights on both variables being -0.34 in equation 3(a) on 
LOW 20, and -0.43 in equation 4(a) on LOW 40.
The negative coefficients on the logarithm of per capita 
income, agricultural workforce share, and crude birth rate,
4 The critical t-value from Student's t-distribution at the 5% 
level for (N-6 ) degrees of freedom is 1.71 for the sample of 
developing countries, and 1.69 for the combined sample (one- 
tail tests). The critical F-value for the equation as a whole 
at the 1% level for (k=5, N-k-1) degrees of freedom is 3.90 for 
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confirm the previous hypothesis that there are strong secular 
forces typical of the growth process in developing countries that 
tend to reduce the income shares of the poorer groups. The 
negative association Of the primary school enrolment rate with 
the income shares of the poor may be similarly interpreted since 
education is typically expanded in the course of development. An 
alternative hypothesis that is not inconsistent with the 
regression results is that, in developing countries, high primary 
school enrolment rates may generate (after a short lag) intense 
competition among young school leavers for modern sector jobs, 
even to the extent that school leavers are willing to be 
unemployed for long periods in the hope of getting a wage job in 
urban areas.
Finally, in equation 3(a) and 4(a), the speed of economic 
growth indicated by growth rate shows an important positive 
association with the income shares of the poor (3 = .43 for LOW 20, 
and 3 = .37 for LOW 40). These positive coefficients are 
statistically very significant and certainly do not support the 
hypothesis that rapid growth tends to make the poor both 
relatively and absolutely worse off by exacerbating the growth- 
related influences. On the contrary, the speed of these changes 
would appear to provide a useful parameter for policy 
manipulation in order to generate resources for redistribution 
towards the low income groups. An alternative interpretation may 
be that those underdeveloped countries in the sample which do have 
relatively low degrees of inequality also happen to have 
experienced rapid growth. In either case, the regression results 
indicate that rapid growth in the short term, as contrasted with 
factors that typically accompany secular development, is not in
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itself inimical to raising the income shares of the poorer groups.
It was not possible to improve the adjusted R2 for either of 
these equations representing the poorest 20% and poorest 40% of 
income recipients by adding variables from the list used in the 
factor analysis. The other variables introduced in test runs had 
low beta weights and were quite insignificant. Moreover, there 
was no variation in qualitative interpretation of the results of 
equations 3(a) and 4(a) in such tests. 5
In equations 3(b) and 4(b), a quadratic term in per capita 
income is added to test the inverted-U hypothesis for the sample 
of thirty developing countries. Although the sign on the 
quadratic term is positive, it is not statistically significant. 
There is a change in the coefficient on the "linear" term in 
income from the corresponding equations 3(a) and 4(a), which is to 
be expected because of the high collinearity between it and the 
introduced quadratic term. However, the size and significance 
levels of the other coefficients are not affected and it may be 
concluded that the quadratic term logarithm of per capita income 
(squared) is an irrelevant variable for the sample of thirty 
developing countries. The sample data thus provides no evidence 
of "trickle down" effects for developing countries.
Next consider equations 3(a) and 3(c). The difference
5 The variables shown in equation 3(a) and 4(a) were consistently 
significant explanatory variables in all tests, except of course 
when other variables highly correlated with one of the chosen 
five but not themselves significant, were introduced, thus 
creating problems of multicollinearity with what were 
statistically irrelevant variables. As previously noted, 
results which are not significant are not reported, however 
readers are welcome to peruse the computer printouts if they 
desi re.
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between equations 3(a) and 3(c) is that the observations on 
logarithm of per capita income in the latter equation were 
calculated from the method outlined in the Appendix to Chapter 1 - 
that is, they were predicted on the basis of physical indicators 
of real per capita product. Also the average annual growth rate 
was calculated from a ten year series of per capita G.D.P. in the 
currency of the selected country (without conversion to $U.S .).
The overall fit of equation 3(c) is worse than that of equation 
3(a) - adjusted R2 falls from .64 to .45, and the F statistic 
falls from 11.2 to 5.5 (still significant at the 1% level).
Despite this, each of the coefficients in equation 3 (c) is still 
significant at the 5% level and, what is most important for the 
sensitivity test, the general order of magnitude of each of the 
regression coefficients is substantially unchanged by the 
alternative method of measurement of two explanatory variables.
The same holds true in comparing equations 4(a) and 4(c) for 
dependent variable LOW 40. The overall fit is worse in equation 
4(c) as R2 falls from .71 to .60, but the size and significance 
of the regression coefficients is not very different. 6 The 
fact that the coefficients are fairly robust under alternative data 
systems is encouraging. Although there is a considerable amount 
of unexplained variation in income shares of the poor in developing 
countries, the significance of the relationships that are 
included in the equations is made more difficult to deny by the 
results of the sensitivity test.
When the sample of countries is expanded by the addition
6 As was the case for equations 3(a) and 4(a), the addition of 
other variables from the list used in the factor analysis did 
not result in any improvement in the fit of equations 3(c) and 
4(c).
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of thirteen developed countries there are some notable differences 
in the results. Equation 3(d) shows that the same explanatory 
variables still provide the most significant explanation of 
variations in LOW 20 with each coefficient being significant at the 
5% level. The adjusted R2 is only .45, considerably less than 
the .64 in equation 3(a). On the other hand, the introduction 
of a quadratic term in per capita income (shown in equation 3 (e)) 
improves the adjusted R2 to .55 as well as increasing the F 
statistic from 7.8 to 9.5. The coefficient on the quadratic 
income term is statistically significant indicating a strong 
quadratic relationship in income share of the poorest 20% with 
the logarithm of per capita income. Simple calculus applied to 
equation 3(e) reveals that, for given levels of the other 
variables, the turning point of the quadratic function is 
predicted to occur at a level of per capita gross domestic income 
of $U.S. 3163 (by exchange conversion) which is at the very 
high end of the income range for the sample (see column 1 in 
Table 1.1) . 7 In equation 3(f) use is made of the physical 
indicators prediction of per capita income in a quadratic 
relation for the sample including developed and developing 
countries. Again the overall fit of the equation using this 
data is worse than that using exchange conversion of per capita 
income, yet the size and significance of each of the coefficients 
on logarithm of per capita income, growth rate, agricultural 
workforce share and crude birth rate is not very different from
7 Found by setting the first partial derivative of LOW 20 with 
respect to logarithm of per capita income equal to zero and 
solving for the level of per capita income. The second order 
condition shows the quadratic function to be concave upwards.
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equation 3(e). Note that the coefficient on the latter variable 
is not significant in either of equations 3(e) and 3(f). The 
coefficient on primary school enrolment rate is not significant 
in equation 3(e) but regains its significance in equation 3(f).
The coefficient on the quadratic income term in equation 3(f) 
is not as strongly significant as in equation 3 (e), but similar 
application of calculus reveals that, for given levels of the other 
variables, the turning point of the quadratic function estimated 
in 3(f) is predicted to occur at a level of real per capita G.D.P. 
of SU.S.5461 (a repricing estimate), again at the very high end 
of the income range for the sample (see column 2 in Table 1.1).
The discussion relating to equations 3(d), 3(e) and 3(f) may 
be carried over almost verbatim for equations 4 (d), 4 (e) and 4 (f) 
where the dependent variable is the income share of the poorest 
40% (LOW 40) and the sample includes thirteen developed countries. 
In particular the significance of the quadratic relationship of 
LOW 40 with per capita income is demonstrated, and is reinforced 
by the sensitivity test on the data as before. Note that the 
crude birth rate regains its statistical significance, and that 
the predicted turning points of the quadratic functions occur a 
little earlier in the income scale for LOW 40 than was the case 
for LOW 20 - the turning points occur at $U.S .2718 (by exchange 
conversion) for equation 4(e), and at $U.S.5240 (by repricing 
estimates) for equation 4(f). These results indicate support for 
the hypothesis that the income shares of the poor tend to decline 
in the early and middle stages of development, and to improve 
again only when countries reach a level of development comparable 
to that of the most advanced countries.
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2.3.2 Regressions for the middle income groups:
Regression results for the middle 40% of the income 
distribution (deciles 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 , called MID 40 for convenience) 
are shown in Table 2.5 which has a similar format to Tables 2.3 and 
2.4. Equation 5(a) shows that, of the five explanatory variables 
found to be significant for the low income groups, only the crude 
birth ratef agricultural workforce share, and primary school 
enrolment rate are statistically significant as explanatory 
variables for the income share of the middle income groups (all 
being negatively related to MID 40). Moreover, with the adjusted 
R2 of only .41 there is a considerable amount of unexplained 
variation in MID 40. It was possible to improve this adjusted R2 
to .53 by adding the share of agriculture in G.D.P. and the share 
of government consumption expenditure in final demand to the
explanatory variables. The results of this are shown in equation
5(b). No other variables from the list used in the factor analysis
had statistically significant coefficients relating them to MID 40
for the sample of developing countries. 8 There is a small
reduction in the size and significance of the coefficients for the
crude birth rate and the primary school enrolment rate in moving
from equation 5(a) to 5(b), and an increase in the size and
significance Of the coefficient for agricultural workforce share.
the latter change is very interesting. The proportion of the
workforce engaged in agriculture is highly positively correlated
with the share of agricultural output in total G.D.P. However,
in equation 5 (b) the effect of increases in agricultural workforce
8 No significant quadratic relationship with the level of per 
capita income was discernable in any regressions involving MID 40. 
Indeed, none was expected in view of the data shown in Table 1.1.
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TABLE 2.5
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MIDDLE 40% 
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share is shown to reduce the share of income accruing to the 
middle income group, while increases in agricultural value added 
share increase the share of income accruing to the middle income 
group. The beta weights for these two explanatory variables 
indicate that the effects are of almost equal relative strength 
(3 r -0.80 for agricultural workforce share, and 3 t 0.85 for 
agricultural value added share). A reasonable hypothesis to 
explain the opposite signs of those two variables might recognise 
that the agricultural sector is the low income sector in developing 
countries and also that the middle income groups derive much of 
their income from "middle-man" activities such as transport and 
distribution mark-ups on agricultural products for urban consumption
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or for export. Then increases in employment in low-productivity 
agriculture may reduce the surplus available for middle (and high) 
income groups to appropriate, while increases in agricultural 
output may promote higher levels of activity in transport and 
distribution of this output and hence higher MID 40.
In equation 5(c) the logarithm of per capita income is 
computed from physical indicators of real G.D.P., and in this case 
its coefficient is statistically significant in contrast to that 
in equation 5(a). The effect of the growth rate ÌS al SO 
strengthened in the alternative data test but is still not 
statistically significant. The effects of both agricultural 
workforce share and primary school enrolment rate are also 
strengthened, and the adjusted R2 increases to .46. Half of the 
variation in MID 40 across developing countries remains unexplained 
by the variables in this study.
The proportion of explained variation in MID 40 is 
considerably increased by the addition of the thirteen developed 
countries to the sample. For instance, comparing equations 5(a) 
with 5(d), the adjusted R2 increases from .41 to .61, and there is 
an improvement from 5.0 to 14.4 in the F statistic. This supports 
Kuznets' observations that there is not much variation in income 
share of the middle income groups across developing countries, but 
there is a significant change between them and the developed 
countries. The coefficients on the logarithm of per capita income 
and the growth rate remain insignificant, and those on the crude 
birth rate and the primary school enrolment rate are Strengthened. 
Comparison of equation 5(d) with 5(f) shows no significant differ­
ence, which is of course expected since the variables which were 
re-estimated with alternative data were not found to be significant
as explanatory variables for MID 40.
In equation 5(e) it is shown that the addition of three more 
significant explanatory variables improves the adjusted R2 
further to .70 - these are the share of agriculture in G.D.P., the 
share of government current expenditure in final demand, and the 
share of gross domestic investment in final demand (each of these 
three is positively related to MID 40).
The opposite signs on agricultural workforce (3 t -1.03) and 
agricultural value added (3 t 0.86) again is demonstrated in 
equation 5(e). The negative influence of the crude birth rate 
and the primary school enrolment rate indicate that the effects Of 
these on low income groups as discussed in section 2.3.1 also 
extend to the detriment of the middle income groups. Interestingly, 
an increasing share of government current expenditure in final 
demand appears to benefit the middle income groups with a 
significant positive coefficient in both equations 5(b) and 5(e), 
whereas this had no discernible influence one way or the other on 
the income shares of the low income groups. The investment rate 
also has a significant positive coefficient in equation 5(e) 
whereas it was not significant for the developing country sample 
(in equations 5(a) and 5(b)). This may be partly a reflection of 
higher investment rates in developed countries than in developing 
countries, but in order to explain the positive association of the 
investment rate with MID 40 (when there was no statistically 
significant relationship with LOW 20 or LOW 40) one might 
hypothesise that this variable is capturing part of the influence 
of ownership of productive capital by middle income groups (but 
see the discussion of this in the next section for TOP 20 also).
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2.3.3 Regressions for the high income groups:
Regression results for the richest 20% of the income 
distribution (deciles 1 + 2, called TOP 20 for convenience) are 
shown in Table 2 .6 , which has a similar format to Tables 2 .3 , 2 . 4  
and 2.5.
In equation 6 (a) one additional variable to the five that 
were found significant for the low income groups enters to account 
for variation in TOP 20 across developing countries. That variable 
is the agricultural value added share which has a Significant 
negative coefficient (3 4= -0 .6 ). Explanation of why this 
coefficient has the opposite sign to that on agricultural workforce 
share was commented on in section 2.3.2 for MID 40. No other 
variable from the list used in the factor analysis was significant 
for the sample of developing countries. The positive signs on
logarithm of per capita income, crude birth rate, agricultural 
workforce share and primary school enrolment rate in equation 6 (a) 
may be contrasted with the negative relationships between these 
explanatory variables and the income shares of the low income 
groups, as well as the middle income groups (equations 3(a), 4(a), 
5(a)).
There is an identity relationship between the income share 
groups:
LOW 40 + MID 40 + TOP 20 e 1
Together they account for total income, and increases in the share 
of one income group can only be obtained by reducing the income 
share of other groups. This fact supports the regression results 
here. The influences typically associated with economic 
development that were previously argued to reduce the income 
share of the low income groups (recall section 2.3.1) are found to
TABLE 2 . 6
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR RICHEST 20% 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE TOP 20 (DECILES 1+2)
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
LOG OF CRUDE AGRIC. PRIM. (LOG OF ) z AGRIC. SECOND.
PER CAP. GROWTH BIRTH WORK- SCHOOL (PER CAP.) VALUE SCHOOL INVEST. LIT. POP.
CONSTANT INCOME RATE RATE FORCE ENROL. (INCOME ) ADDED ENROL. RATE RATE GROWTH R2 F
6(a) 30 developing countries 
$US exchange GDY per cap.
Beta weight 0.374 -0.271 0.485 0.861 0.462 -0.594
Coefficient 5.989 3.395 -119.600 0.399 0.304 0.116 -0.340
(t value) (1.2) (2.2) (2.9) (3.7) (2.9) (2.1)
6(b) 30 developing countries
$US exchange GDY per cap.
Beta weight ' -0.853 -0.266 0.494 0.894 0.504 1.261 -0.561
Coefficient 32.617 -7.740 -117.652 0.4C6 0.314 C.126 1.041 -0.321
(t value) (0.4) (2.1) (2.9) (3.7) (2.9) (0.6) (1.9)
6(c) 29 developing countries
Physical indicators of GDP
Beta weight 0.556 " -0.341 0.506 1.097 0.543 -0.502
Coefficient -13.694 6.052 -153.112 0.402 0.375 0.136 -0.304
(t value) (2.0) (2.7) (3.1) (4.2) (3.6) (2.3)
6(d) 43 countries
$ US exchange GDY per cap.
Beta weight 0.777 -0.008 0.972 1.235 0.405 -0.413 -0.467 -0.272 0.563 -0.362
Coefficient -15.046 5.226 -3.673 0.654 0.385 0.119 -0.224 -0.140 -0.435 0.157 -3.093
(t value) (2.1) (0.1) (2.9) (3.6) (3.2) (1.4) (2.0) (1.8) (2.1) (1.7)
6(e) 43 countries
$ US exchange GDY per cap.
Beta weight 1.599 -0.168 0.591 0.909 0.416 -1.429 -0.566
Coefficient -12.432 10.758 -77.782 0.398 0.283 0.122 -0.768 -0.308
(t value) (1.2) (1.7) (3.0) (3.6) (2.9) (1.1) (1.9)
6(f) 42 countries
Physical indicators of GDP
Beta weight 0.630 -0.082 0.965 1.175 0.451 -0.476 -0.369 -0.166 0.329 -0.353
Coefficient -17.510 5.279 -40.022 0.649 0.368 0.136 -0.276 -0.110 -0.274 0.095 -2.984









be systematically increasing the income share of the high income 
group. This statement is qualified by noting that the coefficient 
on the logarithm of per capita income is not significant at the 
6% level (but is weakly significant at the 15% level). The 
coefficients on the growth rate, crude birth rate, agricultural 
workforce and primary school enrolment rate are all significant 
at the 5% level and have signs opposite to their counterparts for 
the low income groups, indicating the effect of the identity 
mentioned above.
In equation 6 (h), the quadratic term logarithm of per capita 
income (squared) is added to the relationship of 6 (a). The result 
indicates that no statistically significant quadratic relationship 
of TOP 2Ji with per capita income is discernible for developing 
countries. In equation 6 (c) the logarithm of per capita income 
and the growth rate were calculated from the alternative data 
described in the Appendix to Chapter 1. The effect of both of 
these on TOP 20 is strengthened by using the alternative data and 
there is a marginal improvement in the overall fit of the equation 
compared with equation 6 (a). Again the qualitative nature of the 
results is found to be quite stable under the data sensitivity 
test.
Increasing the sample of countries by the addition of 
thirteen developed countries causes some important statistical 
changes in the estimated equation accounting for variation in 
TOP 2?. In equation 6 (d) five other variables were found to be 
statistically significant. There are significant negative 
coefficients on agricultural value added, secondary school 
enrolment rate, and population growth rate, and there is a 
significant positive association between TOP 20 and the adult
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literacy rate. However, the introduction of these additional 
variables requires rather more careful interpretation. Some 
provide evidence of interesting hypotheses, but others constitute 
a deliberate specification error which was committed in order to 
draw out stronger versions of hypotheses already discussed. This 
point will become more obvious in the following discussion of 
equation 6 (d).
The significant positive coefficients on logarithm of per 
capita income, crude birth rate, agricultural workforce share, 
and primary school enrolment rate support the identity relation 
between income shares discussed above. Similarly, the negative 
sign on agricultural value added share supports the earlier 
discussion from section 2.3.2, although in this case its coefficient 
is only weakly significant at the 10% level and its beta weight 
is considerably smaller in relation to agricultural workforce 
share than in previous equations.
The growth rate variable loses all of its influence in the 
expanded equation 6 (d). It is likely that this influence has 
been simply transferred to the investment rate, which has a 
significant negative coefficient, and a beta weight of the same 
order of magnitude as that of the growth rate in equation 6 (a). 
Recall that in the factor analysis of Section 2.1, the growth rate 
and the investment rate were both associated with the same 
theoretical dimension of the development process. One may argue 
therefore that the shift in significance from one to the other is 
simply a reflection of higher rates of investment in developed 
countries included in the expanded sample. Showing both 
variables in equation 6 (d) thus amounts to a form of specification 
error, for which no apology is made. The negative association of
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this effect with TOP 20 can be explained in terms of the identity 
relation of income shares mentioned above, and in view of the 
significant positive association of the growth rate with the 
income shares of the poor. It thus provides an interesting twist 
to the earlier result, which could not be explored in section 2 .3.1 
because the investment rate did not emerge there as a significant 
explanatory variable.
Next consider the emergence of the population growth rate as 
a statistically significant explanatory variable in equation 6 (d) 
when it was not significant in equation 6 (a), and also the fact 
that it has an opposite sign to the variable crude birth rate with 
which it is positively correlated (as shown in the factor analysis). 
Firstly, recall the result in section 2.3.1 which showed that 
increases in the birth rate were associated with decreases in the 
income share of the poor. By the identity relation of income 
shares this is expected to increase the income shares of the high 
income groups, so the positive sign on the crude birth rate is 
easy to explain by itself. Secondly, note that the beta weight on 
crude birth rate is 0.485 in equation 6 (a) and is 0.972 in 
equation 6 (d). Here is another example of specification error 
which provides an interesting twist to an established result. The 
error occurs because the population growth rate is defined as the 
difference between the birth rate and the death rate; including 
it in the same equation as the crude birth rate is simply 
double-counting the birth rate (as shown by the doubling of the 
beta weight) and the negative coefficient appearing on population 
growth rate is in reality capturing only the expected effect of 
the death rate on income shares. This in turn reflects the 
relationship previously discussed between the crude birth rate
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and income shares - a discussion which was not possible in 
section 2.3.1 because the population growth rate did not emerge as 
a significant explanatory variable.
The significant positive coefficient on the adult literacy 
rate is probably a reinforcement of the effect exerted by primary 
school enrolment rate which has been previously discussed. That 
is, that increasing access to basic education creates aspirations 
for particular forms of employment in young school leavers who are 
prepared to remain unemployed (or underemployed) for long periods. 
This increases the population counted in low income groups thus 
reducing the income share of the poorest (say) 40% of income 
earners and, ceteris paribus, increasing the income share of the 
high income groups. Alternatively one may argue that an educated 
workforce provides labour input of higher quality which will 
raise the productivity of existing capital employed and also 
facilitate the introduction of capital embodying higher technology. 
It is known that the distribution of capital income is more highly 
concentrated than that of labour income and hence a high proportion 
of income accruing to the richest 20% of the distribution will be 
returns to capital. Then higher productivity of capital in general 
will raise the income share of TOP 20. Wider access to secondary 
schooling also indicates an increasingly educated workforce which 
should raise the productivity of capital as argued above. However, 
it may reasonably be argued that the negative coefficient on 
secondary school enrolment rate in equation 6 (d) is not necessarily 
at variance with the capital income hypothesis. Wider access to 
education beyond the basic level will result in increased 
competition in the labour market for the highly paid occupations, 
thus reducing the component of TOP 20 due to returns to highly
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skilled labour, and this is possibly the effect captured by the 
negative coefficient on secondary school enrolment rate. The fact 
that this effect emerges only when the sample of countries is 
expanded to include developed countries, with higher levels of 
secondary and further education, would also support this labour 
market hypothesis.
Equation 6(f) uses the same explanatory variables as were 
shown in equation 6(d). The logarithm of per capita income and 
the growth rate were calculated from the alternative data 
described in the Appendix to chapter 1. However, the results are 
virtually the same as for equation 6(d). Since the latter has been 
exhaustively discussed, we simply note the insensitivity of the 
equation to the alternative data.
Equation 6(e) uses the same explanatory variables as were 
shown in equation 6(b) to test the significance of the expected 
inverted-U relation of TOP 20 with per capita income level. The 
sign on the quadratic term is negative (b t -1.43) but the 
coefficient is only weakly significant at the 15% level. Similar 
application of calculus to equation 6(e) as was done to find 
the turning point of the quadratic functions fitted in Tables 3 
and 4 reveals that, for given levels of the other explanatory 
variables, the turning point for TOP 20 occurs at a level of 
per capita gross domestic income of SlJ.S.llOO (by exchange 
conversion). This is evidence of a turning point in the income 
share TOP 20 at a considerably lower average income level than 
was found for the low income groups.
CHAPTER 3
Summary of International Evidence
3•1 Conclusions from the regression analyses
In order to place the results of the regression analyses in 
oerspective, it is useful to reiterate a distinction made in 
Chapter 1 between the historical pattern of inequalities on one 
hand, and changes that have occurred in this generation on the 
other. There is little doubt that to a considerable extent 
present levels of inequality are due to the persistence of 
historically determined patterns of wealth distribution and factor 
endowments which have varied greatly from country to country. 
Because of the paucity of data it is not possible to quantify the 
importance of these influences on inter-country variations in 
income distribution. Nevertheless, seen in this perspective it is 
encouraging that over half of the variations in income shares can 
be explained without this information entering the analysis 
exp!icitly.
The regression results indicate support for the hypothesis 
that there exists a complex of structural changes, which typically 
accompany economic development, which do tend to lower the income 
share of the poor and raise the income share of the rich. In 
general terms the level of development is approximated by the 
level of per capita income. For regressions based on a sample of 
developing countries only, a strong inverse linear relationship 
exists between the logarithmic transform of per capita income and 
the income shares of the low income groups. This relationship 
develops a distinct non-1inearity when countries representative
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of the whole range of development are included in the sample.
That is, the rate of decrease in the income share of the poor 
slows over the range of incomes and is arrested only when a level 
of per capita income comparable to the most advanced countries 
is reached. The income share accruing to the high income groups 
displays an inverted-U pattern with the logarithm of per capita 
income - it increases throughout the range of incomes of the 
developing countries and decreases thereafter. The results 
indicate that if there is any "trickle-down" of benefits in the 
course of growth, these benefits take a very long time to reach 
the low income groups - they are appropriated by the middle 
income groups in countries in the middle range of development and 
significantly arrest the rate of decline in income share of 
the poor only at an advanced level of development.
Several specific aspects of this general relationship are 
discernible, including dualism in the employment patterns of the 
workforce, access to basic education, and the differential effects 
of demographic transition. The first of these aspects is the 
most important. The variable measuring the share of the workforce 
engaged in agriculture consistently affects observed inequality in 
each of the cross-sectional regressions, with a relative influence 
roughly twice as great (by the standardised coefficient) as that 
of access to primary schooling or the crude birth rate. High 
primary school enrolment rates are shown to work against 
improvements in income distribution, being negatively associated 
with the income shares of the low and middle income groups. This 
supports the hypothesis that primary education induces aspirations 
for modern sector employment in young school leavers, who may 
swell the ranks of the unemployed or underemployed for long periods
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in the hope of satisfying such aspirations. This increases the 
proportion of the population with low income levels thereby 
(ceteris paribus) increasing the degree of inequality. Similarly, 
high birth rates are shown to increase the degree of inequality or, 
put another way, reductions in the crude birth rate are shown to 
improve the income share of the low and middle income groups at 
the expense of the high income groups.
An interesting result associated with the breakdown of 
dualism in the course of development arose in the regression 
analysis for the middle income group. Two aspects of dualism - 
the proportion of the workforce engaged in agriculture, and the 
share of value added from agriculture - have opposite effects on 
the income share of the middle income group. Recognising that the 
agricultural sector is the low income sector in developing 
countries, and that the greatest proportion of their workforce is 
engaged in agricultural activity, it is clear that increases in 
the proportion of the workforce engaged in agriculture will 
(ceteris paribus) reduce the share of income accruing to the low 
and middle income groups. Observations in several developing 
countries of the activities of the more prosperous agricultural 
workers reveals a tendency to diversify their activities into 
transport and distribution services for agricultural products.
To the extent that these mark-ups provide an important income 
source for the middle income groups, an increase in the share of 
agricultural output in value added (to satisfy higher urban 
consumption or export markets) will raise the income share of the 
middle income groups. The middle income group is also the main 
beneficiary of government activity in the economy at all levels of 
development. This is the only group for which the share of
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government current expenditure in total final demand is a 
significant explanatory variable in the regressions, the positive 
coefficient indicating that a direct relationship exists.
Finally, although there are strong forces associated with 
development that tend to lower the income share of the low income 
groups, the speed of this development (measured by the average 
annual rate of growth of per capita income over ten years preceding 
the income distribution observation) is shown to be independent of 
the nature of these forces. Moreover, there is a strong and 
significant positive association between the rate of growth of 
per capita income and the income share of the low income group.
This indicates that rapid growth in per capita income may be 
regarded as a potentially valuable source of improvement in the 
relative (and absolute) position of the poor in developing 
countries. There is thus no necessary conflict between growth 
per se and a reduction in the degree of inequality in the course 
of development. This is an important result, which seems to be 
stable under a variety of regression tests, and which, because it 
is remarkably different to the expectations held by some economists, 
may bear further investigation. This is attempted briefly in 
section 3.3 below.
3.2 Postscript on the results of Adelman-Morris (1973) and 
Ahluwalia (1976)
Several researchers have criticised the Adelman-Morris study, 
arguing that the technique employed by them is inappropriate and 
that the conclusions reached on the basis of that technique are 
suspect (see Chapter 1). Here I wish to consider the regression
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results presented by Adelman and Morris as an appendix to their 
book. They maintain that these support their other results but
that they have only a low degree of confidence in the regression 
results, because
...Regression analysis is more dependent on and 
more sensitive to the accuracy of data inputs than 
is hierarchical analysis, since it requires that 
measurements be cardinal, (p.220)
In my view this is a plus for regression analysis if it is 
done properly; and I have shown above that the regression results 
may very well be insensitive to alternative data specifications 
when the relationships one is purporting to measure are in fact 
quite robust and fundamental to the processes of interest.
Their technique of hierarchical analysis indicates that five 
of the most important variables associated with inter-country 
differences in patterns of income distribution are: (i) an index 
of equality of access to secondary and university education 
(favoring equality); (ii) natural resource abundance (favoring 
concentration at the top); (iii) the government share in 
investment (with a large share shifting income from the top to the 
middle class); (iv) the extent of dualism (with greater dualism 
associated with greater concentration); and (v) the level of per 
capita G.D.P. In their regressions they use a quadratic term in 
G.D.P., but not the logarithmic transformation which I have argued 
is reasonable; and they note a statistically significant inverted-U 
pattern in support of Kuznets hypothesis, although the degree of 
explanation is very low. Their variable measuring the rate of 
improvement in human resources ((i) above) is a better conceptual 
measure than I have used; however, their interpretation of its 
relationship with G.D.P. is not correct:
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...With the addition of rate of improvement of 
human resources as a second independent variable, 
the relationship between income of the poor and 
averaae G.D.P. shifts from a positive to a net 
negative one. The shift is understandable 
statistically, since per capita G.D.P. and rate of 
improvement of human resources are significantly 
correlated. We interpret the shift to have 
substantive meaning in part because of its 
consistency with the results of the hierarchical 
analyses, (p.224)
In fact the coefficient on per capita G.D.P. is not 
significantly different from zero in the equations to which they 
refer, neither before nor after the addition of the rate of 
improvement of human resources. The shift in sign is statistically 
meaningless.
Variables to capture the effects of natural resource endowment 
and of dualism are not included in their regression analysis, 
although they recognise the importance of these effects in the 
main analysis. Lack of suitable data prevented me from including 
natural resource endowment as an explanatory variable in my 
regressions. The effect of dualism has been shown to be of prime 
importance in this chapter, particularly dualism in the labour 
force structure. The importance which Adelman and Morris attach 
to the economic role of the government is also overdone - it has 
a significant negative effect on income of the high income groups 
in their regressions, but no significant effect on the low income 
groups (i.e. it benefits only the middle income group).
Finally, they state that short-term growth rates are not 
significantly related to income shares in any of the regression 
equations, neither are they important in their hierarchical 
analyses. However, they measure the rate of growth of per capita 
G.D.P. "...for the longest available period prior to the year of 
the income distribution data" (p.233). This is surely a less
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consistent measure than the fixed ten year growth effect I have 
used, and found to be associated significantly with reductions in 
equality. In a more recent paper, Adelman (1975) qualified the 
conclusions of Adelman-Morris (1973), stating that high growth 
rates in per capita income (greater than 5.5% per annum) are a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for substantial 
improvements in the income share of the poor. The sufficiency 
conditions she stated required a human-resource-intensive 
development strategy in which broad-based massive investment in 
education is combined with labour intensive production on a large 
scale. Such a conclusion should be tested for individual countries 
and can not be evaluated on the basis of the cross-country results 
presented in the previous chapter. Indeed, Adelman's conclusions 
seem to be strongly influenced by her experience with economic 
development planning in the Republic of Korea.
My study is methodologically very close to that by Ahluwalia 
(1976) being based upon multiple regression analysis, and we have 
drawn our data from the same source reference (Jain (1975)). The 
actual income distributions for the various countries selected by 
Ahluwalia for his sample are different from those which I have 
selected, and his choice of explanatory variables is also different.
Ahluwalia's explanatory variables account for a higher 
proportion of variation in income shares of the middle income 
group than is the case in my Table 2.5 above, but for the other 
income shares the overall fit of our respective results are very 
similar. He has included a dummy variable for socialist countries 
in his analysis (my sample excludes socialist countries) which is
58.
highly significant, and I would argue that this "explains" much of 
the explained variation in income shares in his study. His result 
in this respect is to be expected in view of the importance of the 
initial distribution of capital ownership for income distribution 
(mentioned earlier). My results are therefore even more 
encouraging in view of the statistical significance attained 
without recourse to this acknowledged determinant of inequality.
The three main aspects of the development process which 
Ahluwalia finds systematically related to the degree of inequality 
are:
(1) Intersectoral shifts involving a relative 
decline of the traditional agricultural sector 
and a parallel shift of population to the 
urban sector.
(2) Expansion in the educational and skill 
characteristics of the population.
(3) The 'demographic transition' involving a 
reduction in the rate of growth of population, 
(p.314).
He uses agricultural value added and urban population to 
measure the first aspect, the literacy rate and secondary school 
enrolment rate to measure the second aspect, and the population 
growth rate to measure the third aspect. All of these are 
different to the variables I have used to measure similar aspects 
of the development process. The method of deducing the explanatory 
variables which provide the most stable and significant relation­
ships in both studies is "...essentially a heuristic exploration 
of alternative patterns", (p.315). I have considered the reasons 
why the particular variables used in chapter two appear to provide 
slightly better results, reasons which are discussed in the text 
above.
Ahluwalia found no statistically significant relationship
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between the rate of qrowth averaged over ten years and the income 
shares of the poor, and concluded that this does not support the 
hypothesis that faster growth exacerbates the longer-term forces 
outlined above. This conclusion is true, and my results have 
shown a significant positive effect of growth in per capita income 
with the income share of the poor.
In a footnote on page 313 Ahluwalia recognises the bias
involved in making international comparisons of G.N.P. by official
exchange conversions. I have been able to test the regression
results for sensitivity to alternative estimation of per capita
income. Finally, Ahluwalia's conception of the appropriate
methodological standpoint involved in this type of study is very
well expressed in the following words:
It is self-evident that the relationships thus 
identified are primarily associational. They do 
not necessarily establish the nature of the 
underlying causal mechanism at work for the simple 
reason that quite different causal mechanisms might 
generate the same observed relationship between 
selected variables. Such alternative mechanisms 
(or hypotheses) are observationally equivalent in 
the sense that our estimated equations do not 
always permit us to choose between them, (p.308)
3.3 Short-term growth and income distribution revisited 
One of the most interesting results to emerge from the 
previous analysis is the significant positive effect exerted by 
the aggregate growth rate on income shares of the poor. This is 
so despite the observed tendency for secular forces that are 
typically associated with long term development to work against 
the poorer groups in under-developed countries. Moreover, since 
this result for aggregate income growth appears to challenge the
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expectations held by some economists over the postwar period, it 
may be useful to consider the question from a slightly different 
point of view. In the absence of time series data for most 
countries, it is again necessary to approach the problem using 
cross-country data from Jain (1975). This time, however, we 
consider only those countries for which distribution estimates are 
listed for two separate points in time. Provided that the estimates 
for a given country are derived from reasonably comparable 
sources1, they can be combined with aggregate per capita income 
estimates for both points in time to yield estimates of income 
accruing to various percentiles of the population. It is then a 
simple matter to compute the implied average annual rate of growth 
of income accruing to (say) the poorest 40% of the population, and 
to compare this with the average annual growth of total income per 
capita over the same period. Table 3.1 lists the 15 developing 
countries and 11 developed countries for which two reasonably 
comparable distributions were available (for at least five years 
apart). Each country is given a number to simplify plotting of 
the results.
Figure 3.1 plots the average annual rate of growth of real per
capita gross domestic income on the horizontal axis, and the
estimated annual growth in income of the poorest 40% of the
1 Strict comparability is probably impossible, even if the data is 
presented by the same researcher or institution. The judgement 
about comparability of different distributions for the same 
country is to this extent arbitrary. However, in many cases it 
was possible to cross-check the apparent distributional change 
between the two chosen observations with source references or 
other country-specific information and, since we are again 
concerned mainly with broad patterns, we can be reasonably 
confident in the results presented here. Once again the 
methodology has been suggested by Ahluwalia (in Chenery et.al.
(1975)) but again the chosen observations are quite different.
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population over the same period on the vertical axis. The scatter 
of points are numbered for each country in Table 3.1, and changes 
in relative inequality can be inferred for each country by 
considering its position in relation to the 45° line. Countries 
above the 45° line are those in which the income of the lowest 40% 
grew more rapidly than total income (i.e. the poor have benefited 
from growth). In those countries below the 45° line, the lowest 
40% of income recipients have not shared in the overall growth of 
the country as much as the higher groups. Once again, because of 
the nature of the data, too much credence should not be placed in 
small quantum differences between points in Figure 3.1; rather we 
wish to consider the general area of the plot occupied by each 
country.
Statistical analysis of the results presented in Figure 3.1 
is indeterminate in the following respect. Let X be the percentage 
growth rate of per capita aggregate income, and let Y be the 
percentage growth rate of income accruing to the poorest 40%.
A line fitted by O.L.S. to the 26 observations in Figure 3.1 is 
given by:
Y = 0.59 + 0.92X (r2 = .47)
(SE = .20)
The slope estimate (0.92) is not significantly different from 
unity, neither is the intercept term (0.59) significantly 
different from zero (even at the 20% level). Therefore the 
estimated line is not significantly different in the statistical 
sense from the 45° line.
Similarly, fitting an O.L.S. line only to the 14 developing 
countries in the sample (excluding Yugoslavia) gives:
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TABLE 3.1
SAMPLE OF 26 COUNTRIES FOR EXAMINATION OF SHORT-RUN EFFECTS 
OF GROWTH ON INCOME SHARES ACCRUING TO POOREST 40% OF POPULATION


























20. Phi 1 i ppi nes 1961(2)
21. Sri Lanka 1963(1)
22. Sweden 1963(1)
23. Taiwan 1964(3)
24. United Kingdom 1960(2)




























Notes: (a) Fiji - 1968 data from Ward (1971)
- 1973 data from Fiji Unemployment Survey (1973) 
(b) Korea - data from Renaud (1976) (Chae's estimates)
Numbers in parentheses after years in table refer to 
numbered sources in Jain's compilation.
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r  = 0.55 + 1.114X' (r2 = .55)
(SE = .29)
(where the prime on X and Y indicates the different sample).
Again the estimated line is not significantly different from the 
45° line.
Therefore, it is not possible to draw any generalised 
conclusion from Figure 3.1 about the positive or negative effects 
of short-to-medium-term growth on the income of the poorest 40% of 
the population. For the developing countries, eight of them lie 
above the 45° line - that is, positive redistribution to the poor 
has accompanied growth. These eight countries are:
3. Colombia (1964-70)
4. Costa Rica (1961-71)




21. Sri Lanka (1963-73)
23. Taiwan (1964-72)
Four of the countries which have enjoyed less inequality have 
also experienced rapid aggregate growth (Fiji, Korea, Pakistan and 
Taiwan), which would tend to suggest that it is possible under 
certain conditions for some developing countries to improve the 
distribution of income in general, and the lot of the poor in 
particular, while still maintaining rapid aggregate growth.
On the other hand there are four developing countries below 
the 45° line in Figure 3.1 - that is, growth of the national 
economy in these countries has left the poorest 40% of the
64.





Thus we cannot deny the existence of immisensing growth for many 
developing countries, and most notably for the populous countries 
such as India and Brazil. Of course, the critical questions 
relate to the type of growth required, and how it is generated, 
as well as who receives the benefits. These questions cannot be 
answered with the type of cross-section regression analysis used 
in this section and the previous chapter. In fact all of the 
findings discussed above should be treated as generalised results 
which may be useful for organising hypotheses to be examined in 
the context of individual countries' situations and experiences. 
In subsequent chapters of this dissertation I have examined the 
relationships here shown to be generally important, for the 
particular case of Fiji.
PART I I
Patterns of Demography and Employment
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CHAPTER 4
Analysis of Population Growth and Forecasting for Fiji
4.1 Introduction
In the econometric analysis of chapter two the variable which 
most consistently affected the income shares accruing to 
particular groups was that relating to employment patterns in the 
workforce. Any planning framework designed to promote reductions 
in income inequality would have to give careful consideration to 
the creation of employment opportunities for a growing workforce.
In doing so it would take as part of the given initial conditions 
the size, age structure, location and rate of growth of the 
country's population, these being the primary determinants of the 
size of the workforce now and in the future. Demographic changes 
are not easily predictable, however, and it is necessary to 
recognise this explicitly before proceeding to the analysis of 
employment problems in a planning situation. The empirical 
analysis of chapter two also showed that demographic changes 
themselves have an important influence upon the distribution of 
income through changes in the birthrate. It was suggested that 
this affects family size and hence savings and consumption 
behaviour of families at different income levels. For each of 
these reasons the planning framework with which we are concerned 
will require a demographic subsystem as one of its building 
blocks.
This chapter examines the age/sex composition of Fiji's 
population and considers techniques for projecting it into the 
future according to a set of strict accounting identities. This 
projection method uses standard demographic techniques as described 
in Keyfitz and Flieger (1971).
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Certain modifications to the accounting framework are considered 
with a view to changing the projections into forecasts, then 
statistical confidence intervals are estimated for the forecast 
results. The procedure is applied to available data on demographic 
change in Fiji between the 1966 and 1976 Censuses. The first set 
of forecasts was based upon the 1966 Census and was prepared 
before the 1976 Census and 1974 Fertility Survey were published.
The degree of accuracy with which the size and age structure of 
the 1976 population is predicted constitutes a validation test of 
the forecasts. The chapter also contains population projections 
for Fiji to the end of this century under a range of assumptions 
about changes in the birthrate. Finally there is a section 
analysing available data on rural-to-urban migration in Fiji 
over the 1966-76 intercensal period.
The demographic changes studied in this chapter are not 
derived from an economic-demographic modelling process (for 
example, Coaleand Hoover (1958), I.L.O. (1973), Denton and 
Spencer (1975)). They may be assumed to occur in response to 
many different social and economic conditions which for the most 
part remain unspecified here. The primary purpose is to quantify 
demographic changes which have occurred in Fiji in recent years, 
from which certain social and economic implications may be seen 
to emerge, the most important for my purposes being the demand 
for employment opportunities. An associated goal is to assess 
the relative sensitivity of the population forecasting model to 
variations in patterns of fertility, mortality and net migration 
(both internal and overseas migration). From this point of view 
the accuracy of the population forecasts per se is not so 
important as the sensitivity tests. These will provide an
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appreciation of the key variables of interest to the planner who 
is concerned with income distribution and employment patterns.
4.2 Historical patterns of population growth in Fiji
The markedly different patterns of population growth exhibited 
by the two major racial groups in Fiji (Fijians and Indians) have 
been important in a historical context. Table 4.1 indicates how 
the two groups have grown over the past century. Before 1921 the 
number of indigenous Fijians had been declining due to their 
susceptibility to diseases brought in by immigrant races (primarily 
measles, and also influenza). Indentured labourers were brought 
from India between 1879 and 1916 and few returned after their 
indenture period expired. At this time there were nearly twice 
as many Indian males as Indian females, and their natural growth 
was consequently slow.
Since 1921 the Fijian population has grown at an increasing 
rate, and the Indian population at a rapid rate, until the 
mid-1960's. The introduction of a family planning programme in 
1962 has reduced the rates of growth of both major racial groups, 
the impact in the Indian community being relatively greater than 
that among Fijians. In 1976, Indians were 49.8% of the total 
population, Fijians were 44.2% and other races made up 6% of the 
population.
An examination of very recent trends in birth and death 
rates for the two main component populations reveals a striking 
convergence in performance. For example, consider Figure 4.1 
which shows a three-year moving average of general fertility 
rates for Indians and Fijians from 1957 to 1974.
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Table 4.1
Population of Fiji (in thousands) (Census)























Average annual exponential growth rates (%)
Period Fij ian Indian Total
1921-1936 0.97 2.25 1.55
1936-1946 1.90 3.48 2.69
1946-1956 2.27 3.41 2.86
1956-1966 3.11 3.52 3.21
1966-1976 2.51 1.95 2.10
The general fertility rate (G.F.R.) is given by:
P F R  - Number of births occuring in a calendar year x 1000 
* * ‘ ~ Mid-year estimate of fertile-age females (15-44 years)
This is a better measure of fertility than the crude birth rate 
used as an explanatory variable in chapter two. Since 1965 the 
G.F.R.'s of both Indian and Fijian women have been falling at the 
same rates. Similarly, in 1972 the crude birth rate of Fijians 
and Indians alike was about 28 per thousand of population, and 







Fiqure 4.1 GENERAL FERTILITY RATES FOR FIJIANS AND INDIANS 1957-1973 
(3-YEAR MOVING AVERAGES) (Source: Registrar-General)
(Redrawn from 1974 Fiji Fertility Survey p.8)
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In view of this convergence in vital rates among the two
major racial groups it was decided to ignore racial differentials
in the population projection methodology applied in this chapter
for the period 1966-76. Moreover, since the planning framework
envisaged is not concerned explicitly with a division of interest
along racial lines, then it is reasonable to assume for the
present that the vital rates of the component populations do not
deviate significantly from those of the total population. This
does not rule out the possibility of important differences between
the two groups in the future. The following comment from the
1974 Fiji Fertility Survey is an appropriate warning on this point:
Indeed, one of the most striking findings of the 
survey is the close similarity between Fijian and 
Indian marriage cohort fertility. This 
correspondence appears to be unstable for, unless 
new trends are initiated, it is probable that 
Fijian marriage and birth cohort fertility will 
soon emerge as higher than the corresponding 
measures of Indian fertility. In other words, the 
similarity evident from the survey (and other 
contemporary data) may represent only a passing 
moment in the demographic history of Fiji. This 
prognosis is further strengthened by the balance 
of survey data on attitudes, which suggest that 
Fijians want slightly larger families than 
Indians, (p.96).
4.3 The life table and its interpretation.
A fundamental model in demographic analysis is the life 
table. The life table for Fiji 1966 shown in Table 4.4 was 
computed from a methodology given by Keyfitz and Flieger (1971). 
Their method requires data in five-year age cohorts for:
(i) population, by age and sex;
(ii) deaths, by age and sex;
(iii) births, by age of mother.
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Data on the age and sex structure of the population is available 
from Census enumerations - the initial reference point for this 
analysis is the 1966 Census. Data on births and deaths are 
published in the United Nations Demographic Yearbook and these 
are from the Fiji Registrar-General. These registrations are 
known to be incomplete and inaccurate as a guide to levels of 
fertility and mortality and have been adjusted before computing 
the life tables. The data input to computation of the Fiji 1966 
life table is shown in Table 4.3 - the adjustments to the data 
are discussed below.
To illustrate those concepts shown in the life table which
are important for the discussion which follows, we can treat the
probabilities as applying to all individuals observed in a given
cohort at a particular point in time. The fundamental column is
Q(X)n where X refers to the initial age which identifies a
cohort, the subscript N denotes the number of years in the cohort
(one year for the first row, four years for the second row, and
five years for each subsequent row), and Q refers to the
probability1 of a person dying before reaching the next cohort
(X+N). Conversely, the chances of living through the age range
of a given cohort is l-Q(X). This is represented by the
"survivorship ratio" L(X)/L(X-N). The absolute values of the
L(X) have no intrinsic meaning so, by convention, L(0) is set
1 The accuracy of the last three digits in these six digit 
probabilities should not be taken seriously. They are included 
merely for conformity with the other columns of the table, 
e.g., the L(X) column which is standardised on 100,000 births. 
Readers are referred to Keyfitz and Flieger (1971) for 
explanation of the other columns of the life table and for 
discussion of the simplifying assumptions made in its 
compilation.
Table 4.3
Fiji 1966 (Total Population)
Population data from 1966 Census with age groups 75 and over aggregated. 
Population of unknown age included with 75 and over group.
Births from Census 0-1 years plus infant deaths in 1966.
Distribution of births averaged over 1964-1968 registrations. 
Distribution of deaths averaged over 1964-1968 registrations 
Infant deaths inflated to account for assumed 10% underregistration.
All other deaths inflated for assumed 5% underregistration.
Age Population Births Deaths Age
Male Female Male Female
0 8574 8215 0 253 213 0
1 33344 32330 0 101 94 1
5 39372 37951 0 40 42 5
10 31892 31061 0 33 27 10
15 25473 25438 1689 32 32 15
20 20677 21128 6036 38 37 20
25 17060 17247 4693 35 29 25
30 14054 13399 2583 37 32 30
35 11957 11455 1564 45 37 35
40 9675 9093 690 51 37 40
45 8819 8072 0 79 42 45
50 7091 6205 0 92 54 50
55 4689 4147 0 102 53 55
60 3527 3111 0 118 75 60
65 2372 1981 0 107 54 65
70 1666 1344 0 118 67 70
75 2505 1803 0 273 163 75
Total 242747 233980 17255 1554 1088
Table 4.4













































































































Age M(X) A (X) TT(X) R(X) E(X)
0 .029508 .120 6496947 .0000 64.969
1 .003029 1.500 6399477 .0000 65.890
5 .001016 2.500 6013902 .0000 62.674
10 .001036 2.547 5535337 .0326 57.980
15 .001261 2.630 5059198 .0400 53.268
20 .001844 2.586 4585730 .0392 48.588
25 .002056 2.576 4115924 .0380 44.014
30 .002643 2.629 3650678 .0337 39.443
35 .003782 2.638 3190778 .0349 34.933
40 .005299 2.689 2738118 .0283 30.549
45 .008989 2.660 2295394 .0193 26.298
50 .013067 2.669 1867970 .0400 22.387
55 .021923 2.643 1463095 .0400 18.722
60 .033650 2.575 1091540 .0358 15.592
65 .045336 2.557 767924 .0355 12.990
70 .070828 2.528 501822 .0000 10.665























































































70 1344 67 .222895 59850 13340 267603
75 1803 163 1.000000 46510 46510 514463
Age M(X) A(X) TT(X) R(X) E(X) MM (X)
0 .025928 .114 6961668 .0000 69.617 .025928
1 .002908 1.500 6863914 .0000 70.424 .002908
5 .001107 2.500 6476866 .0000 67.229 .001107
10 .000869 2.535 5996494 .0297 62.588 .000869
15 .001264 2.643 5518476 .0353 57.850 .001258
20 .001755 2.547 5042928 .0360 53.200 .001751
25 .001684 2.575 4571000 .0400 48.646 .001681
30 .002400 2.630 4103092 .0391 44.036 .002388
35 .003242 2.601 3639848 .0369 39.536 .003230
40 .004081 2.592 3183080 .0316 35.140 .004069
45 .005229 2.671 2734570 .0302 30.811 .005203
50 .008766 2.662 2296145 .0400 26.557 .008703
55 .012886 2.708 1872526 .0400 22.630 .012780
60 .024282 2.585 1470659 .0400 18.960 .024108
65 .027378 2.605 1104299 .0400 16.081 .027259
70 .049851 2.628 782066 .0000 13.067 .049851
75 .033032 11.061 514463 .0000 11.061 .090405
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equal to 100,000 and the relevant probabilities of surviving to 
the next cohort are the ratios between the L(X)'s. For example, 
of 100,000 hypothetical male births in Fiji 97,124 are expected 
to see their first birthday - the male survivorship ratio for 
L(0) is thus 0.97124.
The computed life tables for Fiji in 1966 show a life 
expectancy at birth (E(0)) of almost 65 years for males and 69 
years for females. This appears to compare favourably with life 
expectancies in more advanced countries. For example, Australian 
males born in 1967 could expect 68 years of life on average and 
females 74 years (from the life table for Australia 1967 in 
Keyfitz and Flieger (1971)). By way of contrast, life expectancy 
for males and females born in Mexico in 1966 was 59 years and 
63 years respectively (Keyfitz and Flieger (1971)).
Comparisons of infant mortality rates are similarly very 
favourable for Fiji. The male infant mortality rate in Fiji 
from Table 4.4 (M(0)) is shown as about 29.5 per thousand live 
births; in Australia in 1967 it was 21 per thousand, but in 
Mexico in 1966 it was 76 per thousand. For females the 
corresponding infant mortality figures are Fiji 26 per thousand, 
Australia 16 per thousand and Mexico 63 per thousand.
There are two main reasons for exercising a good deal of 
caution in interpreting these results. The first relates to 
the unreliability of data in developing countries in general.
In many developing countries a large number of infants born in 
remote areas who die in the first weeks of life are not reported 
as a birth or a death (Stoeckel and Chowdhury (1972)). This 
may also occur in Fiji because a significant proportion of the
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population lives in areas far from well equipped hospitals and 
far from centres of registration of vital events.2 Although one 
may be skeptical about the apparent closeness of Fiji's infant 
mortality rate and general mortality to that of Australia, the 
results listed above would nevertheless not belie the relative 
differences in mortality. Health and nutrition levels in Fiji are 
undoubtedly high by world standards.
The second important issue for interpreting the calculated life 
table is that a very high proportion of Fiji's population is in the 
young age groups. In 1966 over 40% of Fiji's population was under 
15 years of age and 57% was under 20 years of age. This wide base 
of the population pyramid is a common demographic characteristic of 
developing countries today. For example, in Mexico 1966, 46% of 
the population was under 15 years of age and 56% was under 
20 years. By way of contrast, only 29% of Australia's 1967 
population was under 15 years and 38% was under 20 years. It is 
possible to compute birth and death rates that are standardised 
on the age distribution of another country. The standardisation
2 In 1972 total births reported by the district health nursing 
service numbered 15825, while official registrations only 
enumerated 15160 - a difference of 665 or 4.2%. The number 
of deaths reported by nurses in 1972 was 2812 whereas official 
registrations were 2680 - a difference of 132 or 4.9%
(Sahib (1973)). Even the higher figures of the health nurses 
have not accounted for all vital events. It is known that 
the Medical Department improved its data collection techniques 
in 1973, the results of which are shown by comparing reported 
deaths in the Demographic Yearbook of 1976 with that of 1973. 
The latest figures show infant deaths twice the number as 
in 1973 and other-age deaths about 50% higher than in 1973, 
yet real mortality has not increased in Fiji on this scale. 
This new data became available only recently and would seem 
to indicate that my adjustments for underregistration are 
conservative.
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procedure used by Keyfitz and Flieger (1971) gives the following 
standardised death rates for Fiji (1966), Australia (1967), 
and Mexico (1966):
Table 4.5







England & Wales (1961) 10.18 11.34 15.30
United States (1960) 8.55 9.24 13.33
Mexico (1960) 5.26 4.73 9.18
A high proportion of the population in the young age groups 
will yield a low death rate simply because of lower age-specific 
mortality rates in young age groups generally. It should also be 
noted that a high proportion of the population in the young age 
groups ten years ago means, inter alia, that there will be strong 
pressure for expansion of employment opportunities in the coming 
decade and beyond. Further, as these young people marry and have 
families of their own, the base of the population pyramid will 
continue to widen and the absolute numbers of new entrants to 
the labour market will still increase rapidly for a generation 
or more. This is the basis of our concern for population growth 
as it influences the planning system for Fiji.
4.4 Population projections and modified forecasts: 1966-1976 
In order to consider the size and age structure of Fiji's 
expected future population we need a methodology for moving a 
given population structure according to expected age-specific 
birth and death rates. One such methodology was developed by
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Leslie (1945), (1948). His technique involves taking the given 
population distribution as a vector, and premultiplying it by a 
matrix operator (the "Leslie matrix") which contains mostly zeros 
with the exception of the first row and sub-diagonal. The first 
row contains age-specific fertility rates and the sub-diagonal 
contains survivorship ratios. The number of persons in a given 
five-year age cohort is multiplied by the appropriate survivorship 
ratio to yield the number of persons surviving to the next cohort 
in the subsequent five-year period. The whole population structure 
progresses by following survivors down cohort lines in this manner. 
At each five-year stage the number in the 0-4 years age group is 
created by the first row of the matrix operator. The identification 
of age-specific birth and death rates in the Leslie matrix allows 
us to separate the effects of long-run birth and death rates from 
short-term fluctuations in a given age distribution. Further it 
allows us to make the assumptions used in forecasting (as opposed 
to projections) quite explicit - for instance, the effects of 
family-planning campaigns or rural health schemes.
Leslie matrices for Fiji in 1966 were computed for both
females and males3 because the mortality rates are different for
the two sexes and because the distribution of births by age of
father is different to the distribution of births by age of
mother. These 1966 Leslie matrices are shown in Tables 4.6 and
4.7 for females and males respectively. When the observed 1966
age distribution for females (or males) is premultiplied by its
appropriate matrix operator, the result is a vector of projected
age structure of Fiji's 1971 female (or male) population.




Females 1971 5 yrs Females
Age 1966 Proj- Adjust 1971
group Leslie Matrix for Females 1966 Census ected •ment Forecast
0- 4 .0000 .0000 .0782 .4143 .6577 .5481 .3876 .2499 .0898 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 40545 45190 6020 * 39170
5- 9 .9909 37951 40176 295 39881
10-14 .9951 31061 37765 240 37525
15-19 .9948 25438 30899 456 30443
20-24 .9924 21128 25245 701 24544
25-29 .9915 17247 20948 576 20372
30-34 .9900 13399 17075 381 16694
35-39 .9860 11455 = 13211 332 = 12879
40-44 .9819 9093 11248 160 11088
45-49 .9775 8072 8888 136 8752
50-54 .9662 6205 7799 74 7725
55-59 .9487 4147 5887 64 5823
60-64 .9116 3111 3780 48 3732
65-69 .8796 1981 2736 24 2712
70-74 .8305 1344 1645 8 1637
75+ .5992t 1803 1886 8 1878
233980 274378 9523**264855
* 241 net emigration + 5779 change in fertility (all other cells in column are net emigration)
** 3744 net emigration + 5779 change in fertility





group Leslie Matrix for Males 1966 Census ected
0- 4 .0000 .0000 .0204 .1851 .5747 .7749 .6030 .4086 .2418 .0726 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 41918 46808
5- 9 .9907 39372 41528
10-14 .9949 31892 39171
15-19 .9944 25473 31713
20-24 .9923 20677 25277
25-29 .9903 17060 20476
30-34 .9885 14054 16864
35-39 .9843 11957 = 13833
40-44 .9781 9675 11695
45-49 .9654 8819 9340
50-54 .9472 7091 8353
55-59 .9177 4689 6507
60-64 .8710 3527 4084
65-69 .8223 2372 2900
70-74 .7523 1666 1784
75+ .6044+ 2505 2521
242747 282854
* 261 net emigration + 5682 change in fertility (all other cells in column are net emigration)
** 4056 net emigration + 5682 change in fertility
t Calculated as ratio of survival 75 and over to 80 and over (from United Nations (1974)).






















* 857 net emigration + 4326 change in fertility
** 13300 net emigration + 4326 change in fertility 
t As for Table 4.6
Females Females
1971 1976 5 yrs Females
Fore- Proj- Adjust 1976
cast ected -merit Forecast
.0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 39170 42311 5183 lr 37128
39881 38857 1049 37808
37525 39702 854 38848
30443 37304 1621 35683
24544 30172 2491 27681
20372 24306 2047 22259
16694 20158 1353 18805
. 12879 = 16420 - 1178 = 15242
11088 12601 568 12033
8752 10796 484 10312
7725 8368 263 8105
.9412 5823 7271 229 7042
.9087 3732 5291 172 5119
.8741 2712 3262 84 3178
.8058 1637 2185 29 2156
.5992+ 1878 2106 21 2085
264855 301110 17626* *  283484
Table 4.9
Age
* 927 Net emigration + 4392 change in fertility
** 14400 net emigration + 4392 change in fertility 
t As for Table 4.7.
Males Males
1971 1976 5 yrs Males
Fore- Proj- Adjust 1976
cast ected -ment Forecast
.0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 40865 44189 5319 k 38870
41208 40469 1136 39333
38911 40990 924 40066
31219 38643 1755 36888
24517 30860 2697 28163
19852 24179 2216 21963
16452 19570 1464 18106
♦ 13474 = 16111 - 1276 = 14835
11522 13040 615 12425
9192 10945 524 10421
8273 8498 285 8213
.9028 6437 7469 248 7221
.8536 4032 5495 186 5309
.7943 2875 3203 91 3112
.6896 1775 1983 32 1951
.6044+ 2512 2591 24 2567
273116 308235 18792** 289443
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Successive pre-multiplication of female and male population 
distributions by their corresponding matrix operators as shown 
in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 would generate projections of the age and 
sex structure of the population for any desired number of five- 
yearly periods after 1966. This projection technique constitutes 
the accounting identities mentioned in the introductory section. 
Given age-specific birth rates and death rates the population in 
a given year is projected to a later year in much the same way 
that accounts are balanced after a period by the recording of 
inflows and outflows. Such projections cannot be interpreted as 
predictions of actual numbers however, because the age-specific 
rates of inflow and outflow are usually not constant. The effect 
of the family planning campaign in reducing the general fertility 
rate since the mid-1960's has already been mentioned. The G.F.R. 
will vary with the number of women in child-bearing age groups and 
this is endogenous to the projection method; but the numerator 
(number of births) has been declining much more rapidly with the 
result that the general fertility rate has fallen. There has also 
been a differential change in the fertility of women at different 
ages, partly because of the readier acceptance of birth control 
methods by women over thirty years of age, and partly because of 
social changes leading to later age of marriage for young women 
(notably the effects of increasing education, urbanisation and 
workforce participation of young women).
The crude death rate will vary endogenously with the 
projection method as a direct function of the average age of the 
population. On the other hand, exogenous influences on the death 
rate such as improvements in health conditions of the population 
will cause the death rate to change in a manner which is not
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accounted for in the projection method. Certain stochastic 
influences may also be considered to affect the future population, 
the most important being net migration of people overseas.
Since the projection method moves the population in five- 
yearly intervals, the first task is to estimate the actual 
population structure in 1971 from the benchmark 1966 Census and 
to explain the variation observed between the estimated and the 
projected figures on the basis of adjustments made in fertility, 
mortality and net migration. The second stage repeats the process 
using the forecast 1971 population as a base from which to 
estimate the 1976 population. Second stage forecasts are shown 
in tables 4.8 and 4.9, for females and males, respectively. 
Fertility:
The best methodology for analysing changes in the level and
age-pattern of fertility over time would be to estimate the net
maternity function and to predict changes in the number of births
occurring over time on the basis of known (or assumed) changes in
the mean, variance and amplitude of this function. Adequate
estimation of the net maternity function requires source data in
which the analyst has a high degree of confidence, and this is
not the case for Fiji.11 Therefore it was decided to base estimates 4*
4 The problem of underregistration has already been mentioned.
The reported distributions of births by age of mother are also
unreliable because data are published by year of registration
and not by year of occurrence and the lag between these two
reference points may often be quite long. This aggrevates the
significant variability in the reported distribution of births
from year to year. Mention may be made of interesting work by 
p. Cerone, graduate student in Mathematics at the University of
Wollongong, who has developed a method for analysing the  ̂
implication of changes in the parameters of the net maternity 
function over continuous time. Unfortunately it was not 
possible to make use of Cerone's work here.
85.
of changes in fertility on given rates of change in the general 
fertility rate (but not the reported levels of G.F.R. shown in 
figure 4.1, which are subject to the same underregistration 
problem). After adjusting the 1966 Census enumeration of 
fertile-age females to obtain a mid-year estimate, and correcting 
the number of births in the year for underregistration, the G.F.R. 
for 1966 was estimated to be approximately 178. Using data from 
the district health nursing service on the number of births in 
1972, and adjusting the 1971 forecast of fertile-age females for 
changes in mortality and net emigration (discussed below), gave 
an estimated G.F.R. in 1972 of approximately 133. Births in the 
intervening years 1976-1971 were then calculated by assuming a 
constant exponential rate of growth of fertile-age female 
population and a linear decline in the G.F.R.
It is possible to estimate the end-period (1976) number of 
births and the G.F.R. using the 1976 Census data for population 
aged 0-1 years, together with an estimate of infant deaths in 
1976, but my purpose is to test the sensitivity of a forecasting 
procedure for use in the absence of adequate data. Therefore, it 
was simply assumed that the G.F.R. in 1976 would fall to about 
125.00 and that the number of fertile-age females would grow 
evenly between 1972 and 1976 according to the second stage of the 
forecasting method. Although the fall in G.F.R. over the 1960's 
was rapid, this decline is not expected to be as dramatic during 
the 1970's and beyond. There are several reasons to support this 
view:
Firstly, the family planning programme is likely to 
encounter increasing resistance in reducing births 
still further. Secondly, certain structural factors 
which may have helped reduce the birth rate in the 
latter half of the 1960's may not continue to
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exert a similar influence in the future. It is 
probable that delayed marriage by Indian women was 
a factor in the rapid fall of the birth rate in 
the 1960's. Thirdly, the number of women entering 
the fertile age group will increase rapidly.
(Sahib (1973) pp.58-59).
Provided there is some reasonable justification for the 
assumed change in G.F.R. we may proceed for the time being 
confident in the expectation that the validation procedure in the 
next section will indicate the magnitude of any error in judgement.
Mortality:
It has been stated previously that registrations of deaths in 
Fiji are known to be inaccurate. They are also distorted by 
"historical accidents" of the age distributions of deaths and of 
total population which may not apply to the future. Under these 
circumstances an attempt was made to generalise the age- 
distribution of deaths by averaging the registrations over five 
calendar years centred on the life-table calculations (for both 
1966 and 1971) and also to make some correction for under­
registration of deaths.
An alternative approach is to use survival ratios computed 
from model life tables published by the United Nations (for 
example, U.N. (1974) pp.124-125), which are based upon world-wide 
averages about mid-20th century.5 The sensitivity of the population 
projections to this alternative specification of survivorship is
5 Our calculated life expectancy in Fiji would tend to lead us to 
adopt level 90 of the U.N. estimates as model survivorship 
ratios. There is a close correspondence between the U.N. 
level 90 model survivorship ratios and those calculated from 
the Fiji 1966 life-table for age cohorts 5-9 years through 
40-44 years, whereas those cohorts aged 45-49 years and older 
tend to correspond to lower level models (i.e. have lower 
survivorship ratios than the level 90 model).
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very low indeed. Details of this sensitivity test are shown in 
Table 4.10. The difference in male population is +173, female 
population -99 and total population +74. This is quite 
insignificant (but note the higher relative sensitivity for the 
over 50 years old population). It was therefore decided to base 
the mortality aspect of the population forecasting upon the 
adjusted data from Fiji and not on the generalised U.N. model.
Table 4.10
Sensitivity of 1971 projection to alternative survivorship ratios 






U.N. Level 90 
Model Survivorship 
Ratios [21]nyc
Group Males Females Males Females
0- 4 46808 45190 46808 45190
5- 9 41528 40176 41155 39912
10-14 39171 37765 39124 37754
15-19 31713 30399 31662 30878
20-24 25277 25245 25200 25219
25-29 20476 20948 20414 20908
30-34 16864 17075 16831 17047
35-39 13833 13211 13842 13222
40-44 11695 11248 11727 11273
45-49 9340 8888 9412 8900
50-54 3353 7799 8463 7830
55-59 6507 5887 6666 5938
60-64 4084 3780 4266 3878
65-69 2900 2736 3047 2791
70-74 1784 1645 1889 1653
75+ 2521 1886 2521 1886
Total 282854 274378 283027 274279
(Note: 0-4 yrs assumed identical to computed projection;
70-74 yrs survivorship ratio identical to computed projection)
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Migration:
There has been net emigration of Fiji residents each year 
since 1966. The estimated annual levels of net emigration of 
residents (i.e. citizens and permit holders) from 1966 to 1976
are:6
1966 - 800 1972 - 2800
1967 - 1100 1973 - 4900
1968 - 1300 1974 - 6500
1969 - 1300 1975 - 7500
1970 - 1800 1976 - 6000
1971 - 2300
Net emigration has been much greater during the second stage 
of the forecasting period than the first. Table 4.11 shows the 
age distribution of net emigration derived from monthly migration 
figures for the financial year 1973/74, as well as the total 
number of males and females. Unfortunately there is no published 
data showing distribution of net migration by both age and sex, 
and the 1973/74 monthly migration statistics were the only ones 
available to me at the time of writing. Applying the proportionate 
distributions of 1973/74, first by sex, then by age group, to the 
aggregate net emigration figures is the best possible approximation 
in view of the lack of accurate data.
6 Total estimates of annual net emigration for 1966 to 1973 are 
from Bartsch (1974). Those for 1974 to 1976 were derived from 
monthly statistics of migration supplied by the Bureau of 
Statistics. The figures relate to net emigration of "residents", 
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Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics
This completes the description of the changes made to the 
projection method in order to generate population forecasts.
The sequence of working began with the computation of a life 
table for males and females in 1966, then used the stationary 
age distribution as well as observed fertility patterns to 
calculate Leslie projection matrices for males and females. The 
1971 projections were adjusted for known changes in fertility and
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net emigration, and were tested for sensitivity to alternative 
survivorship rates. Then a new life table for 1971 was calculated 
using the estimated age and sex distribution of population, births 
and deaths for that year, and 1976 projections were generated 
using updated Leslie matrices. Again the projections were 
modified to account for assumed changes in fertility and for net 
emigration to yield a forecast of the age and sex structure of 
Fiji's population in 1976. These adjustments are shown alongside 
the projection method in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 (for 1971 forecasts) 
and Tables 4.8 and 4.9 (for 1976 forecasts). The differences 
between the forecasts and the projections are summarised below:
1971: Males Females Total
Projection 282854 274378 557232
Forecast 273116 264855 537971
Difference 9738 9523 19261
Of which: due to change
in fertility: 5682 5779 11461
due to net
emigration: 4056 3744 7800
1976: Males Females Total
Projection 308235 301110 609345
Forecast 289443 283484 572927
Di fference 18792 17626 36418
Of which: due to change
in fertility: 4392 4326 8718
due to net
emigration : 14400 13300 27700
For 1971, 60% of the difference between the Leslie projection 
and the adjusted forecast is attributable to the falling fertility 
over the previous five-year period, and 40% is due to net 
emigration (both of which are ignored in the projection method).
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There was no alteration in assumed survival ratios between 
the two methods.
For 1972-1976, when migration had been more than in the 
preceeding five years and the rate of fertility reduction somewhat 
less, assumed fertility change accounted for 24% of the difference 
between the projected total population and the adjusted forecast, 
while assumed net emigration accounted for 76%. Again mortality 
assumptions were invariant between the two methods.
4.5 Validation of the forecasts 1966-1976
Even if all of the assumptions made in the previous section 
did happen to accurately reflect actual behaviour, some random 
error in prediction would still remain. The columns of the life 
tables used refer to expected values, and even if the probabilities 
do apply to individuals in the course of natural growth, any 
actual cohort will vary by chance from the expected value because 
of random disturbances in the current period (affecting current 
deaths) and in previous periods (affecting the given age 
distribution). In this section statistical confidence limits 
on such random errors are calculated. Then the forecast 1976 
population (by age and sex) is compared with the 1976 Census 
enumeration. Differences between the two distributions that 
exceed the random error bounds may then be attributed to errors 
in the forecasting procedure. The calculation of statistical 
confidence limits on random projection errors is not discussed in 
Keyfitz and Flieger (1971) although they do refer to the existence 
of such errors. The validation procedure in this section takes 
these errors into account and provides a basis for identifying the 
important demographic variables of interest to this study.
9 2 .
Consider first of all the relation between the error, the 
risk and the sample size for proportions (Yamane (1973) pp.205-207). 
The statistical question is: what sample size must be drawn so 
as to keep the error within (say) 2% with a risk of 0.05?
Assuming a normal distribution, this is illustrated as:
The standard error of p is given by
v i P F 1 ..(,)
Without knowing the value of t t ,  we may note the relation
Solving for n, we have
n Z 2 t t ( 1  - t t )
= Q-96)2
(0.02)2




Now, if we can find a value of tt that maximises (3), then n will 
be large enough to be sure (at least 95% sure) that the random 
error is within ±2% of the estimate. This is the same thing as 
maximising t t O - t t ) ,  which is given by solving
¿7 (""T2) = 0
.  * .  TT = 0.5
Substituting into (3), the desired sample size is
n = 11-96^2 . (0.25)
(0.02)2
= 2400
The formula for sample size can now be generalised with the 
inclusion of t t ( I - t t ) = 0.25 as follows:
n = 0.25 z2
Re-arranging (4) to make e the
(4)
subject of the formula gives
e = / 0.25 z2
V — S........  ........ (5)
We are now able to compute error bounds for the population 
forecasts. Firstly, values must be assigned to n and z. As 
regards n, the size of each estimated age/sex cohort as a sample 
estimate is supposed to be the same as that of the population 
(i.e. my forecasts should ideally correspond with the Census at 
that date). As the sample size approaches the population, the 
probability that the estimate is a consistent estimate approaches 
unity. Therefore, the acceptable risk may be set as low as 
possible - say 0.001. The value of z will then be 3.09 and the 








where n is the estimated cohort size. Table 4.12 shows the 
calculated random error range (+ or - the value shown) for my 
1976 forecasts of male and female population by five-year age 
groups. These calculations indicate that we are almost (99.999%) 
certain that the random errors of the population distribution will 
be within the bounds shown.
Table 4.12 also shows the difference between my forecast 
results for 1976 and the 1976 Census enumeration; this is 
labelled "estimation error". Any excess of the estimation error 
over the random error (in absolute value terms) may confidently be 
attributed to inappropriate assumptions in the forecasting 
procedure. Put another way, if for any cohort the estimation 
error is less than the random error bound, we cannot be sure 
that the estimation error is not simply due to random processes. 
This condition appears to be satisfied only for males aged 
15-19 years, for some older age males, and for females in the 
45-54 age range. We are now in a position to evaluate the 
assumptions used in the forecasting procedure.
The total estimation error of 15000 persons is shared fairly 
evenly between males and females. There appears to be some 
consistent overestimation of the older male and female populations 
(aged over 55 years). This might be partly due to a failure to 
account adequately for overseas migration in these older age 
groups but, in view of the earlier comments on underregistration 
of deaths, it is more likely to be due to the conservatism with 
which I have approached mortality rates in Fiji. Table 4.10 
demonstrates that the numbers in these older age groups are
Table 4.12
Validation of 1976 Population Forecast
MALES
Random Estimation
Forecast Error Error Census
% Value
0- 4 38870 0.78 305 - 2672 41542
5- 9 39333 0.78 306 - 386 39719
10-14 40066 0.77 309 - 1520 41586
15-19 36888 0.80 297 + 59 36829
20-24 28163 0.92 259 + 330 27833
25-29 21963 1.04 229 - 472 22435
30-34 18106 1.15 208 - 647 18753
35-39 14835 1.27 188 - 1096 15931
40-44 12425 1.39 172 - 766 13191
45-49 10421 1.51 158 - 406 10827
50-54 8213 1.70 140 - 444 8657
55-59 7221 1.82 131 + 107 7114
60-64 5309 2.12 113 + 82 5227
65-69 3112 2.77 86 + 178 2934
70-74 1951 3.50 68 + 62 1889
75+ 2567 3.05 78 + 84 2483



















Error Error _______ Census
% Value
0.80 298 - 2636 39764
0.79 300 - 441 38249
0.78 305 - 2146 40994
0.82 292 - 656 36339
0.93 257 - 1294 28975
1.03 231 - 385 22644
1.13 212 + 238 18567
1.25 191 - 821 16063
1.41 169 - 558 12591
1.52 157 - 74 10386
1.72 139 + 118 7987
1.84 130 + 432 6610
2.16 110 + 403 4716
2.74 87 + 252 2926
3.32 72 + 307 1849
3.38 71 - 373 2458
vocxi
0.29 823 - 7634 291118
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sensitive to variations in assumed survival ratios because of 
their relatively small size and because their age-specific 
mortality rates are higher than those for younger age groups.
Variation in mortality will tell only a minor part of the 
story for the population under 45 years old. This is because the 
size of the younger cohorts is relatively large and, for at 
least the 5-9 to 30-34 years cohorts, their survival ratios are 
very close to unity as a general rule. With the exception of 
20-24 year old males and 30-34 year old females, there is 
consistent underestimation of the population under 45 years. 
Consider the population in the age range characteristic of female 
reproductive age, viz: 15-44 years. (Females in this age range 
are the denominator of the fertility rate so it is important to 
estimate their numbers accurately for future projection purposes). 
Clearly the estimates of net emigration were too high for both 
males and females in the 15-44 years age groups. Part of this 
error is undoubtedly due to the assumption which was made 
concerning the age/sex composition of net emigration (i.e. using 
the observed composition by sex and by age in 1973/74 for all 
years in the forecasting period). Taken as a whole, the 
estimation error for the 15-44 years age group is approximately 
6000 persons. It may be that not all residents departing Fiji 
who list themselves as emigrants are permanent emigrants, but 
are only temporarily so. Net emigration would appear not to be 
quite as serious as was formerly feared (but see the comment 
below by the Statistician on errors in estimating population).
Finally, consider the forecasts for children. The 
underestimation of the child population in 1976 is primarily due 
to erroneous assumptions about fertility variations in the two
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five-year periods 1967-71 and 1972-76, although clearly much worse 
for the latter period. These errors are more serious when it is 
remembered that the fertile-age female population was also 
underestimated, and when new evidence regarding extremely high 
underregistration of infant deaths before 1975 is considered.
This means that the divergence between the assumed fertility 
and the actual fertility rate is even larger than is 
indicated by estimation errors in the child population, this being 
only a reflection of the numerator. For example, if it had been 
assumed that the G.F.R. was nearly constant after 1972 at 
approximately 130.00 instead of falling to 125.00, and that births 
were recalculated on this basis with no other changes, then forty 
percent of the estimation error in the 0-4 years age group would 
disappear. If the new evidence on infant mortality had been 
published earlier, the higher number of infant deaths would 
increase the error by twenty per cent. Much of the remaining 
error is attributable to inaccurate estimation of the population 
of fertile-age females.
In demographic analysis it is usual to accept the census 
enumerations as accurate, and this has been the approach adopted 
in this chapter. However, there is good evidence in this case 
that some of the estimation error observed in my forecasts is 
attributable to some degree of underenumeration at the 1966 census, 
the basis for my forecasts. This evidence was presented in the 
1976 census report, where the Statistician commented on the census 
coverage:
The total of 588068 persons compares with an 
estimate of 581324 persons for census night. The 
estimate is based on the 1966 census, registration 
of births and deaths and on migration statistics 
and when it is adjusted to allow for incomplete
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registration, the possibility of underenumeration 
at the (1966) census is suggested. Obviously no 
conclusions could be made as to the degree of 
error until the data had been processed and the 
whole of the evidence had been assessed, but on any 
reasonable assumptions about the 1966 base and the 
completeness of registration it was clear that the 
error was not unduly large, (p.15).
The Statistician's estimation error was only half as great as 
mine, but this is of little consequence as my purpose has been to 
assess the relative sensitivity of population forecasting to 
assumptions concerning different aspects of demographic change. 
This would not have been as clear if my forecasts had just 
happened to be accurate.7
4.6 Population projection: 1976-2001
A life table for 1976 was calculated using the 1976 census 
enumeration by age and sex as the base. Data on the distribution 
of deaths in 1976 was not available, so the 1975 data was used as 
a proxy with some slight adjustments to overcome obvious 
irregularities in the age distribution of registered deaths in 
that year. The total number of female deaths was increased 
slightly, but there was no systematic attempt to account for 
underregistration of deaths. This is because the registrations 
for 1975 are believed to be far more accurate than was the case 
in earlier years (as noted in footnote 2) - in particular, infant
7 The Statistician seems to be hinting that his estimation error 
of 6744 may largely be due to underenumeration at the base 1966 
census. There is close correspondence between this figure and 
the amount of error which I have previously attributed to 
inappropriate emigration data and it might be argued that the 
latter data is not greatly in error. The evidence is inadequate 
to permit this line of argument to be accepted. The sensitivity 
of working-age population estimates in Fiji to net emigration 
assumptions as demonstrated in the text still remains as the 
pertinent conclusion (rather than the accuracy of those 
assumptions per se).
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mortality is believed to be more fairly represented in the more 
recent data. The total number of births was obtained by adding 
infant deaths to the observed 1976 census enumeration of 0-1 year 
old population. This gave an estimate of 17714 births for 1976 
and, with the population of fertile-age females at the census 
being 135177, the estimated general fertility rate for 1976 was 
approximately 131. The distribution of births by age of mother 
was only slightly different to that used in the 1966-based methods, 
the main effect being to reduce the proportion of births occurring 
to women over thirty years of age.
The data input to the 1976-based computations is listed in 
Table 4.13 and the life tables for males and females are shown 
in Table 4.14. The mortality rates are higher in the 1976 life 
tables than in the 1966 life tables, and the survival rates used 
in the projection will therefore be lower. Life expectancy at 
birth is estimated at 61 years for males and almost 67 years for 
females.8 Infant mortality rates are 43 and 39 per thousand 
male and female births respectively. *I
8 Population projections used by the Fiji Central Planning 
Office in preparation for Fiji's Seventh Development Plan 
1976-1980 (D.P. 7) were based upon the 1966 Census and 
adjusted in the light of subsequent medical and other data:
"___ they imply a life expectancy at birth for
Fijians of 59.3 years (males) and 62.4 years 
(females), and for Indians of 58.1 years (males) 
and 61.3 years (females)." (D.P. 7, p.259)
These life expectancies are significantly less than those which
I have computed. Yet within D.P. 7 there is some inconsistency 
which states on page 190 that:
"___ life expectancy rates are comparable to
those in more developed countries".
TOO.
Table 4.13
Fiji 1976 (Total Population)
Population data from 1976 Census with age groups 75+ aggregated 
Population of unknown age included with 75 and over age group 
Deaths based on 1975 registrations - some adjustment to smooth 
distribution
Births from 1976 Census 0-1 yrs plus infant deaths estimate 
Distribution of births averaged over 1969-1973
Age Population Births Deaths Age
Male Female Male Female
0 8582 8439 0 367 326 0
1 32960 31325 0 156 140 1
5 39719 38249 0 61 64 5
10 41586 40994 0 50 42 10
15 36829 36339 1718 52 49 15
20 27833 28973 6643 59 57 20
25 22435 22644 5084 54 46 25
30 18753 18567 2462 58 49 30
35 15931 16063 1311 70 56 35
40 13191 12591 496 77 57 40
45 10827 10386 0 122 65 45
50 8657 7987 0 141 82 50
55 7114 6610 0 157 81 55
60 5227 4716 0 180 115 60
65 2934 2926 0 165 82 65
70 1889 1849 0 180 103 70
75 2483 2460 0 417 250 75
Total 296950 291118 17714 2366 1664
The 1976 population was projected to the year 2001 using a 
projection technique similar to the Leslie matrix multipliers 
described in section 4.4. At first it was assumed that the rates 
of fertility and mortality would remain constant at their 1976 
levels, and that no net emigration would occur. The results 
are shown in Table 4.15 which indicates an average exponential 
growth rate of approximately 2.4% per annum for total population, 
2.7% for the population over 15 years old, and 2.0% for the
1 0 1 .




' L(X) D(X) LL(X)
0 8582 367 .041252 100000 4125 96463
1 32960 156 .018711 95875 1794 379015
5 39719 61 .007650 94081 720 468606
10 41586 50 .005993 93361 560 465394
15 36829 52 .007060 92802 655 462457
20 27833 59 .010588 92147 976 458385
25 22435 54 .011995 91171 1094 453207
30 18753 58 .015411 90077 1388 447092
35 15931 70 .021827 88689 1936 438841
40 13191 77 .028984 86753 2514 428047
45 10827 122 .055241 84239 4653 410341
50 8657 141 .078659 79585 6260 382914
55 7114 157 .105186 73325 7713 348231
60 5227 180 .160264 65613 10515 303030
65 2934 165 .249393 55097 13741 242262
70 1889 180 .385247 41356 15932 167202
75 2483 417 1.000000 25424 25424 151385
Age M( X) A(X) TT(X) R(X) E(X) MM(X)
0 .042764 .143 6102872 .0000 61.029 .042764
1 .004733 1.500 6006409 .0000 62.648 .004733
5 .001536 2.500 5627394 .0000 59.814 .001536
10 .001202 2.476 5158789 .0000 55.256 .001202
15 .001417 2.632 4693395 .0288 50.574 .001412
20 .002128 2.594 4230937 .0400 45.915 .002120
25 .002413 2.579 3772552 .0391 41.379 .002407
30 .003105 2.626 3319345 .0333 36.850 .003093
35 .004411 2.621 2872254 .0312 32.386 .004394
40 .005874 2.725 2433413 .0317 28.050 .005837
45 .011340 2.668 2005366 .0322 23.806 .011268
50 .016349 2.602 1595025 .0273 20.042 .016287
55 .022148 2.615 1212111 .0241 16.531 .022069
60 .034701 2.619 863880 .0400 13.166 .034437
65 .056719 2.582 560849 .0400 10.179 .056237
70 .095289 2.516 318587 .0000 7.703 .095289
75 .098721 5.954 151385 .0000 5.954 .167942
1 0 2 .
Life Table for Females 1976
Table 4.14 (cont.)
Age PP DD Q(X) L(X) D(X) LL(X)
0 8439 326 .037382 100000 3738 96769
1 31325 140 .017680 96262 1702 380793
5 38249 64 .008331 94560 788 470830
10 40994 42 .005109 93772 479 467630
15 36339 49 .006742 93293 629 464982
20 28973 57 .009821 92664 910 461107
25 22644 46 .010123 91754 929 456507
30 18567 49 .013159 90825 1195 451268
35 16063 56 .017349 89630 1555 444426
40 12591 57 .022490 88075 1981 435656
45 10386 65 .031041 86094 2672 424252
50 7987 82 .050348 83422 4200 407041
55 6610 81 .059957 79222 4750 385158
60 4716 115 .116014 74472 8640 351580
65 2926 82 .132021 65832 8691 308560
70 1849 103 .246017 57141 14058 252354
75 2460 250 1.000000 43083 43083 423938
Age M(X) A( X) TT (X) R(X) E(X) MM(X)
0 .038630 .136 6682852 .0000 66.829 .038630
1 .004469 1.500 6586083 .0000 68.418 .004469
5 .001673 2.500 6205291 .0000 65.623 .001673
10 .001025 2.431 5734461 .0000 61.153 .001025
15 .001353 2.643 5266831 .0235 56.455 .001348
20 .001974 2.569 4801848 .0400 51.820 .001967
25 .002035 2.564 4340741 .0400 47.308 .002031
30 .002648 2.609 3884234 .0332 42.766 .002639
35 .003499 2.605 3432966 .0341 38.302 .003486
40 .004547 2.618 2988539 .0377 33.932 .004527
45 .006299 2.673 2552884 .0392 29.652 .006258
50 .010319 2.603 2128632 .0360 25.517 .010267
55 .012332 2.695 1721591 .0372 21.731 .012254
60 .024574 2.595 1336433 .0400 17.946 .024385
65 .028167 2.630 984853 .0400 14.960 .028025
70 .055706 2.628 676292 .0000 11.836 .055706
75 .040820 9.840 423938 .0000 9.840 .101626
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under-15 years population. The dependency ratio (i.e. the 
proportion of population under 15 years old)9 is projected to 
decline from 41.1% in 1976 to 36.6% in 2001 under the constant 
fertility/mortality and no migration scenario.
In order to transform this projection shown in Table 4.15 
into a forecast it is necessary to make some assumptions about 
changes in fertility, mortality, and net overseas migration.
The rate of net emigration which would have to occur to hold total 
population growth at 2.1% per annum (the average 1966-76 rate) is 
approximately 3000 persons per year. This would still imply a 
total population of one million at the end of the century with 
constant fertility and mortality. However, any forecast of net 
emigration is really only conjecture and none was made for this 
chapter. Changes in mortality may occur over the period due to 
improving health conditions and expanded rural medical facilities; 
but the general level of mortality in Fiji is already quite low so 
such improvements would have only a marginal impact on the 
population projection (although their effect on infant mortality 
would probably be significant). It was shown previously that 
projections of total population tend to be rather insensitive 
to reasonable alternative survivorship regimes. Accordingly it is
9 In developed countries where wage labour is the dominant mode of 
employment and a formal retirement age is institutionally 
regulated (say 65 years), the dependency burden is often 
expressed as the ratio of the population under-fifteen years and 
over-sixty-five years to population aged between fifteen and 
sixty-five. In Fiji self-employment is so prevalent that the 
specification of a formal retirement age would not be relevant 
(see chapter 6). Therefore the definition of dependency burdens 
used here is quite different to that commonly used. Hereafter 
the "working-age population" refers to the population aged 
fifteen years and over.
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Population Projection 1976-2001 by Sex and Five-year Age Group
Table 4.15
Males
1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
0 41542 47350 56497 63103 66830 71124
5 39719 40942 46666 55680 62191, 65864
10 41586 39447 40661 46346 55298 61765
15 36829 41324 39198 40404 46054 54949
20 27833 36505 40960 38853 40049 45648
25 22435 27519 36092 40497 38414 39596
30 18753 22132 27147 35605 39951 37895
35 15931 18407 21724 26646 34948 39213
40 13191 15539 17954 21190 25991 34089
45 10827 12645 14896 17212 20313 24916
50 8657 10103 11800 13901 16061 18955
55 7114 7873 9188 10731 12642 14606
60 5227 6191 6851 7996 9338 11001
65 2934 4179 4949 5477 6392 7466
70 1889 2025 2884 3416 3780 4412
75 2483 1710 1833 2611 3093 3423
TM 296950 333890 379301 429668 481344 534923
Females
0 39764 46580 55578 62076 65743 69967
5 38249 39203 45924 54794 61201 64816
10 40994 37989 38937 45611 54422 60785
15 36339 40762 37774 38717 45353 54114
20 28973 36036 40422 37459 38394 44975
25 22644 28684 35677 40019 37085 38011
30 18567 22384 28355 35267 39560 36660
35 16063 18285 22045 27925 34733 38960
40 12591 15746 17925 21610 27374 34047
45 10386 12261 15334 17455 21044 26657
50 7987 9965 11764 14712 16747 20190
55 6610 7558 9429 11132 13921 15847
60 4716 6034 6899 8607 10161 12707
65 2926 4139 5295 6055 7554 8918
70 1849 2393 3385 4331 4952 6178
75 2460 3106. 4020 5687 7276 8319
TF 291118 331126 378761 431456 485519 541151
T 588068 665016 758062 861124 966863 1076073
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suggested that the population projection for age cohorts already 
born in 1976 will not be seriously in error if used as a forecast 
of survivors.
The same is not true of the population yet to be born. Changes 
in fertility behaviour are likely to occur - in particular, it 
was suggested earlier that fertility of Fijian women may rise in 
the late 1970‘s and 1980's. However, the magnitude of future 
changes in fertility has generally defied accurate estimation.
In order to indicate what the effects of a dynamic fertility 
regime might be, it was decided to generate two additional 
population projections with, in one case, fertility continually 
rising from its 1976 level and, in the other case, fertility 
continually declining from its 1976 level. Leslie matrix 
multipliers were used for this purpose. At each five yearly 
interval between 1976 and 2001 the multipliers were adjusted to 
simulate, in one case, a continuous increase in the general 
fertility rate of one point each year for twenty-five years 
(from 131 in 1976 to 156 in 2001), and in the other case a 
continuous decrease of one point each year for twenty-five years 
(from 131 in 1976 to 106 in 2001). These essentially arbitrary 
adjustments to fertility are well within the bounds of possibility 
- figure 4.1 shows that the G.F.R. may vary much more than this 
in a shorter space of time. The purpose of these "high" and 
"low" fertility projections is to highlight the cost of increasing 
fertility, and the benefits of reducing fertility, in terms of 
variations of the growth in demand for employment opportunities 
and in terms of variations in the dependency burden. The 
implication for income inequality may then be inferred from 
arguments listed previously is shown in Table 4.16.
Table 4.16 Population projections for the year 2001
(Base year 1976, constant mortality, zero net emigration).
Population in 2001 Annual Growth Rate (%)









Fertility rising 1140762 454098 686664 2.65 2.52 2.74 39.8
Fertility constant 1076073 394321 681752 2.41 1.95 2.71 36.6
Fertility falling 1007753 338359 669394 2.15 1.34 2.64 33.6
106.
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The results of Table 4.16 imply that variations in the 
general fertility rate affect the size of the working-age 
population only after a considerable lag (at least fifteen years), 
and even then the impact is not large over twenty-five years. A 
constantly falling fertility rate has a slightly larger downward 
effect on the growth of working-age population than does a 
constantly rising fertility rate in the opposite direction.
This is because the decline in fertility directly reduces the 
number of potential mothers in the age range 15-24 years for the 
end of the century. From the projections of population 
under-!5 years old it can be seen that fertility changes directly 
affect this group, and hence the dependency burden also, and 
the impact after twenty-five years is quite large. A fertility 
rate continually rising at the rate postulated above would 
generate an additional sixty thousand persons aged less than 
15 years by the year 2001. If the fertility rate fell continually 
as indicated there would be fifty-six thousand fewer persons aged 
less than 15 years by the year 2001 than there would be if the 
fertility rate was constant.
A further simulation of the effect of variations in fertility 
was made by changing the distribution of births by age of mother. 
This simulation was prompted by the fact that in the 1974 Fiji 
Fertility Survey the distribution of births by age of mother was 
estimated to be significantly different to that based on 
registrations. The most obvious difference was a higher 
proportion of births occuring to women in the 15-19 years age
group in the Fertility Survey, as shown below:10___________________
10 It should be noted that these two distributions are not strictly 
comparable because one is based upon an institutionally 
organised system of continuous recording and the other is 
deduced from a small sample of households drawn at one point in 
time. The test is of methodological interest only and nothing 



























In order to test the sensitivity of the post-1976 population 
projection to an alternative fertility distribution, the general 
fertility rate was held constant but the number of births was 
assumed to be distributed across age cohorts of mothers as in the 
1974 Fertility Survey. This would not alter the life table 
calculation for 1976, but one would expect some difference in the 
population projection because births would be occurring at 
different rates to the several cohorts of mothers. In fact the 
total projected population for the year 2001 is only 3340 less 
under the alternative fertility regime. Total population growth 
would still occur at 2.4% per annum and the under-15 years 
population would grow at 1.92% per annum. Clearly changes in the 
distribution of births by age of mother are of little significance 
by themselves when compared with changes in the general fertility 
rate.
The implications of limiting the rate of growth of population 
through fertility reductions are reasonably clear as regards the 
average level of per capita income. The Fiji government has a 
general policy of limiting population growth to 2% per annum 
(D.P. 7, p.10). Actual population growth between 1966 and 1976 
was close to this target at 2.1% per annum but this was achieved 
with a high level of emigration. Many of the emigrants possessed
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skills which would be useful to the economy, and the implications 
of limiting population growth through net emigration are not 
clear. The projections of population beyond 1976 indicate that 
it would be possible to keep the population growth rate close to 
the target 2% per annum in the absence of net emigration if 
strong and sustained efforts are made to reduce the birthrate.
It has also been suggested that there may be a differential 
dependency burden among income groups. If this is so then a 
reduction in fertility would also have a direct effect upon the 
distribution of income, as discussed in chapter 1.
4.7 Rural-to-urban migration: 1966-1976
Previous sections of this chapter have concentrated upon 
accounting for changes in the age and sex composition of the 
total population and on its overall rate of growth. Another aspect 
of demographic change which is important for the planning 
framework aimed at promoting employment opportunities and reducing 
income inequality is that associated with the location of 
population in rural and urban areas. In this section the extent 
of urbanisation of Fiji's population is considered and an attempt 
is made to measure the rates of net rural-to-urban migration by 
age and sex cohorts.
Rapid urbanisation in many developing countries in recent 
times is accompanied by severe unemployment and bitter social and 
economic distress. Strategies to promote employment in developing 
countries under such circumstances may be classified into one of 
two broadly opposing viewpoints. On the one hand, there is the 
view that modernisation, industrialisation and urbanisation are 
processes which appear to have occurred concurrently in history
n o .
and are necessary for the achievement of development goals:
We are witnessing an historical transformation in 
which great forces are at work, rending and 
remaking the whole social pattern; these forces 
are operating over a long period, and the concept 
of crisis is inappropriate. It is an unbalanced 
transformation... Yet urbanisation is, for better 
or worse, at the core of the process of development. 
(Westebbe (1970), p.2). M
On the other hand, the view is that policies to facilitate 
rapid urbanisation are, if not entirely misplaced, then at least 
premature:
...if as much as sixty to ninety percent of the 
population depends on "traditional" activities - 
agriculture in particular - then the economic 
upgrading of these activities must form the 
cornerstone of any strategy for solving the 
unemployment problem. (Turnham (1970), p.8).
There is a paradox involved for the planning framework in 
that, while urbanisation is essential to the development of a 
sophisticated modern economy, it is at the root of tendencies 
towards increasing regional inequalities in income distribution 
(see, for instance, McKee and Leahy (1970)). This is because the 
modern economic structure has located in and around urban areas 
primarily in response to the trading function of towns and 
cities, where it serves also to reinforce the disparities imposed 
by dualism in the urban areas. The link between the distribution 
of income between modern and traditional sectors on one hand, and 
the distribution of income by size-income groups on the other was 
discussed in chapter 1. In Fiji, the concentration of development 
activity in recent years has taken place in and around the major 
urban centres on the main islands of Viti Levu (Suva, Lautoka and 
also Vatukoula) and Vanua Levu (Labasa). This has been a source 
of concern for the current Development Plan:
Although in the absence of adequate statistics 
it is not possible to determine the level of 
rural-to-urban migration in Fiji in recent years, 
indications are that the towns have been 
experiencing a considerable inflow of rural 
dwellers, particularly youth. By mid-1973 an 
estimated 33.8% of Fiji's population lived in the 
country's 13 towns and city. For various reasons - 
including an increase of urban anti-social 
behaviour and inadequacy of urban job opportunities 
- a major Plan objective is to reduce the level of 
such movement, primarily through programmes to 
improve the quality of 1ife,increase real rural 
incomes, and expand employment opportunities in the 
rural areas. (Government of Fiji (1975), p.20).
Clearly, the attitude of the Fiji Government is much more 
closely related to the second of the two viewpoints contrasted 
above.11
With the publication of the 1976 Census it is possible to 
estimate the change in the proportion of population living in 
urban areas over the previous ten years and to obtain some 
measures of age- and sex-specific rates of rural-to-urban 
migration. These estimates can only be interpreted as broad 
indicators, because there is considerable short-period migration 
which will not be reflected in intercensal comparisons.
In both the 1966 and 1976 Censuses, the urban population was 
designated as those living in the towns and peri-urban areas of 
Suva City, Lautoka, Ba, Labasa, Levuka, Nadi, Savusavu, Sigatoka 
and Nausori, as well as the unincorporated townships of Korovou, 
Navua, Raki-Raki, Tavua and Vatukoula. The capital, Suva, is the
11 This view has not been unchallenged in recent years. Reference 
to the debate on the desirability of concentrating development 
resources in urban or rural areas is made by Brookfield et. al. 
(1977), who contrast their own view (supporting rural 
development) with that of the UNFIPLAN team (1976) (arguing that 
it is more efficient to encourage urban development to absorb 
the inevitably greater flow of migrants). The debate is 
centred on the man/land ratios in rural areas, and on the 
carrying capacities and efficiency of land use in the outer 
islands.
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only urban area with the status of a city; in 1976 the population 
of Suva and its surrounding urban area was 117827 persons 
(54/£ of Fiji s urban population). Lautoka in Ba Province is the 
next largest town with 28847 persons. In the same province,
Nadi had 12995 persons and Ba urban area comprised 9173 persons. 
Nausori, near Suva, had 12821 persons and Labasa, in Macuata* 
Province, had 12956 persons.
The population in urban and rural areas from the 1966 and 





The proportion of population living in urban areas in 1966
was 33.4%. In 1976 the urban population was 37.2% of the total
population. Urbanisation may be discussed in terms of levels
such as these, or in terms of rates of growth of urban population
and the two approaches should be clearly distinguished. The
term "tempo of urbanisation" is often reserved for the latter
approach and one way of measuring this is the urban-rural-growth-
difference (u.r.g.d.) (U.N. (1974) chapter 3). The average
exponential growth of Fiji's urban population between 1966 and 1976
was 3.16% per annum, while that of the rural population was 1.52%
per annum - an apparent u.r.g.d. of 1.64%. However, recall that
emigration overseas has occurred at an increasing rate in the
intercensal period, amounting to a net outflow of some 30,000
persons in ten years.12 It is reasonable to assume that most of
12 This estimate takes into account the fact that my earlier 
estimate of 35,500 was probably too high. The extent of the 
error is difficult to quantify.
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these persons were urban dwellers. If they had remained in Fiji, 
the implied u.r.g.d. would have been much higher (approximately 
2.93% per annum) and this is the more appropriate figure when 
considering the issue from the point of view of a lagging rural 
sector.
A more detailed and informative approach to internal migration 
would recognise that the propensity to migrate is different for 
persons of different ages. There are also differences in 
migration tendencies between males and females. Although the 
1966 and 1976 Censuses do list urban and rural populations by 
sex, the 1966 census does not list urban and rural populations by 
age group, so that it is not a simple matter to compute age- 
specific rates of rural-to-urban migration over the ten years.
Under these circumstances the approach adopted was to consider 
the age/sex distribution of the fifteen provinces of Fiji, and of 
Suva city separately (this data is available in both censuses).
An arbitrary but reasonable distinction was drawn between those 
provinces which are essentially "rural" and those which are 
heavily influenced by urban centres within their boundaries.
In the latter group was included Ba Province (major towns being 
Lautoka, Nadi and Ba), Macuata Province (Labasa), and the combined 
Provinces of Rewa-Tailevu-Naitasiri (dominated by Suva and 
Nausori).13 Those provinces which were designated as "rural" 
included Bua, Cakaudrove, Kadavu, Lau, Lomaiviti, Nadroga/Navosa, 
Namosi, Ra, Serua and Rotuma.
13 "Provincial boundaries are not particularly meaningful to the 
people living in the Suva/Nausori area because the urban 
sprawl overlies them and there were some inconsistencies 
arising from ignorance of them". (1976 Census Report, p.17).
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Table 4.17 shows the age and sex distribution of these "rural 
provinces" combined and of Suva city in 1966 and in 1976. By using 
the survivorship ratios computed from the life tables of the 
previous sections it is possible to compute the expected numbers 
in each age-sex cohort for their population in 1976, at least for 
ages 10 years and over.1Lf This computation is shown in Table 4.18. 
These numbers of expected survivors in the "rural provinces" 
may then be compared with the actual 1976 enumeration for the 
same provinces. Any excess of the former over the latter is 
mostly due to out-migration from rural areas (except for small 
estimation errors). The apparent non-transfer ratio is found by 
dividing the census enumeration by the expected survivors for 
each age/sex cohort. Annual implicit rates of rural-to-urban 
migration may then be calculated by subtracting the non-transfer 
ratio from unity and dividing by ten years of the intercensal 
period. These age- and sex-specific migration rates are shown in 
the right-most column of Table 4.18. It should be reiterated that 
these are useful as a guide to the actual orders of magnitude - 
the last two digits have no significance at all.
For males, the annual rates of net rural emigration are 
clearly greatest for age groups 15-19 years (2.3%), 20-24 years 
(3.0%) and 25-29 years (1.8%). Migration rates for males between 
30 and 60 years of age vary between 0.6% and 0.8% per annum. The
l k  It is not clear whether mortality is higher in urban or in 
rural Fiji. Medical facilities are not as good in rural areas 
but the risk of contagion is less and the diet is probably 
more nutritious in rural areas. Since the population is only 
one-third urbanised, the survivorship ratios computed from a 
national life table are probably not seriously inappropriate 
for rural dwellers. The age and sex composition of Suva city 




Age and sex distribution of "rural provinces1 1966 and 1S76 
(from Table 7 in both Censuses) '
1966 Census 1976 Census
Males Females Total Males Females Total
0- 4 14107 13582 27689 12502 11809 24311
5- 9 12937 12215 25152 12694 12117 24811
10-14 10054 9885 19939 12998 12404 25402
15-19 7014 7482 14496 9809 9604 19413
20-24 5551 6252 11803 6909 7267 14176
25-29 5020 5252 10272 5626 5843 11469
30-34 4431 4299 8730 4975 5134 10109
35-39 3788 3693 7481 4540 4632 9172
40-44 3134 2956 6090 4008 3719 7727
45-49 2837 2676 5513 3307 3089 6396
50-54 2445 2173 4618 2681 2458 5139
55-59 1658 1565 3223 2278 2172 4450
60-64 1295 1185 2480 1842 1660 3502
65-69 882 779 1661 1077 1060 2137
70-74 563 531 1094 703 688 1391
75+ 820 692 1512 769 865 1634
Total 76536 75217 151753 86718 84521 171239
"rural provinces": Bua, Cakaudrove, Kadavu, Lau, Lomaiviti,
Namosi, Nadroga/Navosa, Ra, Serua, Rotuma
(75+ includes unknown age)
Age and sex distribution, Suva city, 1966 and 1976
1966 Census 1976 Census
Males Females Total Males Females Total
0- 4 3924 3687 7611 4084 4027 8111
5- 9 3766 3796 7562 3362 3204 6566
10-14 3310 3383 6693 3381 3483 6864
15-19 3251 3329 6580 4057 4260 8317
20-24 2737 2901 5638 3760 4104 7864
25-29 2131 2275 4406 3105 3020 6125
30-34 1765 1749 3514 2290 2222 4512
35-39 1471 1484 2955 1775 1868 3643
40-44 1266 1188 2454 1517 1503 3020
45-49 1101 1001 2102 1221 1239 2460
50-54 827 762 1589 1045 930 1975
55-59 531 461 992 770 754 1524
60-64 336 371 707 541 536 1077
65-69 302 250 552 265 306 571
70-74 201 151 352 200 186 386
75+ 254 196 450 313 300 613
27173 26984 54157 31686 31942 63628
116.
Table 4.18
Population of "rural provinces" Apparent Annual 

















10 10054 .9944 13905 12998 .9348 .00652
15 7014 .9923 12799 9809 .7664 .02336
20 5551 .9903 9921 6909 .6964 .03036
25 5020 .9885 6892 5626 .8163 .01837
30 4431 .9843 5434 4975 .9155 .00845
35 3788 .9781 4884 4540 .9296 .00704
40 3134 .9654 4266 4008 .9395 .00605
45 2837 .9472 3577 3307 .9245 .00755
50 2445 .9177 2866 2681 .9355 .00645
55 1658 .8710 2466 2278 .9238 .00762
60 1295 .8223 1954 1842 .9427 .00573
65 882 .7523 1187 1077 .9073 .00927
70 563 .6044 801 703 .8777 .01223




10 9885 .9948 13392 12404 .9262 .00738
15 7482 .9924 12092 9604 .7942 .02058
20 6252 .9915 9759 7267 .7446 .02554
25 5252 .9900 7362 5843 .7937 .02063
30 4299 .9860 6137 5134 .8366 .01634
35 3693 .9819 5127 4632 .9035 .00965
40 2956 .9775 4162 3719 .8936 .01064
45 2676 .9662 3545 3089 .8714 .01286
50 2173 .9487 2792 2458 .8804 .01196
55 1565 .9116 2453 2172 .8854 .01146
60 1185 .8796 1879 1660 .8834 .01166
65 779 .8305 1255 1060 .8446 .01554
70 531 .5992 866 688 .7945 .2055
75+ 692 (.3719) (963) 865 .8982 .1018
"rural provinces": Bua, Cakaudrove, Kadavu, Lau,
Lomaiviti, Namosi, Nadroga/Navosa, 
Ra, Serua, Rotuma
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apparently high migration rates for males over 65 years of age 
should be discounted in view of the small numbers in these age 
groups and their sensitivity to inappropriate survivorship ratios. 
The migration rate for males aged 10-14 years is also shown as 
approximately 0.6% per annum. Most of these are likely to be 
accompanying their parents in search of better education for the 
children in urban areas as well as higher income-earning 
opportunities.
For females the annual rates of rural emigration are likewise 
much higher in the age range 15 to 29 years than older years. 
Female migration rates for 15-19 years (2.0%) and 20-24 years 
(2.5%) are somewhat lower than their male contemporaries. For 
25-29 years (2.0%) and 30-34 years (1.6%) they are higher than 
for males,substantially so in the case of the 30-34 years group. 
Migration rates for females between 35 and 64 years of age vary 
between 0.9% per annum and 1.2% per annum, somewhat higher than 
for males of corresponding age. I suspect that the survivorship 
ratios for females over 40 years old may be too high (because of 
greater underregistration of female deaths than male deaths), 
and this probably accounts for any significant difference in 
migration rates between males and females in these age groups.
Once again, the apparently high rates of migration for females 
over 65 years of age should be discounted (and probably ignored).
The greater tendency of young people to migrate from rural to 
urban areas is reinforced by considering the differences in 
proportionate age distributions between the rural provinces and 
Suva city. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2 for both males and 
females in 1966 and 1976. The bars in Figure 4.2 show, for each 
five-year age group (0-4, 5-9,...,55-59, 60 and over), the
F igure  4.2
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difference, measured in percentage points, between the proportion 
of Suva city's population in a given age group, and the proportion 
of the rural provinces' population in the same age group. Suva 
city has attracted a disproportionate share of population in the 
15-34 years age groups, while the rural provinces seem to have a 
disproportionate share of the very young and of the very old. 
Interestingly the difference between Suva and the rural provinces 
in the share of population in the 0-4 year age group is very much 
less in 1976 then in 1966. This is partly due to a high 
propensity for fertile age females to migrate from rural to urban 
areas, but is also influenced by the spread of family limiting 
practices to rural areas in the intercensal period.
It should be noted that despite heavy outmigration of youths 
and young adults from rural areas, the absolute numbers of 
population in rural areas in all age groups has not declined.
There has been some positive growth in rural population even for 
those age groups with high propensities to migrate. Of course, 
this is probably not a general rule - there are some localities 
in which the population has declined (Brookfield et. al. (1977), 
page 28). Further, the above analysis does not capture the 
effects of short-term migration, particularly seasonal migration. 
Nevertheless, it would appear that the average rural man/land 
ratio has not declined as a result of rural emigration over the 
ten years to 1976, and this is particularly important in assessing 
the relationship of demographic changes to income distribution and 
welfare. This point will be taken up in the next chapter.
1 2 0 .
The main purposes of this chapter have been:
(i) to quantify those demographic changes which have occurred 
in Fiji in recent years and which are important for the 
p.anning framework concerned with employment and income 
inequality, and
(ii) to assess the sensitivity of population forecasts to 
alternative assumptions about fertility, mortality and 
migration so thatfurther demographic implications for the 
planning framework could be assessed^
Between 1966 and 1976 the population of Fiji grew from 
477000 to 588000 persons, at an average growth rate of 2.1% per 
annum. In the same period there was net emigration of 
approximately 30000 residents, most of which occurred during the 
second half of the period and was concentrated among the younger 
members of the working-age population. While total population 
growth was 2.1% per annum, the population of working age (15 years 
and over) grew from 254000 in 1966 to 346000 in 1976, an average 
growth rate of 3.1% per annum. This rapid growth of the 
working-age population has been a major contributing factor to 
Fiji's growing unemployment problem in recent years. Urban 
unemployment has also been exacerbated by high rates of rural-to- 
urban migration in the intercensal period, in excess of 2.0% per 
annum for the rural population under 30 years of age. The 
structure of employment and the nature of underemployment and 
unemployment in Fiji is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
Although rapid growth of the working-age population has 
exacerbated the problems of creating sufficient employment
4.8 Summary
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opportunities, it has also contributed to a reduction in the 
dependency burden by raising the growth of the working-age 
population relative to that of the non-working-age population.
The other important influence in this respect was the fall in 
fertility. Between 1966 and 1976 the general fertility rate fell 
from 178 to 131 births per thousand fertile-age females. The 
crude birth rate fell from 36 to 30 per thousand population. As a 
result, the non-working-age population grew from 223000 in 1966 
to 242000 in 1976, an average growth rate of only 0.8% per annum. 
This reduction in fertility and in the dependency burden would 
have been a force working towards reductions in income inequality 
in Fiji, according to the analysis based on cross-section data 
from many countries (in chapter 2). The measurement of income 
inequality in Fiji is examined in chapter 8.
There are some interesting variations in this scenario 
when Fiji's population is projected into the future. With constant 
rates of fertility and mortality as observed in 1976, and in the 
absence of net emigration, the total population would probably 
reach 758000 by 1986, an implied average growth rate of 2.5% per 
annum. This growth rate could be reduced to that observed 
between 1966 and 1976 if net emigration averages 3000 persons per 
year up to 1986. The projected growth rate of the working-age 
population will remain high, at an average 3.1% per annum, in 
the absence of net emigration; its level might then reach 
474000 by 1986. This has been caused by the high birth rates in 
the 1950's and early 19601s. Even if labour force participation 
rates remain constant, this continued rapid growth of the working- 
age population will make the task of generating employment 
opportunities extremely difficult in the coming decade. The
1 2 2 .
situation will be worse if female participation rates continue to 
rise as was observed between 1966 and 1976 (see chapter 6).
Under the assumption of constant age-specific fertility 
rates, the non-working-age population is projected to grow from 
242000 in 1976 to 284000 in 1986, an average growth rate of 1.5% 
per annum. Thus the rate of reduction in the dependency burden 
(and in income inequality as a consequence of it) will be much less 
in the future than was observed in the 1966-76 period, unless 
further reductions in fertility can be achieved. As was noted in 
the text, this is becoming increasingly difficult in Fiji.
Nevertheless, forecasting changes in fertility behaviour is a 
very hazardous occupation. In the validation process applied in 
section 4.5 it was revealed that, even under reasonable 
assumptions pertaining to expected fertility changes over the 
immediate five year period (the common period for development 
plans), the estimated 0-4 years population was in error by 5000 
persons after five years. Population forecasts based on constant 
fertility regimes must therefore be regarded with a high degree 
of caution over the medium to long term.
In view of this, two further population projections were 
calculated to indicate the effects of both increasing and 
decreasing the general fertility rate. It was shown that modest 
but sustained changes in fertility can have a large effect on the 
rate of growth of the non-working age population. For example, 
if the general fertility rate were to decline by one point 
(per thousand) each year for ten years, the non-working-age 
population would only grow to 271000 in 1986, an average growth 
rate of 1.1% per annum. According to the analysis of chapter 1 
we may expect that a reduction in the birthrate will improve the
1 2 3 .
distribution of income in favour of the poor, and an increase in 
the birthrate will cause an adverse shift in the distribution of 
income. An important conclusion of this chapter, therefore, is 
that the birthrate (or the general fertility rate) is a critical 
variable for the planning framework in which we are.interested.
Changes in mortality are expected to make an insignificant 
impact on the projected numbers of cohorts already born in 1976.
The projected population aged 15-years-and-over in 1991 is 
therefore thought to be a good representation of expected 
survivors in the working-age population at that date. The critical 
factor in accurate estimation here is the level of net overseas 
migration. Although ex post data on overseas migration to and 
from Fiji should be readily obtained due to her island geography, 
ex ante estimates are purely conjectural. To the extent that net 
emigration is related to domestic labour market difficulties in 
general, and to the extent that these will be exacerbated by 
rapid population growth, we may expect net emigration in the next 
fifteen years not to be insignificant.
If rural-to-urban migration continues at the same rate as 
was observed in 1966-76, the rural population of Fiji will 
probably number 430000 in 1986. This would be 57% of the total 
population in the absence of net overseas migration (or 59% if 
net emigration at the rate of 3000 persons per year from urban 
locations occurs). The success of the current development plan 
in improving rural welfare in general, and the welfare effects on 
rural households of absorbing more labour in productive activities, 
will be the major determinants of the rate of rural-to-urban 
migration in the immediate future. It is unlikely that present 
internal migration rates can be sustained without increasing 
urban unemployment and social tensions.
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CHAPTER 5
The concept and measurement of employment and underemployment
5.1 Introduction
The rationale of this chapter is that a thorough examination 
of the concept and measurement of employment in developing 
countries is fundamental to understanding the relationship between 
employment and the distribution of income in these countries.
It will be argued that the concept and measurement of employment in 
developing countries is different from that in developed countries 
and as such requires different methods of analysis.
Many theoretical and empirical difficulties are encountered 
when analysis of employment problems in developing countries is 
attempted using some of the formal models designed for this 
purpose. To a large extent this is because these models are built 
upon a premise concerning labour force underutilisation1 which 
is not appropriate for equity-oriented development planning.
That premise is concerned with the transfer of surplus labour 
from the traditional sector to the modern sector in order to 
support growth per se in the modern sector. It is possible to 
draw out some of the distributional implications of this sort of 
development (as described in chapter one, for example), but they 
are rarely treated explicitly.
1 The term "labour force underutilisation" is taken from Smith 
(1971) who uses it as a portmanteau phrase for underemployment 
and unemployment, constituting various degrees of wastage of 
labour resources. The connotation of the phrase with manpower 
utilisation for growth is not entirely apt for present purposes, 
since we are more concerned with the relationship between 
employment and income distribution. Its use here is to avoid 
semantic confusion between "underemployment" as a measurable 
dimension of a concept and as a concept itself. Both aspects of 
"underemployment" will be examined in this chapter.
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Empirical studies have shown that "the employment problem" in 
developing countries is really a multitude of specific problems 
related to technology, education, population, trade, urbanisation, 
and so on. This is well documented in the many studies undertaken 
as part of the I.L.O. sponsored World Employment Programme 
(I.L.O. (1974)). The common denominator of all these problems is 
the fact that poverty, or more generally, a high degree of 
inequality in the distribution of income and of income-earning 
opportunities, is the most pressing problem facing all developing 
countries. It has been suggested that the study of employment 
problems may well be justified by the light which can thereby be 
shed on poverty and inequality (Stewart (1975)). This approach to 
planning and policy formation may be regarded as a pragmatic 
attempt to cut through the many theoretical and empirical 
difficulties associated with the study of underemployment in 
developing countries. Accordingly this chapter presents a very 
selective discussion of some recent attempts to define and analyse 
a concept of employment which is relevant for a planning framework 
in which distributional equity is given primary importance.
Section 2 of the chapter contains a brief overview of the 
models which have been used to explain aspects of the employment 
problem in developing countries and discusses the need for 
country-specific empirical research. Section 3 contains a critical 
evaluation of the internationally accepted conventions used for 
classifying persons according to their economic activity status. 
Some of the problems involved in using this classification scheme 
in developing countries may be overcome with an appropriate 
statistical definition - appropriate, that is, to the particular 
country being studied. In chapter 6 these remarks will be drawn
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upon to discuss the structure of employment, underemployment and 
open unemployment in Fiji. There are other problems, however, 
which require the establishment of appropriate theoretical concepts 
before the classification scheme can be used properly in the 
planning framework we have in mind. These conceptual criteria are 
the subject of Section 4 of this chapter.
5.2 Models and empirical research
Following Jolly et. al. (1973) the formal models designed to 
explain the employment problems in developing countries may be 
grouped into three schools:
(i) models concerned with the transfer of surplus labour 
from a traditional to a modern sector (for example,
Lewis (1954), Fei and Ranis (1964), Todaro (1971));
(ii) models focussing on the growth of output and employment 
(variants of Harrod (1948) and Domar (1957));
(iii) models concerned with factor price disequilibria
(for example, Eckaus (1955), Blaug, Layard and Woodhall 
(1969)).
The Lewis-Fei-Ranis model has a distinct classical orientation 
because its assumptions - that there is some level of agricultural 
workforce oeyond which labour is redundant, and that the real 
wage rate is institutionally fixed - are similar to those 
underlying the Marxian "reserve army of unemployed". Contemporary 
research suggests that in many developing countries almost no 
open surplus labour exists in rural areas, yet there is widespread 
open unemployment in urban areas. Further, the typical situation 
in developing countries has been for urban real wages to rise both 
absolutely and in relation to rural real incomes even in the
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presence of open unemployment (see, for instance, Turnham (1970), 
Bairoch (1973)). Todaro (1971) has formalised the individual's 
decision to migrate from rural to urban areas as a function of 
the difference in real incomes between rural and urban work, and 
of the probability that a new migrant will find a job. His model 
has been further extended to account for persistent urban 
unemployment by incorporating a waiting time into the probability 
function (I.L.O. (1970), (1971), Blaug, Layard and Woodhall (1969)). 
Jolly et. al. (1973) regard the Todaro model as belonging to the 
same school as the Lewis-Fei-Ranis model because he maintains the 
basic contribution of attempting to explain the development of a 
dualistic economy. Then the Lewis-Fei-Ranis model may be 
interpreted as an extreme case (no difference in real incomes, one 
hundred percent probability of finding an urban job) of the more 
general Todaro model.
In the second school of models, employment is made to be a 
function of output through labour-output ratios which may be 
constant or which may vary according to exogenously given changes 
in productivity. Population growth determines the workforce size 
through well developed demographic techniques such as those 
employed in chapter 4. Unemployment is then the difference between 
supply and demand for labour at the given wage. This approach has 
been extended to provide the rich detail of multi-sectoral analysis 
using an input-output matrix and disaggregation by skills of 
different labour units (Blitzer (1975), Dougherty (1972)).
Weaknesses in the approach as it has been applied in the past 
include the exogenous treatment of productivity and the assumption 
of fixed input-output ratios, especially in the long run. The 
BACHUE series of models (see I.L.O. (1973)) has demonstrated that
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such limitations would in principle present few barriers to model 
builders of this school, if only adequate data was available to 
test more complex relationships.
The third school of models takes as its starting point the
observation that the use of conventional income-generating policies
(i.e. Keynesian aggregate demand stimulation) is frustrated in
developing countries. This leads only to excessive inflationary
pressures or balance of payments difficulties long before full
employment is approached. The reasons advanced to explain this
are oriented towards relative factor proportions and the technology
of industry. Eckaus (1955) described two aspects of this:
The first type assumes that available technology 
would permit full use of the working force at 
some set of relative prices and finds the source 
of unemployment in various types of "imperfections" 
in the price system. The second type suggests that 
there are limitations in the existing technology or 
the structure of demand which lead to a redundancy 
of labour in densely populated underdeveloped areas.
Using a static model with different production functions in 
different sectors he demonstrated how both of these aspects of the 
factor proportions problem may result in persistent open 
unemployment. A specific example of this school is the study by 
Blaug, Layard and Woodhall (1969) concentrating on wages and on 
educated unemployment, and introducing a dynamic adjustment 
mechanism to demand and supply curves for labour.
It is tempting to regard these three schools as complementary 
parts of a more complete analysis. However, this is not the 
appropriate solution for two reasons - one methodological and the 
other empirical. A synthesis of models as they have been outlined 
above is not possible because there are assumptions of some that 
are inconsistent with others. For example, the existence of
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surplus labour in the Lewis model is inconsistent with the 
neoclassical price responsiveness assumed by Eckaus. Also, the 
adjustment mechanisms of each can be very different, and this is 
particularly important for planning purposes. The Lewis-Fei-Ranis 
and Blaug et. al. models lead to a prediction in which, after some 
time lag, a reduction in unemployment is automatic. On the other 
hand the Harrod-Domar-type models and Eckaus models indicate a 
knife-edge development path from which any deviation may cause a 
worsening unemployment problem.
The empirical reason for rejecting an attempt to synthesise
the available theories is that the nature of the unemployment
problem is different in different countries. This has been
expressed eloquently in the survey by Jolly et. al (1973, p.17)
In Ceylon, unemployment among secondary school 
leavers and university graduates is the dominant 
part of the problem (dominant, at least in 
political terms) and urban-rural differences are 
small. In India, rural open unemployment is much 
less important than seasonal underemployment.
In Colombia the highly unequal system of land 
tenure has deprived a large proportion of the 
rural population of sufficient land for adequate 
work or income and left some of them totally 
landless. In most African countries there is still 
no landless class, but often inadequate transport, 
capital, knowledge, institutional channels and 
incentives to stimulate full employment and 
adequate income.
It is conceivable, therefore, that any given model may be 
appropriate for some countries but not for others, or appropriate 
at one particular period in the history of a country but not in 
another period for the same country. Under such circumstances 
priority must be given to intensive empirical research, without 
which useful analytical models cannot be formulated or tested.
An excellent basis for this for the case of Fiji is contained in
130.
the 1973 Unemployment Survey, and the next chapter looks at the 
results of this survey in detail. Before doing this it is 
necessary to consider further the concept of employment in 
developing countries and how this concept should be measured.
5.3 I.L.O, Categorisation approach
Unemployment in developed countries stems mainly from 
disruptions to an economic system which has not coped successfully 
with swings in aggregate demand (cyclical unemployment) or with 
adaptations to changing technology (structural unemployment).
For these countries, the concept and measurement of unemployment 
have been embodied in workable conventions which, for the most 
part, are practicable (although there are some problems with the 
classification of married women and some self-employed persons).
However, attempts to transfer such conventions to the 
developing countries have not been entirely satisfactory, mainly 
because the nature of the unemployment problem is so different.
In particular, the rural sector and small-scale artisan activities 
are usually much larger and less efficiently organised in 
developing countries. A.K. Sen has described this problem very 
well:
The concept of unemployment is notoriously vague in 
any economy in which the wage system is weak and in 
which self-employment and unpaid family labour are 
common. Indeed for an economy of peasants and 
artisans the concept of employment loses its 
straightforward meaning and economic activity 
merges into a wider complex of family based 
activities. (Sen (1975) p.5)).
The categorisation of a person's activity status according to 
internationally accepted conventions is shown in Table 5.1 which 
shows categorisation found in annual Yearbooks of Labour Statistics
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published by the I.L.O.2 
Table 5.1




1.1.2 Underemployed (inadequately employed)
1.1.2.1 Visible underemployment (short hours)
1.1.2.2 Invisible underemployment
1.1.2.2.1 Disguised (low income, underutilisation of skill)
1.1.2.2.2 Potential (low productivity of work)
1.2 Unemployed (market or demand factors)
2. Economically inactive
2.1 Potentially employable
2.1.1 Discouraged (no opportunity, prejudiced)
2.1.2 Additional (married women, students, independent means)
2.2 Not available for employment
2.2.1 Unable (too old, sick, young)
2.2.2 Committed Otherwise (domestic work, study)
2.2.3 Other (in institutions, etc).
There are a number of observations which may be made
concerning this classification. Some of these relate to purely
statistical problems which may be overcome only with reference
to the particular economy being studied. Others will require the
establishment of conceptual criteria to enable the classification
to be useful in the planning framework we have in mind.
2 Table 5.1 is reproduced from Horn (1974, p.501). The discussion 
of this categorisation in this section draws heavily on the 
survey by Smith (1971).
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(i) Economically active and inactive
The distinction between persons who are economically active 
and persons who are economically inactive involves problems which 
are largely of the statistical type and for which the conventions 
in the country being studied may be adopted. Problems with this 
distinction arise firstly because the upper and lower age limits 
to the working age population vary between countries, and sometimes 
between activities within a given country. Secondly, the role of 
women in the workforce is similarly variable. Thirdly, problems 
are posed by the phenomenon of the discouraged worker. The 
framework in Table 5.1 classes such persons as economically inactive 
because unemployment definitions (of Western origin) place great 
stress on seeking work. There is thus no unemployment category 
within the active workforce to include those who are available 
for work, but not fervently looking for work because they regard 
their chances of success as too low. The existence of an 
identifiable group of discouraged workers has implications for 
the elasticity of labour response to various government policies. 
This is so irrespective of whether the policies are designed to 
draw upon a labour reserve to support growth per se, or whether 
they are designed to redistribute incomes through employment policy 
explicitly. For this reason the discouraged workers might be 
considered as part of the economically active population.
(ii) Adequate and inadequate employment
This distinction requires consideration of rather more 
difficult conceptual problems, which are considered in detail in 
the next section of this chapter.
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(i i i) Unemployed and underemployed
The framework of Table 5.1 implies that, for any individual, 
this distinction is mutually exclusive. There is a problem in 
drawing this distinction in an agricultural economy because of 
seasonal factors. Agricultural workers are fully occupied on some 
days, only partly so on others, and on other days still they may do 
no work at all. Therefore, the classification of agricultural 
workers as employed, underemployed, or unemployed, depends in 
part upon the length of the reference period of the employment 
survey and the season of the year in which it is conducted.
It is also difficult to avoid a certain degree of arbitrariness 
in this distinction with respect to non-agricultural activities.
Those who do no work at all in a given reference period (usually 
one week) are classified as unemployed; but those who work for 
one or two hours are classified as underemployed and are grouped as 
such with others who may work twenty hours. A more logical approach 
to this distinction would be to regard anything less than full 
employment as a point on a continuum of various degrees of 
underutilisation of labour resources (Smith (1971)), with 
unemployment being the extreme case; but this still requires a 
definition of what is full (or adequate) employment.
(iv) Visible and invisible underemployment
The first, most obvious problem which arises in this 
distinction is that the different classes are subject to different 
units of measurement - viz: hours of work for visible underemployment 
(1121), earnings or a skill factor for disguised underemployment
(11221) , and a productivity measure for potential underemployment
(11222) . A beginning to the solution of this problem is made if 
one recognises that there is no ambiguity in classification on the
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basis of hours worked between visible and invisible underemployment. 
Those in the former group are involuntarily working less than 
normal (or desired) hours. Those in the latter group are, 
inter a l i a, working as long as is normal (or desired).
Given that hours of work is to be the yardstick for 
distinguishing between visible and invisible underemployment, 
there remain two problems. The first has been foreshadowed by 
including the words "or desired" in brackets above. If an 
objective norm is established which applies across the board and 
below which all concerned are visibly underemployed, then such 
a norm may be arbitrary to the point of irrelevance for a large 
section of the working age population. This would be so if many 
of those visibly underemployed (working less than "normal" hours) 
failed to respond to the creation of more intensive employment 
opportunities. Under such circumstances the criteria of desired 
hours is appealing because the elasticity of employment response 
to various government policies could be assessed more accurately.3
The second problem concerns which feature of invisible 
underemployment - low earnings, low productivity or low skill 
utilisation - is to be regarded as the most appropriate indicator 
of the degree of invisible underemployment. The policy implications 
of dealing with this classification will be different depending 
upon which factor is the dominant one in the particular case one 
is studying. It would therefore be necessary to be guided by 
empirical evidence on this point, but of course this is more easily
3 The 1963 Meeting of Experts on the Measurement of Underemployment 
(I.L.O. Concepts and Methods of Measurement of Underemployment - 
Working Paper No. 1, August 1963, p.16) maintained that 
"...availability for extra work can be measured with reasonable 
objectivity and accuracy", (as cited in Smith (1971) p.52).
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said than done. For one thing, the three indicators are not 
mutually exclusive - a person may be in a situation where both 
productivity and earnings are abnormally low, despite working 
normal hours. Moreover, the establishment of norms for each 
indicator from empirical data is fraught with difficulties.
Consider the establishment of a norm for productivity, below 
which all concerned would be regarded as being invisibly 
underemployed. Economic theory suggests that in a competitive 
equilibrium situation the marginal productivity of homogeneous 
factors will be equal. Since variations in capital intensity do 
exist between activities, then average labour productivity may 
vary between activities. When market imperfections and 
institutional rigidities are introduced into the analysis, 
equilibrium contrasts in factor proportions and average productivity 
will be distorted. These two influences - "normal" competitive 
variations on the one hand, and market and institutional 
imperfections on the other - are combined in empirical observations 
of sectoral disparities in average productivity levels. They 
would need to be disentangled before the productivity criterion 
could be used to identify the invisibly underemployed.
Assuming that these empirical problems can be adequately 
accommodated, we return to the policy implications of dealing with 
this classification of underemployment. It is tempting to conclude 
that more hours should be found for the visibly underemployed, 
higher productivity or earnings or both for the invisibly 
underemployed, and so on. However, there is a need to exercise 
considerable caution in drawing such a conclusion. This can perhaps 
best be illustrated by looking at each of the three criteria 
separately.
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(d) productivity criterion
In the following table, 10% of the labour force is unemployed 
at the start of the period, 50% is underemployed (disguised, low 
productivity underemployment) and 40% is fully employed in high 
productivity jobs.4 Suppose that a policy is implemented which 
succeeds in having all output produced by high productivity 
methods so that disguised underemployment disappears (by definition).
Beginning of the period End of the period
Numbers Productivity Output Numbers Productivity Output
Unemployed 10 0 0 35 0 0
Underemployed 50 4 200 0 0 0
Fully employed 40 8 320 65 8 520
Total 100 520 100 520
Half of those previously underemployed are now fully employed 
but the other half are unemployed. Average living standards remain 
constant, but income distribution has become more unequal with the 
result that many more people suffer gross poverty.
Consider the same economy in the beginning of the period 
which implements a policy of providing more jobs for the population 
in labour-intensive (less productive) employment. The result 
might be the elimination of unemployment and perhaps some downgrading 
of high productivity activities:
4 The example here is adapted from Smith (1971) p .57.
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Beginning of the period__________End of the period
Numbers Productivity Output Numbers Productivity Output
Unemployed 10 0 0 0 0 0
Underemployed 50 4 200 70 4 280
Fully employed 40 8 320 30 0 240
Total 100 520 100 520
Again per capita output is constant, but in this case income 
distribution is made less unegual and abject poverty resulting 
from open unemployment has been eliminated.
This static example is deficient in several respects. In 
particular it is unlikely that changing the technology mix 
would leave total output unchanged. It also ignores dynamic 
adjustment effects. Exactly what the outcome of such changes would 
be is an empirical question about which we can say very little here. 
What is clear is that, with no change in labour productivity, 
per capita incomes can be raised by finding more employment 
opportunities for the population at this productivity level. It is 
also clear that such a policy can potentially reduce the degree of 
income inequality; and further, that the faster is the rate of 
growth of employment opportunities (at given productivity levels) 
then the greater is the scope for both raising average living 
standards and reducing inequalities. It may be useful to point 
out that this is fully consistent with the empirical evidence 
discussed in Part I of the dissertation.
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(b) earnings criterion
Once again, the implication that underemployment defined on 
the basis of a specific criterion (in this case, low income) 
should be remedied by action with respect to that criterion 
(i.e. by raising unduly low earnings) may prove to be misleading. 
This would be so if employers reacted in such a way as to dismiss 
underemployed workers if their wage rates increased, thereby 
increasing the numbers in open unemployment and worsening income 
distribution. The extent to which this is possible depends upon 
the elasticity of substitution of factors of production - another 
empirical question. Aside from this it may be argued that wages 
policy should only act in such a way that real labour cost per 
unit of output does not rise (i.e. by keeping wage rises in line 
with productivity increases).
Leibenstein (1957) has built a specific underemployment 
concept upon the premise that higher wages and an improved diet 
would improve the health and efficiency of workers in developing 
countries. Since fewer workers could then produce the same 
output as the previously less vigorous workforce, the number that 
could be retrenched from such increases in wages is regarded as 
surplus labour. This, b y  i t s e l f , clearly runs counter to the 
objective of reduced income inequality. The rise in income of those 
who retain their jobs can only be considered beneficial if 
employment is found for the "surplus labour" which is retrenched.
The relevant question does not concern the difference between 
actual income and some higher acceptable norm. Rather, one must 
first ask what other income earning opportunities can be found 
(at higher, lower, the same productivity levels) for the under­
employed, and only then, what relation exists between higher
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wages and efficiency of those who retain existing jobs so that 
labour cost per unit of output does not rise.
(c) skill criterion
If employment opportunities are out of balance with the 
expectations of a more educated workforce, then policies aimed at 
creating more employment opportunities will depend for their 
success partly on the degree of this mismatch problem - a problem 
which may not necessarily be related to productivity or earnings 
criterion. One must first discover what relationship (if any) 
exists between the number in the workforce with successively 
higher levels of education and the rate of open unemployment. If 
the relationship is positive then more education appears to make 
some people less employable. If it is negative, more education 
improves the chance of employment. The point at issue has been 
crystallised as follows:
It is obvious that education is in no way responsible 
for the problem of over-all imbalance (i.e. between 
labour supply and demand). Changes in the 
educational system will not change the number of 
job opportunities in the economy (except to the 
extent that changes in pupil-teacher ratios affect 
the demand for teaching staff). However, education 
is definitely responsible for one of the problems 
of structural imbalance: that of matching 
employment opportunities and expectations. This is 
one of the lessons to be drawn from the Colombia 
and Ceylon employment reports, in particular the 
latter. (Emmerij (1973) p.415).
Generalisations from empirical work are difficult to draw.
The I.L.O. employment missions to Ceylon (1971) and Iran (1972) 
observed an inverted U-shaped relationship, with the rate of 
unemployment for secondary school graduates exceeding that for 
primary school leavers, although it declines again for university 
graduates. The I.L.O. missions to Colombia (1970) and Kenya (1972) 
found support for the negative relationship, unemployment being
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worst among those with no education whatsoever. Blaug
(1973) has observed the inverted U-shape curve in Agentina,
India, Malaysia, Syria and Venezuela, and the negative relation­
ship in the Philippines.
The link between this type of relationship and the skill 
criterion for an indicator of invisible underemployment is an 
implied one. A strong relationship between open unemployment and 
education level may be assumed to indicate that substantial 
underemployment with respect to skill capabilities also exists.
For those who will remain unemployed rather than accept a position 
well below the expectations which their education has generated, 
there must be many more who are forced to accept more lowly 
employment even on a full-time basis.
Once again, these observations are not necessarily meant to 
imply that employment policy should be directed to creating 
education-specific employment opportunities. This is because 
cross-section observation of unemployment by education levels is 
the outcome of a complex of conflicting forces which will confuse 
our interpretation of the evidence. Firstly, labour force 
participation rates are in most countries positively related to 
educational attainment. This might cause the unemployment rate 
to decline with levels of education because the denominator of 
the unemployment rate will rise (Blaug (1973) p.9). Secondly, if 
the education system is expanding rapidly, particularly higher 
education, then students will comprise an increasing share of 
the working age population, and educated unemployment will not 
rise (in the immediate time period, at least - it may in the 
longer term). Thirdly, rapid population growth may cause the 
throughput of at least primary, and perhaps some secondary,
141.
education levels to be very high. Employers may be unwilling or 
unable to hire the large numbers of graduates from the school 
system primarily because they are young and inexperienced. The 
fact that they are also shown as a high proportion of educated 
unemployment is not the critical factor, but their youth 
(Blaug (1973)). These considerations would have to be isolated 
before one could properly devise policies for dealing with 
disguised underemployment from underutilisation of skills.
5.4 A theoretical approach to underemployment
5.4.1 Introductory remarks:
In the previous section it was shown that attempts to apply 
internationally accepted conventions for the categorisation of 
labour force activities are more difficult in developing countries 
than in developed countries. Some of the difficulties may be 
overcome by adopting statistical conventions which are appropriate 
for the particular country being studied. These include, for 
example, specifying the minimum and maximum age by which people 
are regarded as being part of the economically active population, 
or specifying a norm for average hours of work below which people 
are regarded as being visibly underemployed. On the other hand 
there are more difficult problems associated with the adequacy of 
employment from both the point of view of the economy as a whole 
as well as the individual concerned. These require careful 
consideration because the conceptual approach that is adopted will 
have a direct bearing on the planning framework in which we are
interested.
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Conventional approaches to labour force underutilisation have 
been concerned with the concept of surplus labour in underdeveloped 
areas. For example there has been considerable debate on whether 
the marginal productivity of labour in agriculture in developing 
countries is zero (classical approach) or positive (neo-classical 
approach)5. It has been argued that disguised underemployment 
can exist under the former approach but not the latter. Part of 
this controversy was due to the lack of attention to differentiation 
among labour inputs. It may be possible to remove some labourers 
without affecting agricultural output, provided that total labour 
effort is not decreased - those remaining simply work harder - but 
the marginal physical product of labour time can hardly be zero, 
as Viner points out:
As far as agriculture is concerned, I find it 
impossible to conceive of a farm of any kind on 
which, other factors of production being held 
constant in quantity, and even in form as well, it 
would not be possible by known methods to obtain 
some addition to the crop by using additional 
labour in more careful selection and planting of 
the seed, more intensive weeding, cultivation, 
thinning, and more painstaking harvesting, gleaning 
and clearing of the crop. (Viner (1957), p.18).
For a planning framework in which employment is to be 
regarded as a vehicle of income distribution as well as growth 
of output it is necessary to go beyond this conventional treatment 
of invisible underemployment. This extension is needed, partly 
because the conventional treatment has concentrated upon 
agriculture and yet there is evidence of underemployment in urban
5 An analytical treatment of the classical/neo-classical
distinction is provided by Jorgenson (1970). This source also 
contains critiques by Johnston, Marglin and Ruttan (Ibid). 
Important contributions to the controversy over the existence 
of surplus labour include Nurkse (1953), Viner (1957),
Schultz (1964), Myrdal (1968).
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service industries and some manufacturing, and partly because the 
marginal productivity approach is too restrictive as the sole 
criterion of underemployment. A particularly useful approach 
has been developed by A.K. Sen (1975) who suggests that there are 
problems for which any one of three following concepts of 
employment may be appropriate:
(1) The production approach : if a man can leave his traditional 
activity (e.g. family farm) without adversely affecting the total 
product of this activity he may be regarded as being "under­
employed in the production sense". He is "employed in the 
production sense" if his withdrawal from the traditional activity 
would reduce its total output.
(2) The income approach: if a man's income (including direct 
consumption, food and shelter, and any other emoluments) is not 
conditional upon the continuation of his labour in the traditional 
activity he may be regarded as being "underemployed in the income 
sense". He is "employed in the income sense" if his income is a 
reward for work and if he would cease to receive it should he 
withdraw his labour.
(3) The recognition approach: if a man regards himself as doing 
something worthwhile he may be regarded as "employed in the 
recognition sense". He is "underemployed in the recognition 
sense" if his activity does not satisfy certain expectations and 
self-esteem.
These three approaches are quite different to the three 
criteria for measuring underemployment discussed in the previous 
section, viz: the productivity criterion, the earnings criterion 
and the skill criterion. There the concern was for whether the 
productivity of an activity, the earnings from an activity, or the
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skill utilisation in an activity, was high or low, according to
some pre-determined norm. In Sen's conceptual framework the
behavioural patterns of individuals and groups (families) is the
central concern. For instance, Sen's income approach is not
particularly interested in whether the income is high or low, but
in whether or not it is conditional on the work done. His
production approach is not only concerned with whether the
productivity of an activity is high or low (or zero), but also
with the effect of labour withdrawal on the output of the
activity and on the efforts induced in those remaining. His
recognition approach relates to an individual's own perception
of the activity in which he is engaged, which is only partly a
function of the amount of skill which is required. In short,
Sen's concepts are oriented to a welfare approach to employment,
which is necessary for adequate treatment of the employment-income
distribution relationship in the development planning framework.
The next section discusses these three approaches in more detail
and examines some of their implications:
5.4.2 The production approach:
The production approach to the concept of employment
discussed by Sen represents an illuminating departure from the
conventional treatment of surplus labour. He comments:
While economists seem to have a preference for 
proving the existence of or the absence of disguised 
unemployment in the developing countries in general, 
it is of course perfectly possible that the thesis 
of disguised unemployment would be reasonably 
correct for some countries or regions and not so 
for others. Furthermore, the relevant issue is 
not of the yes-no type, and there are questions 
both of (i) the volume of surplus labour if present, 
and (ii) the quantitative impact of labour 
withdrawal on output, which could be high or low, 
and whether it is exactly zero or not is not the 
only interesting question. (Sen (1975), p.36).
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Sen provides a highly simplified analytical model to
illustrate his conception of underemployment in the production 
sense:
L = nx
Q = f (L), with f' > 0, f" < 0 
S(x) = zx, subject to x < x* 
z = f '(nx)[a+(1-a)h], subject to x < x* 
Q = G(z/[a+(l-a)h]), with G diminishing 





Equation (1 ) gives the equal work-sharing rule for total
labour time (L) and the n working members of a peasant family
(i.e. x hours per member). Equation (2 ) gives total output as a
function of labour, with constant inputs of other factors of
production6. Equation (3) sets compensation at z per unit of
work per member, subject to a maximum work constraint of x* per
person. Equation (4) reflects the work equilibrium of a
representative worker. Such equilibrium is characterised by the
equality of marginal cost of labour with marginal reward from the
individual's point of view. It is assumed that of the additional
output produced by such work the labourer gets a proportionate
share designated a with 0 <_ a <_ 1. Output accruing to others is
valued at h per unit (0 £  h 1 ) in terms of units of output enjoyed
by himself. Sen suggests that if the labourer is completely
alienated from others, h = 0. For a cohesive family, full concern
for others may imply that h = 1 (given equal distribution of work
6 Equations (1) to (5) are as listed in Sen (1975) p.34; in an 
earlier chapter he considers the effect of technological change 
in the production function by using a technology parameter:
0 = $f(L), with 3 > 0. This is rather too simplistic for an 
adequate treatment of technology and its omission in the 
following analysis does not alter the thrust of the argument.
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and income)7. Equation (5) expresses output as a function of
★
z, a and h, subject to x < x . With this model, the work done 
per person is given by:
X  = f"1 (G(z/[a+(1-a)h]))/n .... (6 )
The rationale of this equation is described as follows:
A reduction of a part of the labour force keeps the 
t o t a l work time and the level of output completely 
unchanged (the reduction in numbers being completely 
compensated by the increase of work per person) as 
long as x £  x*. Once that limit is reached, 
everyone's work level gets fixed at this maximum 
value x* and a reduction of workforce will reduce 
output. So the necessary and sufficient condition 
for the existence of "disguised unemployment" in 
this model is:
X  >_ f“ 1 (G(z/[oi+(l-a)h]))/n .... (7)
in which n is the number of working people left in 
the family after the withdrawal of a part of the 
workforce. (Sen (1975) p.34).
Sen describes this model as "shockingly simple" and proceeds 
to make several further observations on it. Each of these further 
observations raises important questions which may be resolved 
empirically. It is intended here to concentrate on conceptual 
issues so Sen's further observations are listed below with little 
additional comment. It should be noted that for the case of Fiji 
some valuable research has already been done on these issues by 
McGregor (1972).
1. The required compensation for work (z) should not be constant, 
but should increase as the amount of work effort (x) increases. 
McGregor has shown that this is caused by two factors - the
I am grateful to Professor Blakey for pointing out that, for a 
family which treats consumer goods as having some degree of 
collective use within the family, then h = 1 is equally 
consistent with concern for oneself. This is also relevant to 
the income approach discussed later.
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disutility of work increases with successive increments to 
effort, as does a worker's requirements for caloric energy 
(which must be purchased in food). Therefore, instead of z, 
one must take S'(x) as compensation for work where 
S'(x) > 0, S"(x) > 0 .
2 . Output will not be a function of labour alone, but of other 
factors as well. McGregor also shows this for agriculture in 
Fiji (as well as the elasticities of output with respect to 
various inputs). If one was to introduce these other factors, 
the equilibrium conditions would have to be redefined.
3. If labour has an outside employment opportunity, a dual market 
equilibrium will exist with (say) z-j the supply price of 
labour in peasant agriculture and z^ the opportunity price in 
capitalist production. Once again, McGregor recognises this 
in his paper and estimates an appropriate elasticity. 
Alternatively it could be accounted for within a Todaro-type 
framework, as Sen does in his sixth chapter.
4. Sen introduces welfare considerations into his model from the 
viewpoint of a group welfare function8, which deducts the 
sum of labour costs from output.
W = f(L) - z.x.n. .... (8 )
From this formation, it can be seen that greater effort 
involves a greater cost (z per unit) but also greater output 
(in f(L)). To determine whether there is a net gain from 
working harder:
f£ = [f'(L)-z].n .... (9)
8 The precise form of the welfare function which is thought to be 
appropriate for an equity-oriented planning framework is discussed 
later in chapter 7.
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There will be a net gain positive) if a > 0, h > 0, thus 
implying f '(L) > z. Note that the limit will be reached more 
quickly if S'(x) is substituted for z.
5. The previous observation values output in natural units, 
whereas in the earlier model, the individual's valuation of 
it depends upon his concern for others (h) and the share of 
output going to them (1 - a). The net gain in the individual's 
welfare (V) can thus be expressed as:
6 .
dV 
dx =  f 1(L)[a + (1- a ) h ] - Z ( 10)
However, the others gain too - viz, to the extent 
f 1(L)(1-a). Assuming symmetrically that they value 
income going to them at one per unit while valuing 
at h per unit the income going to the people whose 
efforts yield these outputs (and similarly their 
efforts), and adding the whole thing up, the total 
social gain when everyone increases his effort, 
x, would be found to be:
3 7 = [f(L)-z](1+h)n .... (11)
In other words, this is simply a blown-up version 
(of that in observation 4.) making allowance for 
social concern to the extent of (1+h).
(Sen (1975) p.28).
5.4.3 The income approach:
In order to distinguish the income approach to employment 
from the production approach, consider the illustration given by 
Sen in which if a person remains in the village he helps with 
productive activities, but if he takes up employment elsewhere he 
cannot do this. Assume that in either situation he still receives 
his share of the farm income. Then if he is "underemployed in 
the production sense" he will also be "underemployed in the income 
sense".
149.
This is because his earnings from the farm are independent of 
his participation in farm work or, put another way, his work has 
no income consequences.
Now contrast this case with another in which a man is 
supported in the village only on the condition that he helps in 
the family work. If he leaves he will not get his traditional 
income. Therefore, he is "employed (in the income sense)", 
irrespective of whether or not he is so in the production sense. 
Thus the income approach to unemployment may yield a different 
measure to the production approach, depending upon the nature of 
the particular situation.
One point of criticism which may be directed against the 
income approach suggested is that the concept of conditionality 
of income upon work presupposes a society which is strongly 
individualistic. If the (extended) family is the unit of society, 
as it is in Fiji and in many other developing countries, and if 
the family "income" is not apportioned among members but communally 
consumed, and if work is considered as part of a complex of 
socio-cultural activity within the family (perhaps even 
indistinguishable from leisure), then the conditionality upon 
work of any individual's claim to "income" may be impossible to 
establish. It is certainly impossible to establish unless and 
until an individual does actually leave the village environment.
The distinction of an income approach to employment from the 
other approaches requires further investigation in each of the two 
issues for which Sen claims that it has significance, viz: viewing 
employment as a vehicle of income distribution, and in the 
determination of the supply price of labour to enterprises or 
activities outside of the family-based enterprise or activity.
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In terms of the first of these issues, the argument is as follows:
Finding an outside job for a person who was 
employed in terms of the income approach has an 
impact not only on his own well-being but also on 
those left behind in the farm, since they now get 
what he was earning while on the farm.
(Sen (1975) p.37).
In terms of the supply price of labour to outside enterprises, 
Sen's argument is:
If a joint family stays joint and completely merged 
together in terms of income, even after part of the 
family migrates elsewhere in search of employment, 
and the migrating members do not have to seek 
compensation for an income loss, the supply price 
of labour will be lower to that extent. This type 
of question seems to have a bearing on the survival 
and success of the so-called "informal" sector, 
since its effective labour cost will remain low 
vis-à-vis that of the organised sector operating 
outside the family orbit. It also has some 
relevance for the pattern of migration of industrial 
labour in some countries, since short-period wage 
employment might permit one to enjoy part of the 
joint family income and assets. (Sen (1975), 
pp.37-38).
These two issues are closely related in the organisation of 
a planning framework concerned with employment and income 
distribution. From the viewpoint of the (extended) family, each 
member remaining after one (or more) migrates will have to work 
harder to maintain the same total output. If the migrant retains 
his claim on traditional income, each remaining member may 
experience a fall in real hourly reward for labour inputs.
On the other hand, if the migrant foregoes his share of income, 
each remaining member may experience a rise or a fall in real 
hourly reward for labour, depending upon the marginal productivity 
of the migrant. In either case the effect upon income distribution 
within the (extended) family could be better examined under the 
production approach, with appropriate acknowledgement to the 
institutional rules governing traditional income claims.
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There remains the important question of income redistribution 
between sectors - rural and urban, traditional and modern, formal 
and informal - as a result of the migration of labour between 
them, and the concept of conditionality of traditional income 
upon participation in traditional activities as set by traditional 
institutional arrangements in a particular society may have a 
great deal of influence upon such redistribution.
The notion that a migrant who is "underemployed in the 
income sense" would be prepared to work at a lower wage level 
than his workmates is difficult to accept. More importantly 
though, given that the predominant employment mode in this sector 
is wage employment, and given the rapid growth of workers' 
unionism in L.D.C.'s, he may not be permitted to accept a lower 
wage, even if he were willing to do so. Sen himself recognises 
this as a cause of dualism in labour markets in his sixth chapter.
However, for many migrants from traditional sector activities, 
it is the "informal" sector (also modern) that may provide their 
only available urban income opportunity; for others it may 
provide a temporary buffer against poverty while they seek formal 
wage employment. In either case, it may well be that there is 
some relationship between income levels in informal sector 
activities and traditional sector activities along the lines 
suggested by Sen. But it can also be argued that the survival 
and success of the informal sector is not only dependent upon 
the availability to migrants of income from traditional sources. 
Hart (1971) contends that the range of income opportunities outside 
the organised labour market is so wide that no-one need be without 
income of some kind, however irregular and however illegitimate.
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He goes on to argue that income in the informal sector is 
primarily a derivative of the "legitimacy" or otherwise of the 
activities concerned. Here the use of the word "legitimacy" is 
not meant to imply only criminal activities such as petty theft, 
prostitution or black-marketing. Rather it refers to the presence 
or absence of official limitations of access to formal sector 
activities which are recognised and fostered by governments. 
Informal sector activities are often ignored, which is sometimes 
a help and sometimes a hindrance, but always the risk and 
uncertainty of earning a livelihood in this sector is magnified 
solely by the doubtful legality of the activity (whether or not 
it is enforced). The relationship between traditional sector 
incomes and informal sector incomes, in view of the conditionality 
of the former on participation in traditional sector activities, 
should therefore be reasoned against the background of the 
legitimacy of informal sector incomes. Both issues are relevant 
in assessing the supply price of labour.
Finally, returning to the relationship between modern 
industrial sector wage rates and the income approach to employment, 
the concept of conditionality of traditional income upon 
participation in traditional activities will clearly be relevant 
in affecting an individual's decision to migrate. From the 
individual's point of view, his subjective assessment of each 
activity, (taking into account real wage differences and the 
probability of finding a modern sector job) is the relevant point 
and this is considered in the following paragraphs. But from the 
society's point of view, the impact of these institutional 
arrangements (for sharing traditional income among family members) 
upon these decisions of individual prospective migrants will be
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important in determining the rate of rural-to-urban migration and 
the share of the workforce engaged in agriculture. The importance 
of this for income distribution has been demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
and lies behind much of the discussion of intersectoral income 
inequalities in Fiji referred to in this dissertation.
5.4.4 The recognition approach:
In discussing the recognition approach to employment,
Sen makes the following observations:
...the question of employment is one of having not 
only a gainful occupation but one which also 
satisfies some of the minimal expectations of the 
job-seekers.
...Precisely because the person in question regards 
himself as employed, certain actual behaviour 
patterns may be expected to follow. One of them 
relates to the question of seeking work elsewhere. 
(Sen (1975), pp.5,39).
He cites the Indian National Sample Survey reports that,
in 1961-62 only 27% of rural workers with 15-28 hours of work per
week, said they were available for additional work if it were
offered. Of those workers with 1-14 hours of work per week, the
corresponding proportion was even lower at 23%.
The conviction of a peasant that he is 'employed' 
relates to a certain structure of thought to which 
the concept of 'disguised unemployment' does not 
really belong...it is necessary to view the 
behaviour patterns of human beings also in terms of 
their own assessments of their position... 
Unemployment is a state of being without fruitful 
work and the perception of the fruitfulness of 
work is, to a large extent, a result of social 
conditioning (Sen (1975), pp.39-40).
The assessment of the worth of a particular activity will 
depend upon from whose point of view that assessment is made. 
Clearly, through his emphasis on expectations, Sen means to stress 
the individual’s own assessment of his activities. The main
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criterion suggested by Sen for determining "unemployment in the 
recognition sense" is that of "seeking work elsewhere".
However, this may not always be equated with "having unsatisfied 
expectations" which he appears to imply.
It is usual in unemployment surveys to ask, "Are you a 
job-seeker?". Anyone answering "Yes" to this question may be 
dissatisfied with his present or immediate past occupation, or 
he may simply be a victim of market or demand factors in an 
industry. Conversely, there may be some respondents who give a 
negative answer because they have a "job", and yet that job fails 
to satisfy certain minimal expectations. The criterion of seeking 
work elsewhere robs the recognition approach of much of its 
significance. For as such it would simply correspond to a portion 
of conventionally defined open unemployment. What is sufficient 
and necessary for this approach is that certain expectations of 
persons with regard to their occupations are not met. Interpreting 
recognition in this manner requires a definition of precisely 
what factors influence this assessment (i.e. what are these 
"minimum expectations"?).
According to Sen, an individual's assessment of the worth of 
his activities stems largely from social conditioning. One might 
also say that it is made with respect to alternatives open to the 
individual in other activities. For instance, Todaro (1971) 
has shown that a person may consider income differentials between 
traditional sector activities and modern formal sector activities, 
and in addition, the probability of his finding a job in the 
latter sector, as factors affecting his decision to migrate 
(i.e. to become a job-seeker). In this respect a person may have 
unsatisfied expectations with regard to his income level, but may
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regard his probability of finding employment which satisfies those 
expectations as being very low, such that he decides not to 
become a job-seeker. Inertia itself may be a factor affecting 
such a decision in a similar manner - so may traditional customs, 
or rigid castes. On the other hand, there may be externalities 
working in the opposite direction, such as "bright city lights", 
or the prestige attached to certain white-collar occupations.
It is tempting to define "recognition" such that all these 
factors are subsumed by an individual "voting with his feet", 
and thereby indicating in which situation his total economic, 
psychological and social well-being is maximised. However, in 
addition to the reservations outlined above about equating 
"job-seeking" with "having unsatisfied expectations", such an 
approach is of limited usefulness to the planner who has no 
knowledge of which factor (or factors) was of primary consequence 
in leading individuals to their decisions. It is difficult in 
these circumstances to model the response of migration rates to 
different policies. Although in the previous chapter some 
attention was given to rural-urban migration, no attempt has been 
made to assess the recognition approach to underemployment, 
because of the difficulties of measurement and the fact that it is 
not included in conventional data.
5.5 Summary
Several different aspects of the concept and measurement of 
employment in developing countries have been canvassed in this 
chapter and it is now necessary to summarise the thread of the 
argument.
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It was argued that the concept of labour force underutilisation 
is quite different in developing countries compared with developed 
countries. Because of this the concept requires different methods 
of analysis and approaches to measurement. None of the now 
conventional models of employment creation in developing countries 
is wholly satisfactory for all countries at all times. The 
particular analytical framework chosen should therefore reflect 
the dominant feature of the employment problem in the particular 
case. When it comes to assessing the extent and nature of the 
problem in a particular case it is common to refer to the 
internationally accepted framework for classifying persons by 
their economic activity status. There is some flexibility in the 
interpretation of this international framework, and it was argued 
that this should be oriented to identifying where and how 
employment creation can improve the distribution of income-earning 
opportunities. The theoretical foundations for this reorientation 
are not to be found in the conventional approaches to surplus 
labour, but are evident in the approach lately outlined by 
Sen (1975). His theoretical approach is fully consistent with 
the view that the appropriate way to discuss employment problems 
in developing countries is in relation to the role of employment 
as a creator of new income-earning opportunities for particular 
(low income) groups.
The three main sections of this chapter therefore constitute 
a discussion of the three basic elements of a planning framework 
with which I am concerned, but with a focus on employment.
The three elements are theoretical foundations, data preparation, 
and model building. The order in which they have been discussed 
was convenient for the purpose of exposition. However, an
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economist would normally work in the reverse order. One would 
begin with the theoretical concepts, and would organise the 
collection of data to provide information on these concepts.
Then the planner would be in a position to formalise the 
relationships in an econometric model which should be useful for 
assessing the impact of various alternative policies.
In the following chapter some of the issues raised in the 




The structure of employment, underemployment and 
unemployment in Fiji
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the level and 
structure of employment, underemployment and open unemployment in 
Fiji. The primary reference is a comprehensive labour force 
survey conducted in 1973 by the Bureau of Statistics under the 
direction of I.W. Kannangara. The survey was conducted on a 
sample basis of twenty-five percent of all households in Fiji and 
fairly represented all relevant dimensions of employment and the 
labour force (i.e. age, sex, race, location, and so on). Some 
reference will also be made to the 1966 and 1976 censuses for 
estimating relevant trends. Census data is not comparable with 
the 1973 survey, not only because the latter is based upon a 
sample of households, but also because the fieldwork for it was 
conducted over several months in 1973 in contrast to census 
enumerations which relate to one particular night of the year. 
Questions relating to labour force characteristics form only a 
part of the census enquiry and may have been treated relatively 
lightly by enumerators in relation to other questions such as age 
of respondents (see 1976 Census Report pp.15-17). On the other 
hand, the 1973 Survey sought detailed information on labour force 
characteristics and has reported over five hundred pages of data 
on these characteristics. The other major sources of data on 
employment in Fiji are the Annual Employment Surveys published by 
the Bureau of Statistics. These annual surveys only cover wage 
and salary employment in firms listed on a register maintained at
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the Bureau. This register is not complete for small firms and 
does not consider self-employed workers. It may be regarded as a 
survey of organised sector employment in contrast to the compre­
hensive coverage of both organised and informal sectors in the 1973 
Unemployment Survey.
6 .2  Definitions and conventions adopted
The lower age limit for allocating persons to labour force 
categories in the 1973 Survey was 14 years. There is no visible 
evidence of very young children in paid employment in Fiji, 
whether as domestic servants, agricultural workers or in work­
shops or elsewhere. Further, school enrolment data shows that 
almost all children attend school up to class 8 or approximately 
14 years of age (although 15 years is the nominal minimum 
school-leaving age, and this is used in census reports). Formal 
retirement ages are irrelevant for most of Fiji's labour force and 
no upper age limit was set on the economically active population. 
The labour force therefore includes all persons 14 years of age 
and over who are economically active (employed and unemployed). 
Persons of working age but who are not economically active mainly 
include students and women engaged in home duties, as well as 
those unable to work because of age and infirmity. Community 
workers are also included in the economically inactive group, 
although they are certainly not idle. They are engaged in building 
roads or churches, raising funds for village projects, disaster 
relief, and so on, all in a voluntary capacity.
Categorisation of persons within the labour force closely 
follows the international standards formulated by the I.L.O.
For example, the unemployed are defined as 'persons 14 years of
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age and over who are available for employment or whose contract
of employment has been terminated and who are without a job, and
all of whom are seeking work for pay or profit'. Given that
such definitions are standardised, they do however pose certain
peculiar problems for researchers in developing countries, as has
been discussed in the previous chapter. They also were in the
mind of the survey director, who found it necessary to insert the
following caveat in her report:
Though the international recommendation for the 
definition of unemployment was followed as stated 
above, there is sufficient material elsewhere in 
this report to enable a more sophisticated analysis 
of unemployment to be made, if so desired, (p.52).
Accordingly, considerable data is listed for persons employed 
on the basis of hours of work, income and educational attainment 
(these elements were considered to be important in the previous 
chapter in the consideration of underemployment as well as 
unemployment).
Classification of employed persons by industry and by 
occupation follows the International Standard Industry Classificat­
ion (I.S.I.C.) and the International Standard Classification of 
Occupations (I.S.C.O.) respectively. The coding of employed 
persons by worker status recognises wage and salary earners (in 
both private and public sectors), own account workers, and unpaid 
family workers.
Aside from some reference to urban/rural differences, the 
discussion in this chapter relates to all Fiji. This was in 
order to facilitate the accumulation of employment data for input 
into the economy-wide planning framework.
1 6 1 .
6.3 Participation ratios and open unemployment
Table 6.1 shows information taken from the 1966 and 1976 
census on working-age population (15 years and over by census 
definition), labour force and unemployment (standard definition). 
Labour force participation ratios for males in each age cohort 
have declined over the intercensal period while those for 
females in each age cohort have increased. A small portion of 
the decline in male l.f.p.r. is due to the fact that in 1966 
members of armed forces were included as economically active while 
in 1976 they were counted as not economically active - but the 
number concerned in only 500 persons in 1976.
An additional category of economically inactive persons was 
added in the 1976 census called 'resting'. It accounted for 
1700 males and 1340 females, half of whom were under twenty-five 
years of age. This may be evidence that some part of the decline 
in male l.f.p.r. was due to the discouraged worker phenomenon, 
an assertion which is supported by the higher unemployment rate 
which is the primary cause of this phenomenon in other countries 
(see chapter 5). It was not seasonal unemployment because this 
was identified separately.
The major influence in the declining male l.f.p.r. for 
15-19 year olds was the increase in secondary and tertiary 
education enrolments. The proportion of male 15-19 years 
population counted as 'students' increased by fifty percent 
between 1966 and 1976 (from 25.7% to 38.0% of the male 15-19 years 
population). For females in the same age group the proportion 
counted as students more than doubled over the period (from 17.9% 
to 38.1% of the female 15-19 years population). In view of this,
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1 6 3 .
the increase in female participation rates in the young age group 
was particularly strong, indicating a dramatic shift in attitudes 
to both work and family among young women in Fiji.
However, for many young women, these aspirations have been 
disappointed, as shown by the very high rates of open 
unemployment for females, particularly those under thirty years 
of age. Unemployment of males has also increased in the 
intercensal period, particularly males under thirty years of age.
A more detailed characterisation of the nature of open 
unemployment in Fiji may be obtained from the 1973 Unemployment 
Survey. Table 6.2 shows information from the survey on 
l.f.p.r.'s and unemployment. The data in Table 6.2 is not 
comparable to that in Table 6.1 because of the different sampling 
procedure employed (as mentioned previously) and because the 
lower age limit for the working-age population is different 
(14 years for the survey, 15 years for censuses). The grouping 
of age cohorts is also reported differently. It is still 
interesting to note that the measured rates of open unemployment 
in the 1973 survey are higher for males and apparently somewhat 
lower for females than was indicated by the census data, and 
that there is no significant difference between the rates of 
youth unemployment for males and females in the 1973 survey.
This survey should be regarded as the more authoritative source 
reference on labour force characteristics, for reasons stated in 
the introduction.
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Table 6 .2 : Participation ratios and open unemployment 
by age and sex 197?
1973 SURVEY
c




































No. No. (*) No. ß T
39024 16772 43.0 3564 2 1 .2
20-24 24418 21540 8 8 .2 2168 1 0 .1
25-34 36830 33780 91.7 1468 4.3
35-44 27462 24812 90.4 528 2 .1
45-54 19076 16480 86.4 280 1.7
55-64 11684 7836 67.1 68 0.9
65+ 6196 1900 30.7 12 0 . 6
Total 164690 123120 74.8 8088 6 .6
Females :
14-19 38630 4324 1 1 .2 916 2 1 .2
20-24 25704 5432 2 1 .1 432 8 .0
25-34 37050 6024 16.3 168 2 .8
35-44 26274 3640 13.9 64 1 .8
45-54 17340 1796 10.4 28 1 .6
55-64 9368 600 6.4 8 1.3
65+ 5176 140 2.7 - -
Total 159542 21956 13.8 1616 7.4
The characterisation of unemployment varies from country to 
country according to which aspect is regarded as most critical.
It has been reported (Jolly et. al. (T973) p .17 quoted in the 
previous chapter) that in most of sub-Sahara Africa there is inad­
equate infrastructure to provide full employment; that in Colombia 
the system of land tenure has deprived many rural dwellers of 
sufficient land; that in India seasonal underemployment is more 
important than open rural unemployment; and that in Sri Lanka the 
dominating factor in political terms is unemployment of educated 
young adults.
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Some of these aspects emerge In Fiji as well, although there 
is a general shortage of educated people in the workforce, not 
a surplus. The unemployment problem in Fiji is first and foremost 
a problem of youth. Whatever market or institutional factors 
exist, the 14 to 24 year old population is particularly prone to 
suffer unemployment. This in turn is a function of the rapid rate 
of growth of the working-age population as demonstrated in 
chapter 4. It can be expected to remain the pervasive character­
istic of unemployment throughout the 1980's. Table 6.2 shows that 
twenty-one percent of the 14-19 year old workforce was unemployed 
in 1973 (both males and females). For 20-24 year olds the 
unemployment rates were ten percent for males and eight percent 
for females. Three quarters of all unemployed persons in 1973 
were aged between 14 and 24 years, yet this age group formed only 
one third of the workforce.
Other characteristics of open unemployment which are important 
to consider include the waiting time before a job seeker is 
successful, and the education level of the unemployed.
Blaug has noted,
There is a world of difference between a situation 
in which everybody takes six months to find a job 
and then holds onto it until retirement, and one 
where 90 percent find work on the day they leave 
school while 10 percent take five years to get a 
job, although both situations actually yield 
identical unemployment rates. (Blaug (19 )
pp.1 0-1 1 ).
Figure 6.1 shows age-specific levels of unemployment in Fiji 
(1973) expressed as a proportion of total unemployment of groups 
who were unemployed for various lengths of time (less than 5 weeks, 
5-9 weeks, 10-14 weeks, 15-26 weeks, 27-52 weeks, and more than 
one year). The diagram in Figure 6.1 again indicates the
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precarious position of youth in the labour market, with 14-19 year 
olds forming a slowly growing proportion of longer-term unemploy­
ment (although 20-24 year olds form a declining proportion of 
1onger-term unemployment).
Figure 6 .2  shows the relationship between age-specific rates 
of open unemployment and the level of schooling completed in the 
unemployed in Fiji (1973). Education levels shown include those 
with no schooling, primary schooling, junior secondary, senior 
secondary, and tertiary. An obvious negative relationship exists 
between unemployment rates and education, unemployment being 
highest in all age groups for those with little or no schooling 
and steadily decreasing as the period of education increases.
Figure 6 .2  also shows the education/unemployment relationship for 
urban and rural Fiji - the broken lines representing urban 
unemployed and the unbroken lines rural. The open unemployment 
rate for 14-19 year olds is considerably higher in urban areas 
than in rural areas. This rate declines with increasing education 
in urban areas, but there is no clear downward trend in open 
unemployment with increasing education for 14-19 year olds in 
rural areas. Urban/rural differences in unemployment rates are 
small for those over twenty five years old. (However, this does 
not refer to underemployment which, as will be shown later, is 
widespread in rural Fiji.)
Finally, we are interested in the behaviour of job seekers 
with respect to the types of occupations sought. Table 6.3 
classifies those unemployed persons who previously held a job on 
the basis of their previous occupation (row headings) and according 
to the occupation they were seeking (column headings). Inexperienced 








6.1 Open unemployment by age by duration of unemployment —  
1973 Survey (All Fiji) (% of those unemployed for 








Figure 6 .2 Open unemployment by age and highest level of 
schooling completed —  1973 Survey —  Urban and 
Rural Fiji (% of those unemployed with given 
level of schooling.
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Table 6.3 Unemployed persons by occupation sought
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P r o f/ te c h / m a n a g / a d m 20 40 - 12 - - 8 - 80
C l e r i c a l  r e l a t e d - 160 4 8 - - 32 20 224
S a l e s  w o rk e r s 4 36 36 - - - 24 8 108
S e r v i c e  w o rk e r s » 12 4 132 - - 40 20 208
A g r i c u l t u r e  e t c . 4 20 20 8 84 - 188 428 752
M i n i n g » q u a r r y i n g - 12 - - - 12 8 8 40
P r o d u c t i o n - 44 8 28 - - 736 296 1 1 1 2
O t h e r s  n . e . c . - 4 - - - 4 8 60 76
T o t a l  w i t h  a 
p r e v i o u s  j o b 28 328 72 188 84 16 1044 840 2600
N e v e r  w o rked 76 1404 468 676 2 12 44 18 7 2 2352 7 1 0 4
T o t a l 104 173 2 540 864 296 60 2916 3192 9704
Source: 1973 Survey, p.541
most strongly desired. Analysis of Table 6.3 reveals that
approximately half of those unemployed who previously held a job
were seeking different occupations to those from which they were
retrenched. This indicates a relatively high degree of
occupational mobility1, which is highest among unemployed
agricultural, forestry and fishing workers. Only 11% of unemployed
agricultural, forestry and fishing workers were seeking a similar
occupation - 82% were seeking jobs in manufacturing industry and
related non-farm labouring. Of all the unemployed who had
previously held a job, 72% were seeking wage jobs in production
work and related labouring activities. A further 13% sought
1 Strictly speaking it indicates a willingness to be occupationally 
mobile - it is not evidence that these wishes are fulfilled.
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clerical positions. None of the unemployed from occupations 
other than agriculture sought to be farmers or fishermen.
Inexperienced job seekers make up three quarters of the 
unemployed in Fiji (1973). Table 6.3 reveals a similar disdain 
for agricultural work among this group as was noted in the previous 
paragraph - only 3% of the unemployed who had never worked wanted 
agricultural work. Twenty percent sought clerical positions and 
16% sought sales and service occupations. Almost 60% of the 
unemployed who had never worked wanted jobs as wage labourers in 
manufacturing and related production activities.
6.4 The structure of employment in Fiji
6.4.1 The employed labour force by industrial sector 
and by occupational group.
Age specific levels of employment for males and females in 
1973 are shown in Table 6.4 which also distinguishes between 
agricultural industries on one hand (agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, and including subsistence farmers) and non-agricultural 
industries on the other. The table indicates a preponderance of 
very young people and very old people employed in agricultural 
industries. For instance 15.5% of agriculture's workforce was 
aged 14-19 years, and 11.1% was aged over 55 years. Only 10% of 
the non-agricultural industries workforce was in the 14-19 years 
cohort while 5.2% was aged over 55 years. Of all employed males 
aged 14-19 years, almost 58% were engaged in agriculture; yet 
agriculture only employs 44% of the total male workforce. 
Agriculture accounts for one-third of the employed females aged 
14-19 years but only a little more than a quarter of the total 
employed female workforce. This gives rise to the proposition that
1 7 1 .
Table 6.4: Employed persons by age and sex, agricu ltu re
and non -agricu ltu ra l in du strie s 1973
Age A g r i c u l t u r e  ^  N o n - A g r i c u i  t u r e
G ro u p H a l e s Fem ales Males Fem ales
1 4 - 1 9 7532 n ? g w 2260
2 0 - 2 4 74 0 4 836 119 6 8 4 1 6 4
2 5 -3 4 119 8 8 1304 20324 4552
3 5 -4 4 10208 1252 14 0 76 2324
4 5 -5 4 7888 72 4 8312 1044
5 5 -6 4 4628 2 72 3140 320
65+ 1280 104 608 36
T o t a l 51028 5640 64004 14 7 0 0
S o u r c e : 1 9 7 3  S u r v e y ,  p . 1 1 8
( a )  A g r i c u l t u r e ,  f o r e s t r y  and f i s h i n g ,  i n c l u d i n g  s u b s i s t e n c e  
s e c t o r .
many young people are drawn into agricultural activities immediately 
after leaving school as a staging ground while they wait for 
employment opportunities in modern sector manufacturing, clerical 
and non-farm labouring jobs. This proposition is supported by the 
high rural-to-urban migration propensities of the young population 
demonstrated in chapter 4. From a different viewpoint it is 
supported by the evidence on job-seeking behaviour of inexperienced 
openly-unemployed youths cited in the previous section of this 
chapter. Support for the proposition will also be demonstrated in 
a later section concerned with underemployment.
Table 6.5 shows males and females employed in 1973 by broad 
occupational groups. Employment of males is concentrated in the 
agricultural occupations (including those partly or mainly engaged 
in subsistence farming) and production and related workers - these 
two occupational groups accounted for 43% and 29% respectively of
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Tab le  6 . 5 : Employed p e r s o n s  by major  o c c u p a t io n s  (1973)
Males Fem ales
N o .  % N o .  %
1 .  P r o f e s s i o n a l , T e c h n i c a l 7206 6 . 3 3742 1 8 . 4
2 .  M a n a g e r i a l » A d m i n i s t r a t i v e 2 1 4 4 1 . 9 92 0 .5
3 .  C l e r i c a l  and r e l a t e d 8490 7 . 4 4 10 4 2 0 .2
4 .  S a l e s  w o r k e r s 73 76 6 . 4 1 7 0 4 8 . 4
5 .  S e r v i c e  o c c u p a t i o n s 4328 3 . 7 3748 1 8 . 4
6 .  A g r i c u l t u r e , f o r e s t , f i s h i n g 4 9 7 1 6 4 3 . 2 5434 2 6 . 7
7 .  M i n i n g , q u a r r y i n g 700 0 . 6 12 -
8 .  P r o d u c t i o n  and r e l a t e d 33580 2 9 . 2 1 4 7 6 7 . 3
9 .  W o r k e r s ,L a b o u r e r s  n . e . c . 1492 1 . 3 28 0 . 1
T o t a l  Em plo ym e nt 115032 100 20340 100
S o u r c e :  1 9 7 3  S u r v e y ,  p . 1 4 1 .
total employment of males. Clerical and sales workers constituted 
14% of the employed male workforce, with a further 8% listed as 
professional, technical, managerial and administrative personnel.
The pattern of female employment by occupations is quite 
different to that of males. Only 27% of employed females were 
listed as agriculturalists. Clerical and sales occupations 
accounted for 28% of female employment, service occupations 18%, 
and professional and technical personnel a further 18%. It must 
be noted that females made up only 15% of the employed workforce. 
Thus, while there were relatively many females employed as 
professional and technical personnel, their actual numbers were 
only half those of the males. Similarly, in clerical occupations 
males outnumbered females by two to one. For agriculture related 
occupations there was only one female counted as employed for 
every nine males. It is evident that the survey enumerators have 
classified most rural women as home workers (not economically
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active). However, if subsistence farming activities are to be 
included with cash activities in the listing of employment in 
agriculture and related activities, there is an apparent 
inconsistency in the survey here - certainly Fijian women do more 
than just 10l  of the work done by men in the villages. This is a 
clear example of the difficulty of defining economic activity and 
employment status discussed in chapter 5 .
Table 6 .6  shows employed persons categorised in the nine major 
industrial sectors (as column headings) and also according to their 
occupation within an industry (as row headings). The occupational 
categories have been rearranged in order, but not 
in content, from the listing of Table 6.5. It is recognised that 
within each industry there is a concentration of employment in one 
or two main occupations. For example, most workers in the 
agriculture forestry and fishing industry are farmers or fishermen; 
most workers in the commerce and distribution industry are sales 
workers; and so on. The re-ordering of occupational groups was 
arranged so as to coincide, somewhat roughly, with the ordering of 
industries in which they are most concentrated. Then the major part 
of the economy's employment structure is found to be on or near a 
diagonal line drawn downwards from left to right across Table 6 .6 . 
Those listings not on or near the main diagonal may be thought of 
as 'supporting' the main structure.
The survey classification of occupations is not ideally suited 
to this type of device for analysing direct and indirect employment. 
The leading diagonal would be more concentrated and illustrative 
if the categories of 'production and related workers' and 'workers 
and labourers n.e.c.' were differentiated according to the type of 
unskilled or semi-skilled occupations they were in. For instance, 
one might want to identify 'manufacturing process workers' from
Table 6 .6 : Employed persons by occupation within industries (1973)
Industry of the Employed by 9 major I.S.I.C. groups
Occupation of the Employed 1 — F ~ 3 4 5 ^ ----- 7 8 9 TOTAL
Agricultural»forest,fishermen 54316" 4 128 - 28 176 40 4 454 55150
Miners,quarrymen 4 704 - - - 4 - - - 712
Production and related 1004 676 7696 672 13088 2808 5840 148 3124 35056
Workers»labourers n.e.c. 284 36 188 12 200 164 116 60 460 1520
Sales workers 88 12 164 - 16 8512 64 104 120 9080
Clerical and related 406 200 896 176 1000 2848 1816 1748 3504 12594
Service workers 108 40 196 8 256 2052 532 72 4812 8076
Managers, admini strators 34 12 308 20 148 720 300 160 534 2236
Professional technicians 424 88 268 36 336 376 528 560 8332 10948
ALL OCCUPATIONS 56668 1772 9844 924 15072 17660 9236 2856 ¿1340 135372
Industry Coefficients
Occupation of the Employed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Agricultural,forest,fishermen .9585 .0023 .0130 - .0019 .0100 .0043 - .0213
Miners,quarrymen - .3973 - - - - - - -
Production and related .0177 .3815 .7818 .7273 .8684 .1590 .6323 .0518 .1464
Workers»labourers n.e.c .0050 .0203 .0191 .0130 .0133 .0093 .0126 .0210 .0215
Sales workers .0016 .0068 .0167 - .0 0 1 1 .4812 .0069 .0364 .0056
Clerical and related .0072 .1129 .0910 .1905 .0663 .1613 .1966 .6120 .1642
Service workers .0019 .0226 .0199 .0087 .0170 .1162 .0576 .0252 .2255
Managers»administrators .0006 .0068 .0313 .0216 .0098 .0408 .0325 .0560 .0250
Professional, technicians .0075 .0497 .0272 .0390 .0223 .0213 .0572 .1961 .3904
Source: 1973 Survey, p -160.
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'builders labourers and building tradesmen', as well as from 
'transport workers'. On the other hand, one might want to combine 
the 'managerial and administrative' with the 'professional and 
technical' occupations as one composite group of high level 
manpower.
Examination of Table 6 .6  reveals that in Fiji (1973) the 
occupational groups of agricultural workers, miners, sales workers, 
and professional and technical personnel were highly concentrated 
in particular industries - in agriculture, mining, commerce, and 
community and personal services respectively. The other occupations 
were more ubiquitous across industries. The sub-table below 
Table 6 . 6  shows the occupational distribution of each sector's 
workforce in coefficient terms (with coefficients summing to unity 
down the columns).
6.4.2 Employed labour force by worker status
The 1973 Unemployment Survey has highlighted an important and 
illustrative distinction within the employed labour force on the 
basis of whether a person was a wage-or-salary earner (and within 
this group, whether in private or government employment), an 
own-account worker (i.e. self-employed), or an unpaid family 
worker. Table 6.7 lists employed persons by type of worker and by 
age and sex.
Almost 57% of the employed labour force were wage and salary 
earners, and of these the public sector accounted for the jobs 
of over 23,000 persons (more than 17% of total employment). A 
further 34% of the employed labour force were self-employed and 
9% were unpaid family workers.
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Table 6.7: Employed persons by age by sex by type of worker (1973)
M A L E S
Age
Wage and Salary Own Unpaid All
Account Family Male
Group Private Govt. Workers Workers Workers
14-19 5212 744 2404 4848 13208
20-24 9344 3008 5348 1672 19372
25-34 14468 6236 10596 1012 32312
35-44 8724 4764 10440 356 24284
45-54 4640 3064 8280 216 16200
55-64 1740 1084 4700 244 7768
65 + 384 116 1288 100 1888
Tot.Employed 14yrs + 44504 19024 43056 8448 115032
% of labour force 38.68% 16.53% 37.42% 7.34% 100%
F E M A L E S
Age
Wage and Salary Own Unpaid All
Account Family Female
Group Private Govt. Workers Workers Workers
14-19 1712 408 292 996 3408
20-24 2756 1276 380 588 5000
25-34 2748 1596 668 844 5856
35-44 1268 768 668 872 3576
45-54 588 260 480 440 1768
55-64 136 44 260 152 592
65 + 4 4 112 20 140
Tot.Employed 14yrs + 9216 4352 2860 3912 20340
% of labour force 45.30% 21.39% 14.06% 19.23% 100%
Source: 1973 Survey, p.171.
An interesting aspect of the assertion made above - that many 
school leavers are drawn into agricultural employment as a staging 
ground - is given by the data in Table 6.7, which shows 5,844 persons 
aged between 14 and 19 years employed as unpaid family workers.
At 35% of the 14-19 years labour force, this is the highest 
proportion of unpaid family workers of any age group. Persons aged 
14-19 years made up almost half of all unpaid family helpers, but
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only 12% of the employed labour force. It may be reiterated 
that many young people are absorbed in family based activities as 
unpaid helpers while they wait for formal sector wage-employment.
The importance of agricultural activities as the dominant 
employer of own account workers and unpaid family workers is shown 
in Table 6 .8  which shows employed persons by worker status within 
nine major industries in 1973 (i.e. at single digit ISIC level).
Some 82% of the self-employed and 90% of unpaid family helpers 
were employed in agriculture. Together they accounted for 86% of 
that sector's workforce. There are also significant numbers of 
self-employed and unpaid family helpers in the commerce and 
distribution sector (25% of that sector's workforce), and in the 
transport sector (17% of the transport sector's workforce).
Half of the public sector workforce is employed in the 
personal and community services industry, and another one quarter 
is employed in the building and construction industry. Employment 
of private sector wage and salary earners is not concentrated 
heavily in one or two sectors, but is represented by significant 
numbers in each industry.
Table 6 .8 : Employed persons by worker status within industries 1973
Wage and S a la r y Own U n p aid
A c c o u n t F a m ily
P r i  v a te G o v t . W orkers H e lp e rs T o t a l
A g r i c u l t u r e ,  f o r e s t ,f i s h i n g 6036 1660 3 778 4 ...... 1 1 1 8 8 5555g-
M i n i n g , q u a r r y in g 1688 24 52 8 1 7 7 2
M a n u fa c tu r in g 6 176 2468 732 468 9844
E l e c t r i  c i t y , g a s , w a te r 516 400 8 - 924
B u i l d i n g ,c o n s t r u c t i  on 9280 5164 536 92 15072
Com m erce,di s t r i  b u t i  on 13048 96 4 10 4 4 12 17660
T r a n s p o r t ,c o m m u n ic a tio n s 5756 1948 14 72 60 9236
B u s in e s s  s e r v ic e s 2560 156 124 16 2856
P e rs o n a l.c o m m u n ity  s e r v ic e 8660 1146 0 110 4 116 21340
A L L  IN D U S T R IE S 53720 23376 45916 12360 135372
Source: 1973 Survey, p.190
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The broad picture emerging from Table 6 . 8  is one of formal 
and non-formal sector activities. In the formal sector, 
government employees are concentrated in service industries in 
clerical and administrative jobs, as well as in the building 
industry in public works. Private firms are responsible for most 
non-farm directly productive employment. The non-formal sector, 
characterised by small scale self-employment activities, is 
dominated by small-holder and village-based agriculture as well as 
some small merchants/hawkers.
6.5 The nature of underemployment in Fiji
6.5.1 Visible underemployment
The conceptual difficulties associated with measuring the
extent of underemployment in developing countries have been
discussed in chapter 5. With this discussion in mind it is
possible to derive an approximation to certain dimensions of
underemployment from the 1973 Unemployment Survey. The Survey
director, Mrs Kannangara, was also aware of the difficulties here,
but seemed undecided about the results. She stated:
Figures show that in entire Fiji the number of 
persons employed for under 15 hours a week was 6 .1% 
and that all part-time workers or those working less 
than 35 hours a week amounted to 15.4% of all 
employed persons at work. This in a sense would be 
a measure of the underemployed in Fiji, whether one 
considers this as voluntary underemployment or 
involuntary underemployment, (p.34).
Then later on she added:
Some would be inclined to consider all persons 
usually working part-time, i.e. less than 35 hours 
a week, as being underemployed, but without knowing 
their conditions of work, their reasons for part­
time work, and their productivity, we cannot with 
any justification include them among the 
underemployed, (p.41).
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In the previous chapter it was noted that the criterion of 
hours of work is a useful starting point for identifying visible 
underemployment. The first problem which then arises is whether 
to set an arbitrary norm of weekly hours of work, or whether to 
consider the desired hours of work stated by survey respondents.
In Table 6.9 the norm of 35 hours per week is adopted as a level 
above which employed persons are regarded as being fully 
employed and below which they are regarded as part-time workers. 
Those employed persons who usually worked fewer than 35 hours per 
week are listed according to whether or not they wanted more work. 
Those employed persons who usually worked full-time but who worked 
less than 35 hours during the survey reference period are listed 
according to their reason for working only part-time. In non­
agricultural industries there were very few part-time workers, but 
almost three-quarters of those who worked part-time during the 
reference period or who usually worked part-time stated that they 
did not prefer more work. In agricultural industries there was a 
significant number of workers who usually worked full-time but only 
worked part-time in the reference period. Almost all of those who 
did so for economic reasons stated that they worked full-time only 
in peak season and that seasonal conditions were responsible for 
their underemployment. One quarter of the agricultural workforce 
was listed as usually working only part-time, and 86% of these 
stated that they did not want more work - that is, only 21% of 
agricultural workers (with less than 35 hours of work per week) said 
they were available for additional work if it were offered. These 
figures offer a broad indication for Fiji of the strength of the 
recognition aspect of rural employment as described in the previous 
chapter; although without data on the terms and conditions upon
Table 6 .9 : Employed persons at work in a g r ic u ltu ra l and n o n -agr icu ltu ra i in d u str ie s





Males Females Males Females
Usually worked full time
Worked full-time in reference period 35944 1704 61396 13424
Worked part-time in reference period
—  for economic reasons 2844 244 76 -
—  for non-economic reasons 640 180 268 60
Usually worked part-time
Prefer to work full-time (35hrs+) 1868 36 156 144
Do not prefer more work 8624 3412 1020 872
Total employed persons at work 49920 5576 62916 14500











which underemployed agricultural workers would be induced to seek 
wage employment elsewhere in Fiji it is not possible to venture 
far beyond these broad indicators.
In Table 6.10, employed persons at work in both agricultural 
and non-agricultural industries are classified by worker status 
and by the number of hours worked in the reference week. In 
agricultural industries 13% of wage and salary workers were on 
short-time (less than 35 hours per week); 30% of own account 
workers and 52% of unpaid family helpers worked less than 35 hours 
per week. For non-agricultural industries only 2% of wage and 
salary workers were on short-time; 9% of own account workers and 
12% of unpaid family helpers worked less than 35 hours per week. 
These figures indicate that visible underemployment in terms of 
workers on short-time is much more widespread in non-formal sector 
activities than in formal sector wage employment, and it is more 
prevalent in agricultural industries than in non-agricultural 
industries.
A more detailed examination of working time in non-agricultural 
industries is shown in Table 6.11 which shows the number of 
employed persons (total of wage and salary earners, own account 
workers and unpaid family helpers) at work in each industry, 
classified by the number of hours worked in the reference week.
It is possible to extend the study of visible underemployment 
(i.e. underemployment in terms of hours worked) by estimating the 
employment level in each industry in terms of ‘full-time worker 
equivalent units' and then comparing this estimate to the actual 
number of persons employed in each industry. To do this a norm 
for the number of hours in an average working week must be 
specified.
Table 6.10: Employed persons at work In agricultural and non-agricui turai industries
by worker status and1 hours of work (1973)
Agricultural Non-agriculturai
Industries Industries
Wage and Own Unpaid Wage and Own Unpaid Grand
Hours of work Salary Account Family Salary Account Family Total
Less than 15 hrs 236 4204 2904 380 288 72 8084
15-34 hours 676 6924 2924 1380 388 68 12360
35-39 hours 1464 10532 2696 7504 756 452 23404
40-47 hours 3156 10012 1636 50272 3064 316 68456
More than 48 hrs 1580 5596 956 9024 3212 240 20608
TOTAL 7112 37268 11116 68560 7708 1148 132912
Source: 1973 Survey, p.259.
Table 6.11 : Employed persons at work in  nine major in d u str ie s  by hours o f  work (1973)




























































































































Under 15 7344 92 60 328 32 . 228 8084
15-34 10524 12 192 - 144 440 184 28 836 12360
35-39 14692 64 960 44 824 1244 816 308 4452 23404
40-47 14804 1560 6540 840 12748 10920 6028 2216 12800 68456
48 over 8132 124 1764 32 1196 4500 1972 276 2612 20608
TOTAL 55496 1760 9548 916 14972 17432 9032 2828 20928 132912
Source: 1973 Survey, p. 244
Table 6.12: Employment computed in "full-time worker equivalents"
Under 15 1836 23 15 82 8 . 57 2021
15-34 5262 6 96 - 72 220 92 14 418 6180
35-47 29496 1624 7500 884 13572 12164 6844 2524 17252 91860
48 over 10165 155 2205 40 1495 5625 2465 345 3265 25760
TOTAL 46759 1785 9824 924 15154 18091 9409 2883 20992 125821
Visible
under -
employ.% 15.7% •  • -2.9% •  • •  • -3.8% -4.2% •  • •  • 5.3%
183.
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, there is a certain 
arbitrariness about the specification of such a norm. The 1973 
Annual Employment Survey showed that average normal weekly hours 
worked was approximately 44 hours. This is one possible norm, 
but it refers only to organised sector employment. From the 1973 
Unemployment Survey we might estimate a mean for each class of 
grouped data on employment by hours worked and multiply the mean 
by the frequency to find total hours worked, then divide the 
grand total by total employment. For example
Hours
Class Mean Frequency Hours
Under 15 hours 10 8084 80840
15-34 hours 25 12360 309000
35-47 hours 40 91860 3674400
48+ hours 50 20608 1030400
132912 5094640
The average hours worked may be found as
5094640 v 132912 = 38.:3 hours. Let the 'norm' be approximately
40 hours per week. Equivalent fractional-time worker status can 
be assigned to any working week using this as a criterion for one 
equivalent full-time worker. Since Table 6.11 shows grouped data, 
we assign the same fractional-time worker status to persons listed 
in the same hourly group2 :
Let persons who worked < 15 hours per week be k time workers
M n h h 15-34 hours h h n i, h n2̂
n h h h 35-47 hours n n h full-time "
h n h n > 48 hours n h h I k  " "
For each industry, simply multiply the number of persons 
employed in each hourly group by the corresponding fractional-time
2 Because the data is grouped it is not possible to approximate 
any closer than this the ideal continuum of underutilisation 
mentioned in the previous chapter.
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worker status, and then sum the results to give an estimate of 
total employment in the industry in terms of full-time equivalent 
employment units. The results of this are shown in Table 6.12.
The difference between the computed full-time equivalent employment 
units shown in Table 6.12, and the number of persons employed in 
each corresponding industry in Table 6.11, is an estimate of 
labour-force underutilisation which may be described as visible 
underemployment. In view of the nature of the data and the 
simplifying assumptions made in the above calculations, too much 
credence cannot be placed upon small quantum differences between 
industries in this measure - it should be treated an an indicator 
of the relative differences in visible underemployment between 
industries.
Table 6.12 shows that the measure of visible underemployment 
in terms of full-time equivalent jobs is insignificant in five 
of the nine major I.S.I.C. groups, viz: mining, electricity, 
building, business services, and community-personal services.
These industries are dominated by wage and salary employment 
modes characteristic of organised or formal sector activity 
(see Table 6 .8 ).
There appears to be some degree of 'overutilisation' of 
labour in manufacturing, commerce and distribution, and transport 
industries - this is indicated by their negative measures of 
visible underemployment in terms of full-time equivalent jobs of 
between -3% and -4%. Analysis of Table 6.11 reveals that in each 
of these industries the proportion of workers employed for 48 hours 
or more per week was well above the national average - in all Fiji 
15% of employed persons were working 48 hours or more in the 
reference week, but in manufacturing, commerce and transport
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industries the proportion of persons working correspondingly 
long hours was 18.5%, 25.8% and 21.8% respectively. These 
industries also had some small, but not insignificant, numbers 
employed on short-time (less than 35 hours per week), but since 
only 25% of part-time non-agricultural workers expressed a desire 
for full-time employment (see Table 6.9) there would seem to be 
little scope for work-sharing within these industries' workforces.
The proportion of the workforce of manufacturing, commerce and 
transport industries which was employed in informal sector 
employment modes (own account workers and unpaid family helpers) 
was higher than in other non-agricultural industries - self­
employed and unpaid family helpers made up 1 2 .1% of the manufacturing 
sector's workforce, 25.5% of the commerce and distribution 
workforce and 16.6% of the transport workforce, which contrasts 
with 4% in building and 5.7% in community and personal services 
(see Table 6 .8 ).
Visible underemployment in terms of full-time eguivalent 
jobs is confined to the agriculture, forestry and fishing industry 
(which includes the subsistence sector). The underemployment 
measure computed in Table 6.12 is 15.7%, although it is not clear 
how this compares to the non-agricultural industries because of 
the seasonal nature of work in agriculture (in the sugar industry, 
for example). Unlike the other industries, agriculture is 
dominated by informal employment modes - self employed and unpaid 
family helpers (see Tables 6 .8  and 6.10). While 35% of these 
worked less than 35 hours during the reference week, 14% worked 
more than 48 hours (see Table 6.10). There would appear to be 
scope for work-sharing arrangements within the informal sector in 
agriculture, yet this is not occurring - only 20% of part-time
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agricultural workers stated a preference for full-time work 
(Table 6.9), and many of these may be presumed to be seeking wage 
jobs in non-agricultural activities as previously argued. It may 
be concluded that visible underemployment in agriculture is a 
persistent phenomenon, probably of the order of 10% to 20% of the 
agricultural sector workforce. Certain labour market behaviour 
patterns associated with this have been discussed above. We now 
turn to examine disguised underemployment in Fiji.
6.5.2 Invisible underemployment
In the previous chapter it was shown that the adequacy of 
employment from the society's point of view is not only measurable 
in terms of hours of work. There are other relevant dimensions of 
labour force underutilisation, which may be associated with 
activities spanning normal working hours, the two most important 
being inadequate income from work and underutilisation of the 
skills of the workforce. These dimensions are called disguised 
or invisible underemployment in order to distinguish them from 
visible underemployment discussed in the previous section.
The immediate problem which arises concerns which particular 
feature of invisible underemployment is the most appropriate for 
the case of Fiji. In section 3 of this chapter it was shown that 
there is very little open unemployment of people with secondary or 
higher education. It is recognised that there is a general 
shortage of skilled personnel in Fiji, a shortage which is 
exacerbated by net overseas emigration of many well-qualified 
workers and young people of high potential. In view of these 
observations it is unlikely that any serious underutilisation of
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skills of the workforce exists in Fiji3. On the other hand it 
can be shown that there is a lack of income-earning opportunities 
in general, and especially for those with little or no education.
It was therefore decided to consider invisible underemployment in 
terms of low incomes from work.
Table 6.13 lists employed wage and salary earners and own 
account workers in nine major I.S.I.C. industries in 1973 by 
weekly earnings. Unpaid family helpers are excluded from Table 6.13, 
but some 7,000 own account workers who were paid-in-kind-only 
(mostly in agriculture) have been counted in the group receiving 
less than $15 per week. For all Fiji there were almost 42,000 
wage and salary earners and own account workers who received less 
than $15 per week, and a further 39,000 who received between $15 
and $24 per week. These two groups together made 65% of all 
employed wage and salary and own account workers. A further 25% 
(30,000 persons) received between $25 and $49; 7% received
between $50 and $99; and 3% received more than $100 per week.
An estimate of average weekly earnings in Fiji from the 
Unemployment Survey is approximately $27. Again the specification 
of a norm is somewhat arbitrary. The 1973 Annual Employment 
Survey showed an average weekly earnings for wage earners of $22 
and for salary earners $42, an overall average in organised 
sector employment of $29. The value in the text ($27) comes from 
the following estimated frequency calculation:
3 Strictly speaking this refers to particular types of skills - 
i.e. Western or modern skills as compared with more traditional 
skills in agriculture. It should also be noted that to some 
extent the skill drain is a manifestation of the "mis-match" 






Under $15 10 41964 419640
$15-$24 20 38988 779760
$25-$49 37 30304 1121248
$50-$99 70 8392 587440
$100+ 120 3364 403680
123012 3311768
$3311768 v 123012 = $26.90
Another estimate obtained from national accounts data was $30 
per week per employed person. These several different estimates 
are not greatly inconsistent with each other for present purposes.
The data in Table 6.13 gives some idea of the distribution 
of weekly incomes about this mean, although the grouping of 
weekly incomes disguises the $27 'norm1 somewhat. Analysis of 
Table 6.13 shows that over three-quarters of the number of employed 
wage and salary earners and own account workers in agriculture 
received less than $25 per week (almost 35,000 persons). Once 
again it is difficult to draw comparisons with non-agricultural 
industries because cf the prevalence of payment-in-kind in 
agricultural employment and the difficulties of imputing monetary 
values to such payments (especially for own account workers engaged 
mainly in subsistence sector activities). It should also be 
remembered at this point that any comparisons which are made here 
refer to income comparisons and not welfare comparisons - the link 
between income and welfare is considerably more tenuous in rural 
Fiji than in urban Fiji because of the subsistence affluence in 
some rural areas (see Chapter 8 ).
There was also over 70% of employed wage and salary earners 
and own account workers in the manufacturing industry and building 
and construction industry earning less than $25 per week (over
17,000 persons in both industries together). The corresponding
Industry of Employed Wage, Salary and Own Account Workers
Table 6.13: Employed wage and sa la ry  and own account workers






























































































































Under $15 27752 92 2116 68 1744 3508 1056 188 5440 41964
$15-$24 7008 944 4744 496 8824 6380 3968 680 5944 38988
$25-$49 7852 512 1848 308 3836 4684 3036 1132 7096 30304
$50-$99 2512 164 384 48 400 1504 748 464 2168 8392
$100 over 356 52 284 4 176 1172 368 376 576 3364
TOTAL 45480 1764 9376 924 14980 17248 9176 2840 21224 123012
Source: 1973 Survey, pp.409 ,430
Table 6.14: Employment computed in “average-wage equivalent units"
Under $15 11101 37 846 27 698 1403 422 75 2176 16786
$15-$24 5606 755 3795 397 7059 5104 3174 544 4755 31190
$25-$49 10993 717 2587 431 5370 6558 4250 1585 9934 42426
$50-$99 6531 426 998 125 1040 3910 1945 1206 5637 21819
$100 over 1602 234 1278 18 792 5274 1656 1692 2592 15138
TOTAL 35833 2169 9504 998 14959 22249 11447 5102 25094 127359
Invisible 
Under­
employed ^ 21,2% -23.0% . -8.0% -29.0% -24.7% -79.6% -18.2% -3.5%
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numbers earning less than-$25 per week in other industries were:
10.000 in commerce and distribution (57% of employed wage, salary, 
own account workers in that industry), 5,000 in transport (55%),
11.000 in community and personal services (54%). In both the 
mining industry and electricity industry there were 60% of employed 
wage, salary and own account workers earning less than $25, but 
the number of persons involved was only 1600. This data is useful 
as a guide to the distribution of earnings in each industry in 
Fiji and as background to the estimation of invisible under­
employment.
In order to derive estimates of the extent of invisible 
underemployment in each industry a similar technique was adopted 
to that in the previous section. In this case the mean weekly 
earnings of $27 was used as the criterion for computing employment 
estimates in terms of 'average wage equivalent employment units'. 
Fractional-wage equivalence measures were ascribed to each weekly 
earnings group as follows:
Let persons who received < $15 be 0.4 wage jobs
II II II II $15-$24 " 0.8 " H
II II II II $25-$49 " 1.4 " n
II II II II $50-$99 " 2.6 " n
II II II II > $100 " 4.5 " n
For each industry, the number of employed wage and salary 
earners and own-account workers in each income bracket was 
multiplied by these corresponding fractional-wage equivalence 
measures and the results summed to give an estimate of total 
employment in the industry in terms of average-wage equivalent 
employment units. The results of this calculation are shown in 
Table 6.14 along with the corresponding invisible underemployment
192.
estimates. They must be regarded very cautiously. Once again 
it is stressed that it is not possible to compare such estimates 
on a cardinal scale because of the nature of the data and the 
simplifying assumptions used. The results of Table 6.14 should 
be regarded as broad indicators of the relative differences between 
industries in invisible underemployment in terms of average-wage 
equivalent employment units.
The invisible underemployment estimates are not significant 
in either the manufacturing industry or the building and 
construction industry. This is not because there were few workers 
in these industries on low incomes - Table 6.13 shows that was not 
the case at all. The zero invisible underemployment measures in 
manufacturing and in building occur because there were approximately 
the same number of average wage-equivalent jobs attributable to 
income groups on each side of the $27 mean weekly earnings.
In mining, electricity, commerce, transport, business 
services, and community and personal services industries there 
were more average-wage equivalent employment units above $27 per 
week than there were below it. Thus the invisible underemployment 
measures for these industries were negative. The measure was very 
large for the business services industry (-80%) because it had 
relatively few persons employed at low income levels (only 30% of 
business services industry's workforce received less than $25 - 
see Table 6.13). The average degree of negative invisible 
underemployment in terms of average-wage equivalent employment 
units in mining, electricity, commerce, transport, and community­
personal services industries was approximately -20%. The latter 
three of these five industries in particular had large numbers 
of persons employed for less than $25 per week (Table 6.13); but
193.
while low-income workers made up 55% of the workforce of these 
three industries, there was also a significant proportion earning 
in excess of $50 (14% earning more than twice the average weekly 
wage). It is because of this large counterbalancing group of 
high-income earners in commerce, transport and community-personal 
services industries that their invisible underemployment measures 
in average-wage equivalent employment units is negative.
Invisible underemployment in terms of average-wage equivalent 
employment units is significantly positive only for agriculture, 
at approximately +20%. In spite of the difficulties of applying 
an average money wage concept to agriculture, where self-employment 
and unpaid family labour are the dominant employment modes and where 
much of 'income' is paid-in-kind, it is clear that the problem 
of invisible underemployment in terms of low incomes or low 
earnings is widespread within the agricultural sector. There is 
a relatively small counterbalancing group of high-income 
recipients in agriculture, but only 6% of employed wage, salary 
and own account workers in agriculture earned more than $50 per 
week. The agriculture industry is a low-income industry, 
relatively low incomes by national standards being the lot of the 
vast majority of agricultural workers.
Finally we wish to consider the extent to which visible 
underemployment (short hours of work) and invisible underemployment 
(low income from work) are related to one another. If hourly wage 
rates were fixed at a single value, then inadequate working hours 
would be directly related to low incomes. However, the previous 
analysis has shown that in non-agricultural industries there are 
relatively few employed persons on short-time but relatively many
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with low incomes. In agriculture on the other hand, there is 
inadequate employment from both the hours of work and income points 
of view.
Table 6.15 refers to employed wage and salary and own account 
workers who drew their pay in cash - it excludes those who were 
paid wholly or partly in kind, as well as unpaid family helpers.
This cash-earning workforce is divided into agricultural and 
non-agricultural industries and cross-classified on the basis of 
hours worked and usual weekly earnings. The restriction of the 
analysis to the cash-earning workforce avoids problems of valuation 
of payments made in kind and of the labour efforts of unpaid 
family helpers, but it reduces the estimated coverage ratio to 
41% of the agricultural workforce and 93% of the non-agricultural 
workforce. It is necessary to adopt certain simplifying assumptions 
to aid the analysis of Table 6.15. Evidence of visible under­
employment refers to those persons working less than 35 hours per 
week (whether voluntarily or not). Then we let invisible under­
employment be characterised by situations in which working time 
was not unduly low, but for long hours a person received low 
income, viz: less than $25 per week for 35 hours work or more.
In agricultural industries, 20.6% of the cash-earning 
workforce was visibly underemployed (short working hours), and 
45% was invisibly underemployed (long hours, low income). Of the 
very low income group in the agricultural cash-earning workforce 
earning less than $15 per week, more than 75% were working 35 hours 
or more. These are the chronic invisible underemployment in 
agriculture and they accounted for 28% of the cash-earning 
agricultural workforce.
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Table 6.15: Employed wage, salary and own account workers who 
received pay in money only (not paid in kind), by 
usual weekly earnings and hours worked (1973)










hours 48hrs + Total
Under $15 556 1580 2364 2608 1592 | 8700
$15-$24
$25-$49
348 700 1064 2010 912 1 5034
276 956 Ï576 2180 "'1975 6964
$50-$99 96 276 572 690 660 2294
$100 over 4 20 44 108 156 332
TOTAL 1280 3532 5620 7596 5296 23324
NON-AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIES (93% coverage)
Weekly Under 15-34 35-39 40-47
Earnings 15hrs hours hours hours 48hrs + Total
Under $15 308 808 1868 7112 1652 11748
$15-$24 64 340 2644 23420 4200 30668
$25-$49 36 436 2412 15548 3476 21908
$50-$99 - 100 852 3584 1444 5980
$100 over - 44 196 1676 1052 2968
TOTAL 408 1728 7972 51340 11824 73272
In non-agricultural industries only 3% of the cash-earning 
workforce was visibly underemployed (short hours), but 55% was 
invisibly underemployed (long hours for less than $25 per week). 
Ninety percent of those earning less than $15 per week were working 
35 hours or more. These are the chronic invisible underemployment 




A dualistic structure of formal sector and non-formal sector 
economic activities is revealed by an analysis of employment 
patterns in Fiji. Employment in the service industries and in 
construction work is dominated by the public sector. Private 
firms are responsible for most manufacturing, transport and large 
commercial enterprise employment. Together these make up the 
formal sector where wage and salaried employment is the dominant 
employment mode. Agriculture, which here includes small-holder 
commercial farms (primarily sugar cane) and village-based 
agriculture, is characterised by self-employment and unpaid family 
labour. Agricultural industry comprises the major part of the 
non-formal sector along with a relatively small component of the 
distribution and service industries.
Visible underemployment in terms of short working time is 
widespread only in agriculture. After taking account of those 
agricultural workers who worked very long hours in the fields, the 
rate of visible underemployment in agriculture in 1973 was estimated 
to be approximately 15%. There was almost no visible underemployment 
observed in non-agricultural industries. This supports the 
characterisation of dualism in the preceding paragraph.
Open unemployment in Fiji is primarily a problem of youth.
Almost 15% of the workforce under twenty-five years old was openly 
unemployed in 1973 (21% for 14-19 years, 10% for 20-24 years).
Three quarters of all openly unemployed persons in Fiji in 1973 
were under twenty-five years old, but this age group comprised 
only one third of the workforce. Evidence on the job-seeking 
behaviour of the unemployed in 1973 reveals a marked aversion "from 
agricultural employment. Almost all of the unemployed were seeking
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non-agricultural occupations despite the fact that only 58% of the 
employed workforce held non-agricultural occupations.
The age structure of the agricultural workforce is character­
ised by a relatively high proportion of teenagers. Over 15% of 
the agricultural workforce was in the age group fourteen to 
nineteen years old in 1973. This age group only accounted for 10% 
of the workforce in non-agricultural industries. It was also 
estimated that 20% of the agricultural workforce were unpaid 
family helpers, and half of these were aged between fourteen and 
nineteen years.
All of the above observations taken together suggest that 
many young people are drawn into family-based agricultural 
activities immediately after leaving school while they wait or 
search for formal sector employment opportunities in manufacturing, 
clerical or non-farm labouring jobs. Those who are actively 
seeking such employment opportunities (i.e. the openly unemployed) 
would mostly be supported by their families rather than accepting 
some non-formal sector activity.
Reasons for this may be found when the focus of analysis shifts 
to invisible underemployment. The criterion chosen to reflect 
invisible underemployment is that of relatively low income. In 
spite of the difficulties of applying an average money wage concept 
to agriculture, the evidence clearly shows that the agricultural 
sector in Fiji is a low-income sector. Very low incomes by national 
standards are the lot of over 80% of agricultural workers. There 
are significant numbers employed in non-agricultural industries at 
relatively low incomes. Almost 60% of the employed non-agricultural 
workforce received less than the national "average wage" in 1973. 
However, there were also significant numbers of jobs earning much
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higher incomes in the non-agricultural industries, and such 
opportunities in agriculture were very few. These conditions would 
constitute a large part of the reasons for the observed job-seeking 
behaviour of the openly unemployed in Fiji.
Chronic invisible underemployment was defined as an employment 
situation in which working time was not unduly low but for long 
hours a person received low income (for example, income less than 
fifteen dollars per week for more than thirty-five hours of work). 
Here the analysis was restricted to the cash-earning workforce in 
order to avoid problems of valuation of income received in kind.
This causes no significant distortion in non-agricultural industries 
where chronic invisible underemployment was the lot of 14% of the 
employed non-agricultural workforce in 1973. At the same time the 
chronic invisibly underemployed in agriculture comprised 28% of 
the cash-earning agricultural workforce. It may be added that 
almost half of the unpaid family workers in agriculture worked more 
than thirty-five hours per week. Although invisible underemployment 
is not confined to agriculture, it A s certainly far more prevalent 
in agriculture than in the rest of the economy.
It is important to recognise the basic demographic causes of 
the employment problem in Fiji. High fertility in the 1950's and 
early 1960's has led to rapid population growth. Over 60% of 
Fiji's population lives in rural areas where rapid population 
growth has increased the density of settlement and commensurately 
reduced the capacity of the agricultural sector (including 
village-based agriculture) to absorb additional labour. Despite 
declining labour force participation ratios for young males 
(as more of them stay longer in full-time education) the growth of 
formal sector employment opportunities has been insufficient to
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absorb the number of new entrants to the labour market. Wide 
differences exist between rural and urban average income levels 
and this, combined with high levels of underemployment in 
agriculture, has caused the high rates of rural-to-urban migration 
observed in chapter 4. The result has been an increase in open 
unemployment combined with high underemployment in agriculture. 
Both problems are particularly severe for the young members of 
the workforce.
In the previous chapter it was suggested that the appropriate 
way to discuss employment problems in developing countries when 
income distribution is of prime concern is in relation to the role 
of employment as a creator of new income earning opportunities 
for particular (low income) groups. It was shown that per capita 
incomes can be raised by finding more employment opportunities for 
the workforce, even at unchanged productivity levels, and that 
such a development strategy can significantly reduce the degree 
of inequality in the income distribution. The analysis in this 
chapter has clearly identified the rural population as the 
appropriate target population for employment promotion if income 
inequality in Fiji is to be reduced. This conclusion is fully in 
accord with the long term development objectives of the Fiji 
Government as set out in the Sixth and Seventh Development Plans. 
There is insufficient recent data available to enable us to form 
a judgement about the degree of success enjoyed by this strategy 
over the period of these two plans.
PART III
Welfare Economics and Income Distribution
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CHAPTER 7
Measurement of Inequality in a Social Welfare Function
7.1 Introduction
In Part I of the thesis it was shown that there is a 
considerable amount of variation between countries in observed 
inequality of income distribution. It was noted that many 
developing countries have experienced a worsening income 
distribution as their per capita G.D.P. has grown and yet some other 
developing countries have experienced a reduction in inequality 
with growth. The question was asked whether or not it was 
possible to account for a significant part of inter-country 
variability in inequality with reference to observed patterns of 
change in certain socioeconomic variables thought to affect 
inequality in some systematic manner, and several significant 
relationships were identified. It was then argued that the 
significant relationships which were observed to account for 
inequality variations between countries might also be regarded as 
being of key importance in the design of a development planning ’ 
framework for individual developing countries in which concern 
for income distribution is important.
In Part II these key variables were studied for the case of 
Fiji. It was shown that the pattern of employment and under­
employment in Fiji is such that a concerted effort to create new 
employment opportunities in rural areas is required in order to 
make significant progress towards reducing the overall degree of 
inequality of income distribution. This is because very wide 
differences exist between rural areas and urban areas in average 
income levels and in the range of income-earning opportunities.
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This will be further examined in chapter 0 where indicators of 
the degree of inequality in rural areas and in urban areas are 
compared to those for the country as a whole. There it will be 
shown that other aspects of inequality in Fiji, such as that 
between groups within urban areas, are of secondary importance to 
the need for reducing rural-urban income inequality. Part II also 
showed that this development strategy would require continuing 
efforts to reduce the rate of population growth by lowering 
fertility rates. This is to reduce the pressure of population on 
land in rural areas and to limit the growth of the workforce to 
the growth of new employment opportunities.
The approach of this chapter is more theoretical. As an 
opening proposition we state (without the need of proof) that in 
such a development planning framework there is an important 
distinction to be drawn between seeing more or less inequality on 
one hand, and valuing it more or less in ethical terms on the 
other.
This distinction has been stated in these words by A.K. Sen 
(1973a) in connection with objective and normative features of 
inequality indices, on which more will be said later in the 
chapter, But it is also a useful device for comparing the 
objectives of this chapter with what has gone before. The analysis 
of the earlier chapters may be regarded as providing some of the 
building blocks for plans to alter the observed distribution in the 
desired direction, while this chapter is concerned with analysing 
the criteria for judging the relative merits of alternative policies 
that are based on such plans.
Tinbergen (1970) (1972) also distinguishes between theoretical 
approaches to income distribution as being either positive or
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normative. In Tinbergen's scheme a positive theory is essentially 
concerned with explaining a given distribution in terms of its 
underlying causes and with analysing its stability through the 
parameters of change. The income scale is the outcome of supply and 
demand forces, the supply side being derived from the behaviour of 
income maximising (or utility maximising) owners of factor services, 
and the demand side being derived from the behaviour of profit 
maximising organisers of production. It will later be argued that 
these efficiency criteria are very strongly normative in their 
implications. On the other hand, an avowedly normative approach 
would be concerned with defining an optimum distribution of income 
- that is, one which maximised social welfare - and possibly also 
with prescribing policies to achieve gains in terms of the criteria 
defined.
This distinction is not always a very clear one, and both 
positive and normative aspects (in the Tinbergen sense) are 
important for the economy-wide planning framework with which I 
am concerned. To the extent that they are separable, this chapter 
contains a primarily normative approach. It concentrates upon 
defining an appropriate equality-preferring social welfare 
function (i.e. an ordering of social states in which distributional 
considerations are important), and on making explicit the ethical 
judgements involved, through a selective interpretation of modern 
welfare economics literature. In more pedestrian fashion, it may 
be regarded as an attempt to formulate an appropriate objective 
function for use in a computerised programming model which is 
constrained by the organisation of production in the economy 
(i.e. technological and institutional relationships).
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Before approaching social welfare functions (s.w.f.), it is 
useful to consider the normative judgements embodied in the 
so-called objective indices of inequality. It was Dalton (1920) 
who first argued that underlying each of the summary measures then 
in use was some concept of social welfare, and hence some implicit 
form of the s.w.f. The issue has been extensively analysed 
recently by Atkinson (1970), Sen (1973a) and Champernowne (1974). 
The next section summarises Champernowne1s results because his 
presentation is especially illustrative of certain relations which 
are used later in the next chapter. The present chapter as a 
whole draws heavily on Sen's book and also makes use of Atkinson's 
remarkable result on Lorenz curve rankings.
7.2 Ethical judgements in inequality measures
Indices of inequality are often presented as measuring the 
degree of inequality in a given income distribution in some 
objective sense. Champernowne (1974) (and others) have recently 
demonstrated that it is possible for several indices to rank the 
same set of different distributions in a different order.
Therefore there is something of a normative judgement involved 
when one index says distribution x is less unequal than 
distribution y, but another index says y is less unequal than x - 
each of the summary indices of inequality embodies an implicit 
judgement about how income ought to be distributed.
Champernowne's study has exposed the ethical judgements 
implicit in several commonly used inequality measures in a way 
which is particularly illustrative for the purposes of this 
chapter. He began by noting that any inequality index should
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possess certain properties. Firstly it should be easily computed, 
on a range from zero to unity, from readily available statistics.
It should be impartial between persons, depending only on the 
frequency distribution of income and not on other factors such as 
wealth, race, and so on, in their association with income. It 
should be invariant with respect to a change in either the total 
population or total income, as long as the proportionate 
distribution is unaffected. Finally any inequality index should 
exhibit Pigou-Dalton efficiency. Champernowne's interpretation 
of this condition is that more weight should be attached to 
absolute transfers at the low end of the income scale and less to 
those at the top. These criteria were shown to be fulfilled by 
each of the following indices of inequality:
- the coefficient of variation (C)
- the standard deviation of income power (H)
- Atkinson's index (A)
- Gini's concentration ratio (G)
- Theil's entropy index (T)1
At this point Champernowne's approach requires some
qualification. Firstly, a minor point, Theil's entropy measure
(T) does not range from zero to unity strictly, but can be made to
do so by a simple monotone transform. Secondly, Champernowne's
interpretation of the Pigou-Dalton condition involves an ethical
judgement which seems to be derived from the utilitarian
assumptions about equal capacities for satisfaction enjoyed by
all persons, and which has earned the doctrine a reputation for
1 Computational and definitional formulae for these indices are 
widely available and are not presented here. The Gini coefficient 
is singled out for special treatment later on, but very little 
use is made of the other measures beyond this section.
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egalitarian bias. Sen (1973a) has shown that this reputation is
ill-deserved because it stems from certain special assumptions:
The trouble with this (utilitarian) approach is 
that maximising the sum of individual utilities 
is supremely unconcerned with the interpersonal 
distribution of that sum. This should make it 
a particularly unsuitable approach to use for
measuring or judging inequality.... The maximisation
of the sum of individual utilities through the 
distribution of a given total income between 
different persons requires equating the marginal 
utilities from income of different persons, and if 
the special assumption is made that everyone has 
the same utility function, then equating marginal 
utilities amounts to equating total utilities as 
well. (Sen (1973a) p.16).
But more on utilitarianism later. The relevant point here is 
that Sen's definition of Pigou-Dalton efficiency is satisfied if 
the inequality index simply responds in the appropriate downward 
(egalitarian) direction to any transfer of income from rich to 
poor, which is evidently not the same thing as attaching 
relatively more weight to transfers at the low end of the income 
scale. In Sen's analysis of inequality measures, the standard 
deviation of the logarithm of income (H) does not satisfy the 
Pigou-Dalton condition (although it only fails for transfers among 
the very high incomes), but C, A, G and T do satisfy it.
Champernowne then drew up a taxonomy consisting of three 
types of inequality, and proceeded to compare the performance of 
each of the above indices with respect to their sensitivity to 
each type of inequality. He defined:
Type I - inequality due to extreme wealth;
Type II - inequality among the less extreme incomes;
Type III - inequality due to extreme poverty.
He found that Atkinson's index (A) and the standard deviation 
of the logarithms of income (H) were both relatively more
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sensitive to type III inequality - that is, income transfers to 
the poor registered relatively greater responses in A and H than 
in the other indices. Conversely, he found the coefficient of 
variation (C) and Theil's entropy measure (T) to be more sensitive 
to type I inequality. Gini's concentration ratio (G) was found to 
be relatively more sensitive when there is not a tendency for 
incomes to be bunched in a narrow range but are widely spread 
(type II inequality).
The illustrative value of Champerowne's typology is that it 
translates easily into a geometrical property of the Lorenz curve. 
The Lorenz curve of a distribution showing type I inequality would 
be skewed to the lower-left. The Lorenz curve for type III 
inequality would be skewed to the upper-right. The Lorenz curve 
for type II inequality would not be skewed in either direction but 
would be symmetrical about the leading diagonal drawn perpendicular 
to the egalitarian line.2 This is shown in figure 7.1.
A potential source of confusion should be clarified at this
point. The geometric shape of the Lorenz curve will be described
as "symmetrical" if the curve is furthest from the egalitarian
line at a point intersecting the perpendicular bisector of the
egalitarian line. This is point X in figure 7.1. On the other
hand, the property of "symmetry" which is ascribed to the social
welfare functions of the next section is a condition imposed to
show that we are unconcerned with who gets which income - the
s.w.f. and the inequality indices must be impartial between
individuals, depending only on the frequency distribution of
2 An interesting property of symmetrical Lorenz curves is that they 
are derived from income density functions which are very close to 
log-normal distributions (Aitchison and Brown (1957). This may be 
seen as an advantage if one was interested in statistical 
manipulation of the distribution.
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figure 7.1: Lorenz curves, skewed and symmetrical
Percentage 
of Income
income. The context in which the words "symmetric income 
distribution" and "symmetrical Lorenz curve" appear should be 
clear enough in what follows to avoid confusion.
Champernowne's results have clearly demonstrated that the 
indices most frequently used to measure inequality are not free of 
ethical content. On the contrary, certain welfare implications 
may be seen to follow from the choice of one index over another. 
Recall the distinction drawn earlier between seeing more or less 
inequality on one hand, and valuing it more or less on the other. 
Following Sen, it is further argued that it is reasonable, even 
advantageous, to look for inequality measures that are as 
'objective' as possible. In view of the discussion above, this 
would seem to imply a requirement for observing the shape of a 
given distribution, and then choosing a measure of its inequality 
that 'corresponds to' that shape. Although variations in that
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inequality measure must still be interpreted in terms of the 
particular welfare characteristics of the measure, we are then 
permitting our ethical evaluation of such variations to be 
dissociated (as much as possible) from the measure itself and, 
equally important, we are not permitting our welfare judgements 
to be biased by inappropriate sensitivities of the chosen 
inequality measure. This issue will later be linked more clearly 
to that of value judgements about inequality in the framework of 
a social welfare function, to which we now turn.
7.3 Welfare economics and equity
The traditional utilitarian argument in favour of equality of 
income distribution is usually attributed to Pigou (1920) whose 
welfare prescription was formulated on the basis of five 
assumptions:
(i) the utility an individual derives from his income 
(and leisure and wealth) is cardinally measurable,
(ii) the units in which the utilities of different 
individuals are measured are the same,
(iii) all individuals have similar tastes, so that each one's 
utility function is a given concave function of his 
personal income (though, of course, individuals with 
different money incomes are on different points of 
such a function),
(iv) social welfare is the unweighted sum of individual 
utilities, and,
(v) it is desirable to promote social welfare.
The fundamental theorem derived from these assumptions is
stated as:
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Theorem 1 Social welfare is maximised by distributing 
income equally.
As emphasised by Nath (1973) the last of these assumptions 
remains implicit in Pigou's work, which does not refer to the 
concept of an 'ethical judgement'. This is because his utilitarian 
moral philosophy held certain propositions to be self-evident 
- most importantly assumption (iii). Actually Pigou's third 
assumption is a non-testable assumption about the real world, 
which Robbins (1932) exposed as a value judgement. In the aftermath 
of Robbins' critique, it might have been possible to interpret the 
utilitarian assumptions as value judgements which might appeal to 
some, but not necessarily all economists. However, the mainstream 
of welfare economics chose instead to eschew interpersonal 
comparisons of welfare and cardinal measurability of individual's 
utility, and to define criteria for social welfare upon 'almost 
non-controversial' ethical judgements (Nath (1973) p .18).
Sen has described this development somewhat pejoratively
as "non-conflict economics":
The so-called basic theorem of welfare economics is 
concerned with the relation between competitive 
equilibria and Pareto optimality. ...A change 
implies a Pareto-improvement if it makes no one 
worse off and someone better off. A situation is 
Pareto optimal if there exists no other attainable 
situation such that a move to it would be a  ̂
Pareto-improvement. That is, Pareto optimality 
only guarantees that no change is possible such 
that someone would become better off without making 
anyone worse off. (Sen (1973a) pp.6,7).
The real difficulty for our present purpose is that 
economists have tended to adhere to the concept of Pareto 
optimality as being both necessary and sufficient for overall 
social optimality. A Pareto-optimum might better be regarded as 
an optimum for a particular system subject to certain constraints;
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but there may be other systems which are not subject to the same 
constraints. Then a Pareto-optimum, which cannot be improved 
upon in its own terms, may be regarded as inferior in terms of a 
different system of values. If goods are assumed to be finely 
divisible then there exist countless allocations of resources 
which may be Pareto-optimal, each one corresponding to a different 
distribution of utilities (or incomes) among individual members of 
the society. The Paretian ethic does not enable a choice to be 
made between different Pareto-optimum positions. Therefore it is 
not a sufficient criterion for the determination of welfare in my 
view because in my ethical system income distribution ranks highly 
as a direct determinant of welfare.3 The Paretian ethic may not 
even be a necessary condition, for example, in a situation in 
which an increase in income for a rich man with no loss for a poor 
man is ruled out (on equity grounds) under the non-Paretian system 
of values.
Utilitarianism is also unsuitable as an equity conscious 
criterion because of its concentration on the aggregation of 
individual utilities as mentioned previously. Its assumption of 
a common utility function for all individuals is also untenable to 
many economists, although this in itself need not cause us to 
reject the assumption outright. Lerner (1944) rejected the 
assumption that every individual had the same utility of income 
function and suggested that it might be preferable (less
3 It should be remembered that concern for equity is not restricted 
to ethical evaluations - it is also important in the positive 
framework (in the Tinbergen sense) because we are concerned with 
an economic system in which income distribution affects aggregate 
output and income, and increasing aggregate output and income 
may be conducive to improvements in income distribution under 
certain policy regimes. See Part IV for further discussion 
of this.
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controversial) for economists to be concerned with the expected
value of total utility, i.e. its mathematical expectation. His
proposition is stated as follows:
If it is impossible, on any division of income, 
to discover which of any two individuals has a 
higher marginal utility of income, the probable 
value of total satisfaction is maximised by 
dividing income evenly. (Lerner (1944) p.29).
More recently, Sen (1969) has provided a generalised 
formulation of Lerner's proposition. He made the following 
assumptions:
(i) (income fixity) there is a fixed amount of homogeneous 
income to be distributed among a given number of 
persons;
(ii) (concave utility functions) all individual utility 
functions are concave functions of individual income 
and form a set V;
(iii) (equi-probability) the probability distribution of the 
individual utility functions in V is taken by the 
planner to be the same for all individuals;
(iv) (additive probable welfare) probable social welfare is 
the unweighted sum of the planner's mathematical 
expectation of individual utilities.
From these assumptions, Sen formulated his "theorem of 
probabilistic egalitarianism", which is essentially a restatement 
of Lerner's theorem.
Theorem 2 Probable social welfare is maximised with an equal 
division of income.
The equi-probability assumption means that every possible 
assignment of utility functions among individuals is equally
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likely, and this was recognised by Sen as too restrictive. He 
also argued that maximising probable social welfare may not be 
the only objective of the planner - in particular, in a situation 
of uncertainty as to who has which utility function it might be 
reasonable to adopt a "maximin" policy of maximising the security 
level (minimum income) - Sen added two further (weaker) assumptions: 
(iii*) (shared utility set) it is not possible for the 
planner to specify a proper subset S of the set V 
of utility functions that can be enjoyed only by a 
proper subset of the individuals, and
(v) (bounded utility functions) each utility function in 
the set V is bounded from below.
Theorem 3 (Maximin egalitarianism)1*
Given assumptions (i), (ii), (iii*), (iv) and (v), 
an equal division of income maximises the greatest 
lower bound of aggregate welfare over all possible 
utility correspondences.
Thus, using an individualistic s.w.f., Sen showed that an 
equal division of income is an appropriate goal for a planner to 
follow in a situation of uncertainty because it is a maximin policy. 
As such it is in accordance with Rawls' (1971), (1974) principle of 
"justice as fairness" which has been widely acclaimed, and in this *
** This theorem is alternatively stated by Sen as follows:
Let D be an n-vector of income distribution
E " " n-vector of equal income distribution 
C " " n-vector in V with the convention that the i-th 
element is the utility function assigned to individual i 
(i.e. a correspondence between the n individuals and the 
utility functions in V)
Let W(C,D) represent social welfare from distribution D with 
utility correspondence C.
Then Theorem 3: max inf W(C,D) e inf W(C,E).
D C  C
(Sen (1969) pp.216-217).
2 1 3 .
sense is less objectionable than the utilitarian arguments for 
equality based on identical individual utility functions.
Until Atkinson's (1970) paper (reviewed below) this was 
as much as welfare economics could offer to a system of values in 
which income distribution was important. The widely respected 
Paretian ethic avoided distributional judgements completely, and 
the traditional utilitarianism was regarded by most economists 
(except a few hardened Benthamites) as resting on an untenable 
premise. The maximin option is based on more acceptable premises 
(more correctly, it is in accord with more people's value 
judgements under uncertainty) and through its concentration on 
the poorest member of society it may also be recommended as a 
criterion for a poverty-focused development strategy. But this is 
not the only concern of our development planning framework - we 
are still interested in what happens to all of the other income­
earning units in the course of development.
There are two issues which form a bridge between conventional 
welfare economics and the rest of this chapter. Firstly the 
practical development planner is not very interested in an equal 
division of income per se. What is required for planning purposes 
is a reasonable and practical criterion by which to judge that an 
improvement in welfare is (or is not) achieved, i.e. a criterion 
which may be applied to all courses of action that are feasible 
in the sense that they lie within whatever institutional and 
technological constraints must be observed. This criterion for 
an improvement in welfare should enable the planner to eliminate 
all but the optimum policy mix in these terms; but the theorist's
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concern for proving an optimum-optimorum exists in a state of 
perfect equality seems somewhat remote. Secondly, one might 
question whether or not a s.w.f. should be individualistic at all. 
For instance, the planner may have reason to believe that 
individuals have a rate of time preference which is too low from 
the social point of view. Such would be the case if there was 
inadequate provision of public goods to maintain the framework of 
arrangements by which individual utilities are satisfied. The 
planner will probably not have the information to enable him to 
assess individual preferences (even those of the poorest 
individual or group). From this position one may sympathise with 
attempts to establish conditions under which the form of the 
individual utility of income functions need not be specified at 
all in order to compare distributions. The response to both of 
these issues begins with a review of Atkinson's 1970 paper.
7.4 Atkinson's results
Atkinson (1970) approached the problem of income distribution 
rankings in the first instance using Dalton's additively separable 
and symmetric s.w.f. defined over individual incomes and assuming 






U(y) f(y) • dy (7.4.1)
where U(y) is the utility of income function 
f(y) is the frequency distribution 
y is the highest income observed.
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If income distributions (f(Y)) are ranked according to their 
contribution to welfare on the basis of (7.4.1), Atkinson proved: 
Theorem 4 A distribution f(Y) will be preferred to another
distribution f*(Y) for aTJ_ U(Y) (U'> 0, U"< 0) iff
fz *
[F(Y) - F (Y)]dy £  0, all z, 0 < z < y 
j q max
and F(Y) f  F (Y) for some y, where




(i.e. integral of the density 
function)
This is shown to be equivalent to saying that if the Lorenz 
curves of two distributions do not intersect, one can unambiguously 
infer that the distribution whose Lorenz curve is closer to the 
egalitarian line is associated with a higher level of welfare.
Thus, although Atkinson's theorem is formulated on the basis of 
utilitarian assumptions, he showed that a partial ordering of 
distributions^*.e. one satisfying Lorenz superiority) can be 
obtained without specifying at all the form of the individual 
U(Y) function. This is indeed a remarkable result, since in a 
certain set of circumstances it abnegates the controversy over 
the specification of individual utility functions.
Nevertheless one may regard Atkinson's paper as neo-utilitarian 
(the description is due to Phelps(1977) - see footnote on page 224). 
Recognising that his condition on Lorenz curves provides only a 
partial ordering, and that a complete ranking of distributions is 
only possible if the precise form of the s.w.f. is specified, he 
proceeded to restrict his attention to that class of U(y) 
functions that are increasing and concave (as in theorem 4), and










where Y^^. is what he calls the "Equally Distributed Equivalent 
level of income". This concept is defined as the level of income 
which, if equally distributed, would give the same level of social 
welfare as the present observed income distribution. In terms of 
the theory of decision-making under uncertainty, is analogous 
to a certainty equivalent. An inequality index defined on Y^DE is:
A = 1 ’ yEDE/ .... (7.4.3)
y
(where y is the mean of the distribution), and A can be thought of 
as the proportional risk premium.5 To make his index mean- 
independent Atkinson restricted his U(y) function to the following 
class of homothetic functions:
U(y) = z + ^  £ e f  1
and .... (7.4.4)
U(y) = loge y , e = 1
which in the case of discrete distributions implies an inequality 
index
A = 1 - [ I & 1"e-f(yi)]1'e .... (7.4.5)
1=1 u i
where e is a parameter (0<e<“>) that indicates the degree of 
inequality aversion of the society. As e rises, more importance is
5Intuitively, for A = 0.3, we could say that if incomes were 
distributed equally, only 70% of the present national income would 
suffice to achieve the same level of welfare.
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attached to transfers at the lower end of the income scale.
Typical values of e would range from 0.5 to 3.5, with a low 
degree of inequality aversion being represented by e < 1.
Atkinson analysed several inequality indices and found them 
to embody varying implicit values of inequality aversion, and 
hence about social welfare. For instance, the coefficient of 
variation can be shown to attach equal weight to transfers at 
different income levels (e t 0); the Gini coefficient attaches 
more weight to transfers affecting middle income classes and is 
not particularly sensitive to inequality due to extreme poverty or 
wealth (e t 1); and the standard deviation of income power weights 
transfers at the lower end relatively more heavily (e > 1). These 
conclusions parallel those of Champernowne discussed in section 2 
above, except that Champernowne seems to assume e > 1 for 
Atkinson's index whereas Atkinson regards it as possibly extending 
below unity.
7.5 A generalisation by Sen
Drawing on work by Dasgupta, Sen and Starret (1972), Sen (1973a) 
showed that Atkinson's result on Lorenz superior rankings could be 
generalised beyond the restrictive utilitarian frame used by 
Atkinson. He extended the admissible class of s.w.f. to non-additive 
individualistic functions such as:
W = G (U (y-j), U(y2).... U(yn)),
and then also by defining social welfare directly on the 
distribution of incomes (without going through the intermediary of 
individual utilities) as:
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W = F(y1,y2 ,...,yn ) 6
Sen then proceeded to show that the concavity restriction 
could be relaxed - strict quasi-concavity7 is sufficient for his 
generalisation which is expressed as follows (from Sen (1973a) 
pp.53-56)
Considering, therefore, the s.w.f. (F) defined over 
individual incomes, implying neither the necessity 
to go through the intermediary of individual 
utilities, nor the use of the utilitarian additive 
framework, nor even the necessity of strict 
concavity, let F be simply any function that is 
symmetric and strictly quasi-concave. The following 
theorem is true:
Theorem 5 Let F be symmetric and strictly quasi-concave.
For two different distributions x and y with the 
same total income, yLx F(y) > F(X); and if not 
yLx, then for some F, F(y) <_ F(x).
(note: yLx is notation for "the Lorenz curve of y lies everywhere 
inside that of x").
6 Clearly, for any given individual utility function U, the 
individualistic form 6 is really a special case of F, so that 
one is not obliged to go through the intermediary of individual 
utilities at all.
7 The distinction between concavity and quasi-concavity is given 
by Sen as follows:
'A concave welfare function F requires that the weighted average 
of social welfare levels from two income distributions x and y 
must be less than or equal to the social welfare of the weighted 
average of the two distributions using the same weights.
tF(x) + (l-t)F(y) <_ F(tx + (l-t)y), any t, 0 < t < 1.
On the other hand quasi-concavity requires that the minimum of 
the two social welfare levels from x and y respectively should 
be less than or equal to the social welfare of the weighted 
average of the two distributions
Min[F(x), F(y)] £  F(tx+(l-t)y), any t, 0 < t < 1.
For strict quasi-concavity the weak inequality £  is to be 
replaced by <, so that the social welfare from the weighted 
average must be strictly larger than the minimum of the two
welfare levels from x and y respectively.... This is a strictly
egalitarian feature which is all we need for building equality- 
consciousness into our social welfare function'. (Sen (1973a), 
pp.52-53).
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His proof makes use of the following:
Firstly, rearranging the elements of x and y so that they 
are in increasing order, i.e.
x, < x0 < ... < x , and I —  c —  —  n
y-, ± y 2 1  ••• ± y n>
the following four conditions can be shown to be equivalent 




E X. = E yi# and for k £  n > E X. < E
i=l 1 i=l l i=l 1 "  i = l
k k






(2) x can be transformed into y by a non-empty finite sequence 
of operations of the form
x .o+l = x .“ + e“ < Xj°
a+1 a a w a
xj = xj ' e i  xi
for i < j and ea > 0, with x^a+  ̂ = xka if k f  i,j.
(3) For any strictly concave real-valued function U,
n n
z u(x.) < e u(y.)
i=l 1 i=l 1
(4) While y is not x, nor a permutation of x, there exists a
a
bistochastic matrix Q such that y = Qx.
8 A bistochastic matrix is a non-negative square matrix, each of 
the rows and columns of which add up to one. Multiplying a 
vector x by a bistochastic matrix Q converts it into another 
vector y which also has the same sum of its elements taken 
together. It is shown in Berge (Topological Spaces, Oliver & 
Boyd, Edinburgh 1963 p.182) that any bistochastic matrix of 
order n is some convex combination of the set of permutation 
matrices of order n.
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Condition (1) is simply a restatement of the idea of Lorenz 
superiority of y over x. Since the Lorenz curve is computed by 
considering the proportion of income accruing to the bottom m% 
of the population and since total income is the same in x and y, 
the set of inequalities (1) shows that for some bottom m% of the 
population a lower share of income is given by x than y, and for 
all bottom m%'s, x gives no more than y. Condition (2) is easily 
seen to be a finite sequence of transformations transferring 
income from the rich to the poor, taking us from x to y.
Condition (3) reiterates that the Atkinson framework is a special 
case of a strictly quasi-concave and symmetric function F.
Condition (4) is explained by recalling that any bistochastic 
matrix of order n is some convex combination of the set of 
permutation matrices of order n. With Ps being any permutation 
matrix, Q is obtained as
Q = I a Ps, (za = 1 ,  a > 0) 
s s
Therefore, y lies inside the convex hull of the permutations of x, 
but y is not an extreme point of this convex hull. So y can be 
obtained as a convex combination of the set of permutations of x, 
which themselves are socially indifferent by virtue of symmetry. 
Therefore for any strictly quasi-concave F satisfying symmetry,
F(y) > F(x). (Sen (1973a) p.56).
Having generalised Atkinson's result on Lorenz superiority,
Sen noted that Theorem (5) is too restrictive for practical 
purposes because the number of people in the two distributions is 
assumed to be the same,as also is the total income to be 
distributed (and hence, mean income is also identical). The Lorenz
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curve result can easily be extended to the case of variable 
population, which is important for comparing distributions between 
countries or regions with different populations as well as 
intertemporal comparisons of the same country when population 
growth is rapid (see Sen (1973a), pp.58-60).
However, variations in mean income pose a much more difficult
problem for theoretical welfare economics and for the practising
planner. Sen crystallises the difficulty as follows:
It is obvious that any possibility of making 
distributional judgements independently of the size 
of income will make sense only if the relative 
ordering of welfare levels of distributions were 
strictly neutral to the operation of multiplying 
everybody’s income by a given number. We might 
not, however, wish to make this assumption, since 
our judgement about social welfare may not be 
scale-independent in this sense (Sen (1973a),
pp.60,61).
Then, later on,
One can argue that for low income levels the 
inequality measures should take much sharper note 
of the same degree of relative variation on the 
ground that inequality pinches most when people 
are closer to starvation. On the other side, I 
have heard it argued that 'equality' is a luxury 
that only a rich economy can 'afford', and while I 
cannot pretend to fully understand this point of 
view, I am impressed by the number of people who 
seem to be prepared to advocate such a position. 
Though the considerations run in opposite directions, 
that in itself is no justification for making the 
inequality measure independent of the level of mean 
income. (Sen (1973a), pp.70-71).
Sen's approach to this problem is quite persuasive, although 
not completely so. He prefers to regard income distribution 
comparisons as 'non-compulsive judgements'. That is, Lorenz 
superiority yLx is taken to constitute a prima facie case that y 
is a better distribution from a welfare point of view than x (by 
Theorem 5). One must then recognise that contrary arguments may 
exist - falling mean income may be one such argument. Sen then
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places the onus of rejecting the judgement based on Lorenz ranking 
upon any critic, who must in turn specify exactly how he expects 
variations in mean income to affect the distributional judgement 
from a welfare point of view.
There are two problems which must be faced by any attempt to 
apply this criterion. Firstly, Lorenz rankings provide only 
partial orderings. In certain cases this may be a very useful 
approach. However, if the Lorenz curves intersect, nothing can be 
said about welfare unless the s.w.f. is made explicit; and if the 
s.w.f. is formalised, then any distribution function can be ranked 
unambiguously against another in terms of its contribution to 
welfare. Whether or not the particular form of s.w.f. is widely 
acceptable is another matter on which more is said later.
Secondly, even if the Lorenz curves do not intersect, Sen's 
approach might very well involve quite independent judgements of 
the welfare effects of income distribution on one hand and growth 
on the other. That is, the critic who believes that mean income 
may fall with a movement to a higher Lorenz curve, and who wishes 
to reject the "non-compulsive judgement" implied by the Lorenz 
ordering on those grounds, may clearly be working to a different - 
and possibly inconsistent - set of criteria. Further, (and even 
in the case when equity and growth are found not to conflict) 
because the judgement on income growth is exogenous to the Lorenz 
curve system which implies the judgement on distribution, one 
cannot tell how much of the welfare change is due to the 
egalitarian effect as compared with the growth effect.
The reason that these two problems remain is, of course, that 
the function W = F(y^, y2 »...,yn), from which Sen derives his 
position on Lorenz orderings and non-compulsive judgements, depends
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only upon the distribution of incomes. Questions relating to the 
level of income and income growth are, by construction, exogenous 
to his Lorenz ordering system. Therefore, non-compulsive judgements 
are indeed as far as it is possible to go with respect to the 
effects of income growth on welfare. It is possible to go through 
the intermediary of individual U(y) functions if we so desire, 
but we are not obliged to do so unless we want a complete ordering.
There is a way around these difficulties, but to date the 
proof of the existence of this alternative requires that we make 
use of the unpalatable utilitarian assumption of identical 
individual utility of income functions. The most favourable 
interpretation of this assumption is frankly to recognise that it 
is an ethical judgement which might appeal to some, but not 
necessarily all (or even most), economists; and also to recognise 
that the derived social welfare function provides clearly useful 
results, and a model does not have to be realistic in its structure 
to give useful results. The approach is discussed in the next 
section and draws on recent articles by Sheshinski (1972) and 
Kats (1972). Their solution is to write an index of income 
distribution and one of income level directly into the s.w.f. as 
direct determinants of the level of welfare. This approach has 
been dubbed 'simple-minded and overtly honest1 by Rowley and 
Peacock (1975). In my view there are compelling reasons for keeping 
the approach simple (and honest) in many developing countries' 
central planning offices, although simplicity can not be the sole 
supporting attribute. Provided that it is also both reasonable 
and practicable, then 'simple' is to be heartily-praised, not 
disparaged. Accordingly, I shall elevate their pejorative 
remark to the heading of the next section.
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7.6 A simple-minded and overtly honest approach 
(or, the neo-utilitarian alternative)9 
The problem at hand is to specify those conditions under 
which a particular functional form of s.w.f. will enable us to:
(i) derive a complete ranking of income distributions, and
(ii) consistently evaluate the relative impact on welfare of 
both income redistribution and growth.
Sheshinski (1972) and Kats (1972) have addressed themselves to 
this problem; both can be grouped in the neo-utilitarian school 
because of their assumption that all individuals have identical 
utility of income functions.
Consider a vector of income I distributed among n individuals 
with the same utility of income function U(I.), (i = 1,2,...,n).
(The symbol ~ denotes a vector of individual incomes).
Two attributes of I are its mean T  and an index of inequality 
calculated from it. For instance, the Gini index (used by both 
Sheshinski and Kats) is calculated as:
n n
G(I) = £ £ | 1,-1,| .... (7.6.1)
2n2I i=l j=l 1 3
(that is, one half of the mean difference between all pairs of
-  1 nincomes i,j) where I = —  £ I..
n i=l 1 _
A social welfare function which is strictly increasing in I
and strictly decreasing in G(I) will be appropriate for our needs.
Let us call this criterion KS (for Kats and Sheshinski).
9 The notation in this section is different to that in the previous 
section. I have adhered to the notation used by the authors 
cited. Atkinson and Sen use yi for income of individual i, and 
y for. the mean of the distribution. Kats and Sheshinski use I. 
and I respectively for the same variables. The adjective 
"neo-utilitarian" refers to use by Kats and Sheshinski of 
cardinally measurable utility and identical individual utility of 
income functions. They reject the need for additively 
separable s.w.f.
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Sheshinski gave an example of one such function:
n n -1W(U(I1),U(I?),...,U(In)) = H{ E z if [min(U(I•)»U(I.))]}
n i=1j=l 1 J
.... (7.6.2)
This can be shown to satisfy the KS criterion from any 
invertible function U, and any arbitrary strictly increasing 
transformation H, by making use of:
min(Ii ,1.)
I. + I. - Il.-I. 
_ J____ J  ' i J
9
and,
irrin(U(I.) ,U (I j )) = U(min( 1^»I j )) -
Then Sheshinski's function may be rewritten as:
n n n
W = H{ z E U"'[mindKi.), U(I.))]} 
i= i j= i 1 J
n n n
= H{n E I. - E E |l.-I.|}
i=l 1 i=l j=l 1 J
= H{n2 I (1-G)} (7.6.3)
which is increasing in I and decreasing in G. Several observations 
on Sheshinski's function are of interest. Firstly, it is not 
additive in individual utilities - this is the main point of 
departure from traditional utilitarianism. Neither does 
Sheshinski's function possess the property of additive separability 
(the independence of each person's welfare from the position of 
others). The status of additive separability in a s.w.f. has been 
shown by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973) to be a reasonable property 
although not compelling in itself. But there is a difference between 
simply adding individual utilities and the concept of additive 
separability. Sen has shown that the former implies the latter,
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but not vice versa. He explains it as follows:
If we take each U as a strictly concave function of 
individual utilities we are avoiding the simple 
additive formula of utilitarianism, but we are still 
sticking to the notion of additive separability. 
Individual components of social welfare continue to 
be judged without reference to the welfare components 
of others, and the social welfare components 
corresponding to different persons are eventually 
added up to arrive at an aggregate value of social 
welfare...In general, if one feels that the social 
valuation of the welfare of individuals should depend 
crucially on the levels of welfare (or income) of 
others, this property of the independence of each 
person's welfare component from the position of 
others has to be sacrificed. (Sen (1973a), 
pp.39-41).
Atkinson (1970) and Newbery (1970) have shown that if U is 
strictly concave, there exists no additively separable s.w.f. which 
ranks distributions in the same order as the Gini index. The 
status of additive separability thus has a bearing on whether the 
Gini index can be used as an acceptable measure of inequality in 
a s.w.f. We shall return to this in the next section.
The second observation is that Sheshinski's s.w.f. is 
independent of the form of U since any invertible function U will 
suffice. He thus maintains that no concavity restriction is 
required. But an invertible function must be strictly increasing 
(or strictly decreasing) so U must be strictly increasing in 
income. Sheshinski's welfare function H is strictly concave 
given H ' > 0 and H" < 0.
Thirdly, the trade-off between average income and the Gini 
index is proportional on a given social welfare. That is, for 
social welfare W held constant we have:
dl _ d G _ -d(l-G)
i " I ’T gT  _ T T g )
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so that a one percent increase in average income accompanied by a 
one percent increase in the inequality measure leaves social 
welfare unchanged.
Finally, Sheshinski's function can be shown to be consistent 
with Rawls' principle of justice which implies the appropriateness 
of a maximin policy. For instance, if n = 2, (7.6.2) reduces to
W (U (I n), U(I2)) = H{min[U(I.|), U(I2)]} .... (7.6.4)
i.e. welfare depends on the income of the poorer member of the 
society.
In extending the approach of Sheshinski, Kats showed that 
another form of welfare function satisfying KS (and which is not 
simply a monotone transform of (7.6.3)) is given by:
H(U(I1),...,U(In) =




2n i U(I.) 
i=l 1
n n
I z |U(I )-U(I.) 
i=l 0=1 1 J
(7.6.6)
Making the traditional utilitarian assumption that utilities
10
are cardinally measurable (for instance, U (I^) = I.) then Kats'
10 This is one of the "special cases" alluded to by Sen in my 
footnote 6 above, which is required in order to derive a 
consistent ranking of social states relating both income 
distribution and growth. Any serious attempt to apply this 
assumption would of course have to deal with the index number 
problem of valuing real income for individuals facing different 
prices for commodities and consuming different types of 
commodities (some non-market goods as well). The problem is not 
trivial as shown in Chapter 1; we simply note this fact here.
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function satisfies KS since it reduces obviously to
H = log I  - G(I) .... (7.6.7)
Using a sequence of lemmas, corollaries and propositions,
Kats showed the necessary and sufficient conditions for (7.6.6) to 
satisfy criteria KS. His paper is terse and difficult and several 
proofs which he holds to be self-evident are not adequately 
explained. Accordingly, a detailed exposition of his paper with 
comprehensive proofs and notes is given in Appendix A. His main 
results are paraphrased below.
The first condition is that H be symmetric. This is the same 
symmetry definition used by Sen and simply means that a permutation 
of the co-ordinates of a distribution (I) leaves welfare unchanged. 
That is, as long as the pattern of distribution is the same, we 
are not concerned with who gets which particular income. Note 
that two distributions I and I' being symmetric implies that they 
have the same mean and Gini index (T = T', G(I) = G (I')).
The second condition is that H be strictly increasing along 
rays from the origin. Although this condition is difficult to 
visualise in n-dimensions, it can be intuitively explained by 
simplifying to the two-person case (n = 2). Fig.7.2 shows that 
the I.j axis measures individual 1's income and axis measures 
individual 2's income (I-j,^ >_0). Clearly, any ray from the 
origin represents a line on which the ratio I ^ i s  fixed (and 
on the 45° line 1̂  = I^).11
11 As Figure 2 is drawn it implies an additive s.w.f. which is 
inconsistent both with Kats' function and with Gini orderings.
It is only intended to illustrate some properties used by 
Kats and which I had found difficult to interpret.
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If the ray fixes the distribution of income between individuals, 
any movement along it away from the origin must represent an 
increase in income of each individual and hence I. Thus H 
increases along any ray as T  increases, with G(I) fixed.
Thirdly, in order to distinguish between rays (and hence, 
between different inequality indices), he uses the idea of an 
"r-simplex", which is simply a line in two-dimensions (hyperplane 
in n-dimensions) showing all possible distributions of a given 
level of income r. The broken line in Fig.7.2 shows that r could 
accrue solely to individual 1, or solely to individual 2, or any 
combination along the r-simplex (rr). Kats third condition is 
that if two distributions I and I' are both on the same r simplex, 
then H(U(I)) >_ H(U(11)) if and only if G(I) <_ G(11).
The diagram also makes the definition of symmetry more 
obvious. A vector of income distributed between two individuals 
can be represented by a point on rr indicated by the arrow drawn 
along R^. If R^ is the ray along which income is equally
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distributed then we can think of a permutation of co-ordinates 
(i.e. swapping I-j and axes around) as producing an income 
distribution on rr which is a mirror image of the arrow on 
shown as a dotted arrow in Fig.7.2. Since the inequality index 
ranges from zero on R^, to unity on each axis, the symmetric 
distribution has the same inequality index as the original; and 
since it lies on the same r-simplex, it has the same mean income.
7.7 Summary and Conclusions
It is now necessary to draw together the threads of the 
argument in this chapter and to indicate the main issues to be 
further considered.
The traditional utilitarian proposition on welfare formalised 
by Pigou (1920) was that social welfare is maximised by distributing 
income equally. This was the logical outcome of a set of 
assumptions which included cardinally measurable utility and 
identical individual utility functions with diminishing marginal 
utility of income. For traditional utilitarians the value of social 
welfare was simply the unweighted sum of each individual's utility, 
and since a poor man had a higher marginal utility of income than 
a rich man, it followed that a redistribution of income to the 
poor would raise total social welfare.
Many economists became disenchanted with the utilitarian 
assumption that everyone had the same utility of income function 
and, in the aftermath of Robbins' (1932) critique of utilitarianism, 
there was a considerable effort to define the criteria for social 
welfare upon less controversial ethical judgements. Most 
economists adhered to the Paretian ethic in which a situation is
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Pareto-optimal if no other attainable situation exists such that 
no individual can be made better off (in his own estimation) 
without another being made worse off (in his own estimation).
It has been argued above that this cannot be a sufficient condition 
for welfare determination in a planning framework in which income 
distribution is important because many different distributions of 
a given level of income may exist, and the Pareto criterion does 
not enable a choice to be made between them.
Lerner (1944) showed that without the restrictive utilitarian 
assumptions an equal division of income maximises only the expected 
value of total welfare. Later, Sen (1969) showed that a 
probabilistic egalitarian rule provides also for a maximin policy 
in a situation of uncertainty as to the assignment of individual 
utility functions (i.e. maximising the lower bound of income).
Atkinson (1970) demonstrated that the avoidance of 
interpersonal utility comparisons presents no obstacle to the 
ranking of income distributions in terms of their contribution to 
welfare, provided that their Lorenz curves do not intersect. This 
result has been generalised by Sen (1973a) for non-utilitarian 
assumptions. He prefers to regard the distributional implications 
of Lorenz rankings as "non-compulsive judgements" about welfare 
gains from redistribution, which may be rejected by appropriate 
counter arguments about adverse effects on growth. (Note that we 
do not presume any conflict here between growth and equity - in 
fact Chapter 3 indicated the possibility of equitable growth - this 
is regarded as an empirical question).
Sen's book also provides an appealing treatment of the 
measurement of inequality changes. An appropriate inequality 
index is mean-independent (and thus consistent with the notion of
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non-compulsive judgements) and may be selected on the basis of 
the particular sensitivities of different indices to particular 
types of inequality (as analysed by Champernowne and Atkinson as 
well). While inequality indices are not free of ethical judgements 
about how income ought to be distributed, this approach allows the 
adopted inequality measure to come as close as possible to the 
objective facts of the distribution, in terms of which normative 
judgements may be conveniently made.
Although Sen's approach is probably the most persuasive 
(because it uses widely acceptable assumptions) It is not the 
only admissible approach. Sheshinski and Kats have shown that a 
consistent appraisal of growth and income distribution is possible 
in a "neo-utilitarian" framework, which might appeal to some, but 
not necessarily all economists. Their social welfare functions 
are expressed in terms of two variables, viz: mean income, and 
the Gini coefficient. Their functions are not additive in 
individual utilities (a condition consistent with Newbery's analysis 
of Gini orderings), but they do allow for a complete ranking of 
distributions, at least those distributions for which the Gini 
index is the appropriate measure (in the Champernowne sense).
Sen has recently enquired into the necessary and sufficient 
conditions which a s.w.f. must satisfy in order to yield higher 
welfare whenever the Lorenz curve moves upwards. His conclusion 
was:
Essentially any welfare function that responds 
positively to the type of rich to poor transfers 
that is involved in moving to a higher Lorenz curve 
will do....  (Sen (1973b), p.73).
Such transfers are always faithfully registered in the Gini 
index in the appropriate direction, so that aspect of Kats1 and
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Sheshinski's criterion is consistent with Lorenz ranking.
On the problem of variation in mean income levels an earlier 
quote from Sen (on page 221) indicated that he was sympathetic to 
the view that our concern for inequality should be relatively 
greater in low income cases than in high income cases because of 
its association with abject poverty at low income levels. The 
s.w.f. explored by Kats is defined on the logarithm of mean income 
and on a linear term in the Gini index, which means that in order 
to achieve a given change in welfare (say, x%) we require a given 
constant change in the Gini index (say y%) at all income levels.
But in order to achieve the same (x%) change in welfare by varying 
mean income alone, we require a much greater percentage rise in 
mean income level when that level is high than when it is low 
so that its logarithm gives the constant (x%) change required. 
Therefore, in Kats' function, the Gini index has a greater relative 
weight in determining welfare when income is low than when it 
is high.
There is therefore a sense (albeit a superficial one) in 
which the welfare criteria suggested by Sen are not inconsistent 
with the welfare criteria of the neo-utilitarians. However, 
there do remain certain fundamental differences which need to be 
sorted out by the planner. Essentially there are four issues to 
be resolved:
(i) the status of additivity, and of additive separability, as 
desirable properties in a social welfare function,
(ii) the role of the assumption of identical individual utility 
functions,
(iii) the extent to which partial orderings on the basis of Lorenz 
rankings are useful, and,
(iv) the appropriateness of the Gini index as an indicator of the 
degree of inequality, and further, as an indicator of changes 
in social welfare.
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As regards the first of these issues, it should be made 
clear that additivity and additive separability are two different 
properties. A s.w.f. is additive in individual utilities if the 
value of social welfare is arrived at by simply adding individual 
utilities (of course, they would have to be cardinally measurable 
to be additive). By concentrating on the welfare sum, and not 
specifically on the distribution of that sum, the property of 
additivity is not appropriate for our needs as defined earlier. 
Additive separability is a property in a s.w.f. in which individual 
components of social welfare are judged without reference to the 
welfare components of others. In general this property of additive 
separability must be rejected if we feel that the social valuation 
of the welfare of individuals should depend also on the relative 
welfare of others. In a system of values in which income 
inequality ranks high as a determinant of welfare, the valuation of 
individual welfare components in relation to others is implied in 
the process of arriving at social welfare. For this reason neither 
Sen, nor Sheshinski and Kats, nor the present writer regard 
additive separability as a particularly desirable property in a 
s.w.f.
Sen recognises that one may wish to go through the intermediary 
of individual utilities, although one is not obliged to do so.
Sen would not wish to go as far as Kats and Sheshinski do in this 
respect by assuming U(I.) = I.. There is clearly a difference 
between an egalitarian value judgement that, ceteris paribus, all 
persons should receive equal treatment in society, and an 
objectionable utilitarian premise that all persons have identical 
capacities for satisfaction. Nevertheless, it is likely that in a 
planning situation these would come to much the same result.
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The planner who is devising a strategy to alter the distribution 
of income in the desired direction would be interested in 
identifying a target group for the strategy and in evaluating the 
success of the strategy. The extent to which real incomes of the 
target group are raised in relation to other groups would constitute 
an important part of this evaluation, and this is what the 
Kats-Sheshinski functions permit. The planner may find it 
impossible to justify the utilitarian assumption of equal individual 
capacities for satisfaction by itself, but he may also find that 
without it his ranking of social states is incomplete. Unfortunately 
this is an issue on which reasonable men may always differ.
It remains to assess the usefulness of partial orderings of 
alternative social states on the basis of Lorenz curve rankings, 
and to decide whether to use the Gini index as an appropriate 
inequality indicator. In view of the findings of Champernowne (1974) 
and others as discussed earlier, it would appear that the 
appropriateness of the Gini index as an indicator of the degree of 
inequality may well be doubted if the Lorenz curve of a given 
distribution was significantly skewed in one direction. The Gini 
index lays its strongest claim as an unbiased indicator of the 
degree of inequality when the Lorenz curve is very nearly symmetrical. 
This restricts the range of application of the Kats-Sheshinski s.w.f. 
As regards Lorenz curve orderings, it would be impossible to infer 
anything about welfare changes on the basis of Lorenz orderings 
(and without specifying the form of the individual utility 
functions and the s.w.f.) if it was found that in response to a 
given strategy the Lorenz curves for income distributions in 
different social states intersected one another. If the Lorenz
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curves did intersect the planner would be forced to specify a 
particular form of s.w.f. in order to decide which distribution 
yielded the highest welfare level. This is as much as can be 
said from a theoretical point of view. The issues of Lorenz curve 
ranking and the appropriateness of the Gini index are both very 
well suited to empirical analysis in a particular case for their 
resolution. This is the subject of the next chapter in which the 
extent of income inequality in Fiji is assessed and Lorenz curves 





Consider a vector I = (I^ , I2 ..... ,1 ) e |Rn of income
distributed among n individuals with I. >_ 0 (i = 1,2,....,n),
n >_ 2 (the case n = 1 is trivial).
Let each individual have a utility of income function U(I^), 
U : |R (where f/1 is the nonnegative orthant of |Rn). Let
all those utility functions be identical.
Let there be an individualistic social welfare function 
W : |Rn -*» R expressed as
W i U d ^ ,  U(I2).... U(In)) = W(U(I)) where
u(i) = ( u d ^ ,  u(i2),... u(in))
Consider the following possible indicators of income 
distributions
-  1 n





where (Al) is average income and (A2) is the Gini index. 
We want to express W as
W(U(I)) = H O J d ^ ,  U(I2).... U(In)) = H (I, G),
such that H is strictly increasing in I 
and H is strictly decreasing in G(I)
(A3)
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions which H 
must satisfy in order to fulfil the given criteria (A3)?
Assume to begin with that utility is cardinally measurable, 
further that U(I.) = I. for all i. Then discussion is initially
* The author wishes to acknowledge the advice of Subhan Ali 
on the expansion of the proofs here.
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restricted to the function H (1^, In) = H(I), instead of
H(U(I)), defined on individual incomes.
Definition 1: Let I, I' enn then I is symmetric to I' iff
(I-|5... In) is a permutation of the coordinates of 
(It '...., in ').
(note that this is the same definition of symmetry used by Sen).
Lemma 2: If I is symmetric to I' and H(*) satisfies (A3)
then H(I) = H(I'). In this case we shall say that 
11H is symmetric in I"
The proof of this Lemma presents no problem since if I and I‘ are 
symmetric (permutations of essentially the same distribution) 
then I  = T' and G(I) = G(I'). .*. H(I) = H(I').
Lemma 3: For I eftn, G(I) = G(a I) for all A < 0. And I
symmetric to I1 implies 
H(a I) = H (A I*) for all A > 0.
Kats says that the proof is immediate! It is expanded here for 
added clarity.
Proof: Define I = Al = (AI^,AI2,...,Aln)
Then T* = ^  e a .̂ = a ^  z I. = a!
.*. H(I*) = H(AI) iff G(I*) = G(AI) = G(I).
Now G(I*) = G(AI) = — E E |I.* - I.*|
2n2I i j 1 J
— - -- E E |Al.-Al .| =
2n2AT i j 1 J
-^-=7  ̂ E |I,-I.| = G(I) Q.E.D. 
2n2Al i j 1 J
since I = I
* , , G(AI) =
and I = Al
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Corollary 1: If H(-) satisfies condition (A3) then it is
strictly increasing along rays from the origin.
The proof follows from the fact that I is strictly increasing 
along rays from the origin (and note that G(I) is fixed for all 
distributions characterised by vectors along a given ray from 
the origin).
To explain "strictly increasing along rays from the origin" 
(s.i.a.r.f.t.o.) is perhaps difficult in the n-dimensional 
non-negative orthant of |Rn. It is a simple concept if we assume, 
for the sake of clarity, n = 2. Then the non-negative quadrant is:
Clearly any ray from the 
origin fixes the ratio 
of income divided 
between the two individ­
uals
.*. G is constant 
a.r.f.t.o.
As we move away from the origin along a given ray, both 
individuals receive higher income so that T is strictly increasing 
a.r.f.t.o. Symmetry is also obvious considering a vector drawn 
as an arrow from the origin - A permutation of coordinates I-j and 
Î  would leave T and G(I) unchanged.
We distinguish among rays, and therefore among Gini indices, 
by comparing their projections on a given r-simplex - this requires 
two more definitions.
Definition 2: Let e . { r )  = (0,0,...,0,r,0,...,0) be a vector in 
whose components are all zero, except for the i-th 
component {i e 1, 2,...,n} whose value is r , r >_ 0. 
Then the (n-dimensional) r simplex is
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n n
(I : I = t  a.e.(r), 
i=l 1 1
z a. = 1 and a. > 0, all i
1=1 1 1 _
For clarity, this can be expanded as follows:
a-j e-j(r) = (a^, 0, 0, 0) i = 1
a2 e2(r) = (0, a2r, 0, 0) i = 2
a3 e3(r) = (0, 0, a3r, 0, ..., 0) i = 3
an en ^  = .... > °» anr) i = n
I is written on an r-simplex as (a^r, a2r,...anr) 
or alternatively I = r(a-|, a2,..., an) 
r represents the total income, and the a. are the shares 
accruing to each individual i .
By definition, then, the sum of the shares exhausts the 
n
whole, so that z a. = 1 (and no-one has a negative 
i=i 1
share, so â  _> 0).
Definition 3: Q(r) = (£»£»••• »£) r 1 °
Clearly Q can be rewritten r(^, 1,...,^-) which is 
simply the egalitarian line - where every individual 
has an equal share, that share depending only on 
the number of individuals.
Lemma 4: I and I' are on the r-simplex for some
r > 0 iff I  = V  .
For Kats the proof is immediate - not so for me: 
Proof of Lemma 4: (two parts)
(a) Suppose I and 11 are on r-simplex for some r > 0; try to 
show that I = 11.
From the definition, if I is on r-simplex, then 
I = r(a,, a«,...,a )
\ l M n
where a. ^  0, (i = l,2,...,n), a. = 1.
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Similarly
I' = r(a.j1, a2 ',...an ')
where n
n) and z a.1 = 1. 
i = l  1
a.1 > 0 ,  (i = 1,2
r






(b) Now suppose I = I', and try to show that I and I* are on 
same r-simplex for r >_ 0. That is, show that I and I' can 
be written as
I = r (a^, a2 ,...,an)
I' = r (a.|', a2 ',...,an ')
where a.., a..' >_ 0 (i = l,2,...,n) 
n n
and z a . = z a.' = 1 
i = l  1 i =1  1
For the case r = 0 the proof is trivial since 
I = I1 = (0,0,...,0), so that we can choose a. and a.' to 
satisfy the conditions.
For the case r > 0, let
I = ( I ^  I 2 ..............I n ) and
r  = ( I - , ■,  i 2 ' ..............y )
be any two income distributions such that
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Rewrite I and I* as:
I  =  r  ( i i  ll. i l l )
1 1 \ f  9 r 9 * '  *5 t
where r =  ||l|| = z I. (normalised);
i=l 1
and I' = r 1 ( V_) 
r' r* r 1
n
where r ' = 111111 = z I.1 (normalised).
i=l 1
(Note that this type of normalisation is valid since the vectors 
I and I' are in the non-negative orthant of Rn , i.e. I. >_ 0, 
I.' > 0 ,  (i = l,2,...n)
Now since I = I', we have r = r'
I,1 I,*
I' = r ( 4 , 4 -
- Thus I = r (a.|, a2 ,... ,an)
I.
where a. = -J- > 0 (i = l,2,...n)l r -
n n I. n
and z a. = z — ~ = —  z I. = 1.
1=1 1 1=1 r r 1=1 1
- Also I' = r (a^1, a2 li...5an ')
i!
where a^' = -p- >_ 0 (i = 1,2,... ,n)
n n I.' ■, n
and z a.' = z — 7- = -  i  I.' = 11=1 1 i=l r r 1=1 1
Hence if I = I', then I and I' are on the r simplex
for some r > 0 Q.E.D.
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Mow in order to compare Gini indices of vectors on the same 
r-simplex, use the fact that I symmetric to I' implies 
G(I) = G(I'). Therefore, without loss of generality, I can be 
rearranged as follows
I, > I0 > ___  > I1 —  2 -  —  n (A7)
Lemma 5: If I satisfied (A7), then
G(I) = —  z(n-2i + 1)1.
n 2T  1
(A8)
Kats' proof is to assume (A7) is satisfied so that




Expanding this, we have
.... n n
r  z U i  -  I , |  = 2 z  z  ( I .  -  I . )  
1=1 j=l 1 J 1=1 j=l 1 J
n n
z  z I I . - I J  = 
1=1 j = l  1 J
+ + U i - ^ l + . . . +
+ i V h l + + CO 
1—1 1CM




1—1 + i—i CO
1 1—1 CO + . . . + | I , - I  1 3 n
+ i V h l + + CO 
1—(1c
1—1 + . . . + I l  - I  1 n n
- (1,-1,) + (lr l2) + d r l3) + ... + (lr ln) 
+ ( I r I 2 ) + ( I 2 - I 2 ) + ( I 2- I 3 ) + . . .  + ( I 2 - I n )
; {IT In) + + (I3 - V  +
n n
= 2 z z (I.-I.) 
1=1 j=l 1 J
• + < V V
since I-| >_
244.
n n1 ll ll
G ( I )  =  —  t 1  ( I . - I . ) .
n 2 I i =1  j = l  1 J
Now to show that 
n n n
E E (I..-I,) = I (n-21+1) I.
1=1 0=1 1 3 1=1 1
rewrite L.H.S. as:
n n n n n n
l E (I .-I .) = E £ I. - E E l .
1 = 1  o = i  J  i = i  j = i  1 i = i  j = i  J
Consider 
n n
E E l .
1=1 j=i 1
£ I, + E I9 + E I- +
j=l 1 j=2 1 j=3 3




(Note: E E l .  
1=1 0=1 1
= i (n-i+1) I.
1=1 1 
n n n
E I. E 1 = E I. (n-i+1),
1=1 1 0=1 1=1 1





.*. E E I. = E il.
1=1 0=1 J 1=1
" !1 + V  *3
+ ... + In (i =■ D
+
l Z + !3
+ ... + In (i ■= 2)
+ 1-1 00
+ ... + In (i >= 3)
+ + In (i *= n)





+ • • nIn
n n n
Hence E e (I.-I.) = £ (n-2i+1) I.. Q.E.D.
1=1 j=l 1 3 1=1 1
n
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Now the Gini index is given in (A8) as a weighted sum of each
individual's income when these are ordered from largest to
smallest. That is, it is no longer defined in terms of the
absolute differences between the incomes of any two individuals.
The weights depend only upon n, the number of individuals, and
n
the weights sum to zero i.e. z (n-2i+l) = 0
1=1
Proof: n n n n
z (n-2i+l) = z n + z 1 - z 2i 
1=1 1=1 1=1 1=1
n n n
= n z 1 + z 1 - 2 z i 
1=1 1=1 1=1
- n* + n-2
Lemma 6:
= n(n+l) - n(n+l) 
= 0 , since " 1 = n in ill  
1=1 ù
If H(-) satisfies (A3) and I, I* are on an 
r-simplex with
!1
It ' > I2 ‘ > --• >
(i.e. (A7) is satisfied by I and I') 
then H(I) > H(I') iff
z (n-21+1) (1,-1,') < 0.
1=1 1
Proof of Lemma 6: (Kats says it follows from Lemma 5 - we
expand it here).
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Suppose H(•) satisfies (A3), and I, I' are on the r-simplex
with I > 1« > ... > I 1 -  2 -  —  n
y  > y  > - . . i y
Proof is again in two parts:
(a) Let H(I) >_H(I‘) and show that
n
£ (n-21+1) (I.+I.1) < 0. 
i=l 1 1
Since H(I) _> H(I')
we have H (I,G(I)) > H (!' ,G(I')) - *
and since I, I' are on the same r-simplex, T  = V  .
Therefore, as H satisfies (A3), i.e. H is a strictly 
decreasing function in G(I), we have from the inequality - *, 
that
G(I) < G(I')
Then from Lemma 5:
n n
E (n-21+1) I. £  z (n-21+1) I.'.
1=1 1 1=1 1
Hence n
s (n-21+1) (1,-1.') < 0.
1=1 1 1 “
n
(b) Suppose z (n-2i+l) (I.-I.‘) < 0
i=l 1 1 “
and show that H(I) >_ H(I').
Now we have: 
n
r n
(n-2i+l) I. < ẑ (n-2i+1) I.'
which implies (from Lemma 5), G(I) < G(I').
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Therefore, as H(-) satisfies (A3) and I = I', we have 
H (I,G(I)) > H (I',G(r))
hence
H(I) > H(I‘). Q.E.D.
Now the above results are combined into a proposition which
gives necessary and sufficient conditions for H.
Proposition 1: Let H(I):nn-*- R, then H(-) satisfies (A3) iff 
the following hold simultaneously
1. H is symmetric,
2. H i s  strictly increasing along rays from the origin,
3. If I, I' are on an r-simplex then
n
H(I) > H(I') iff, e (n-2i+l) (I.-I.') < 0
1=1 1 1 “
for all r >_ 0 and I satisfying (A7).
Proof: Necessity has been shown above. For instance, suppose 
H(*) satisfies (A3). Then by Lemma 2, H is symmetric 
in I which proves statement 1, Corollary 1 proves 
Statement 2,and Lemma 6 proves statement 3.
For sufficiency, suppose statements 1, 2 and 3 hold, 
then show H(-) satisfies (A3). Statements 1 and 2 prove 
H is increasing in T, and statement 3 proves H is 
decreasing in G(I). Q.E.D.
(Note: while the idea of strictly increasing along rays from the 
origin was used to distinguish distributions with variable 
I but fixed G(I), the r-simplex holds I fixed and varies 
G(I). The r-simplex is shown in the two dimensional 
diagrams under corollary 1 as a dotted line showing all
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combinations (I^, I2) for which total (and therefore, 
average) income is the same).
A further property of H is given by Kats as:
Lemma 7: On a given r-simplex, the Gini-lower contour sets are 
strictly convex.
Proof: Let I, I1 be on the same r-simplex with G(I) < G(I').
Let I" = xl + (1-X) I1 for 0 < x < 1 (This defines 
convexity). Without loss of generality, assume that 
I, I1 satisfy (A7). It follows that I" also satisfies 
(A7).
G(I") - G(I1) = z (n-2i+l) (I,"-I') 
i=l 1 1
= e (n-21+1) (XI. + (1-x) I.'-I.')
i=l 1 1 1
= e (n-2i+l) x(I .-I.')
1=1 1 1
= x(G(I) - G(I')) < 0. Q.E.D.
(Note on convex sets: Let C be a set with vectors x, y e C.
Then the set is convex if another vector z e C can be 
found such that z = a-j x + a2 y where a-j + a2 = 1 
and a.j, a2 > 0.
Clearly for any x, 0 < x < 1, this can be written 
z = x x + (l-x)y)
We now relax the assumption that H is defined directly on 
individual incomes H(I) and state, in terms of the original 
problem, that H is a function of utility (H(U(I))), where U is 
strictly increasing. Then by reproducing the same analysis as 
above:
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Proposition 2: Let H(U(I^), U ( ) > . . . ,U(I )):
Rn -> R, then H(-) satisfies (A3) 
iff the following hold simultaneously
1. H is symmetric in U, i.e. I symmetric to 11 +
H(U(I)) = H(U(I‘)).
2. H is strictly increasing along rays from the origin.
3. If U(I), U(I') are on an r-simplex, then 
H(U(I)) > H(U(11)) iff
E (n-21+1) (U(I.) - U(I.')) < 0 
i=1 1 1 -
for all r >_ 0 and I, I* satisfying (A7).
(Note: the assumption that U is increasing implies that H is
defined on a domain which is bounded from below.
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CHAPTER 8
Income Distribution in Fiji
8.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the measurement of the size 
distribution of income among households and individuals in Fiji.
The nationwide income distribution is estimated at two points in 
time, 1968 and 1973, and the urban 1973 distribution and rural 
1975 distribution are also estimated. It is first necessary to 
attend to certain conceptual issues, as was the case for the 
analysis of employment. Here the important concepts relate to the 
unit of account, the unit of measurement and the practices adopted 
for measuring income. We can be brief here because some relevant 
points have already been discussed in chapter one and in chapter 
five.
Tinbergen (1972) has suggested that it is useful to distinguish 
three units of account for the purpose of analysing income 
distributions - viz: (i) income recipients, (ii) households (which 
may have more than one income recipient), and (iii) consumers 
(typically larger in number per household than income recipients). 
The most relevant unit of account for welfare studies is the 
consuming unit, which may be any one of the above depending upon 
the given situation. Tinbergen accepts the latter unit as the 
most relevant for welfare studies in developed market economies.
He also distinguishes three units of income measurement 
- viz: (i) primary income (gross earnings before tax),
(ii) secondary income (after tax), and (iii) income after complete 
redistribution (i.e. after taking account of social security 
transfers, housing and education subsidies, and so on). Again,
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for Tinbergen the latter is the most relevant unit of measurement 
for welfare studies.
The relatively clear definitions which are found to be 
appropriate for developed market economies are more difficult to 
apply in largely agrarian low-income economies. The conceptual 
difficulties are eloquently described by Freyssinet and Mounier
(1974). They explain how income can accrue in a variety of ways 
and at different levels, and that there is a good deal of overlapping 
in these ways and levels in an economy in which a large part of 
economic activity merges into a wider complex of family-based 
socio-economic activity. For instance, production and exchange 
systems in agriculture may be of the self-sufficiency type, 
small-scale cash crop farming, or large plantations. Each of 
these systems typically co-exist in developing countries and an 
individual or household may participate in all three in any given 
year or season.
A further consideration is that it would be desirable for our 
measurement of income to reflect certain significant aspects of the 
behaviour of economic agents. According to Freyssinet and Mounier, 
agricultural workers in developing countries tend to think in terms 
of direct utilities and direct costs associated with their efforts.
To the extent that this holds in a particular case, the measurement 
of physical quantities produced or consumed, and the measurement of 
labour input, would have relevance to an appropriate concept of 
income in addition to cash earnings. Several issues associated with 
this have been discussed in chapter five, where direct utilities and 
costs of other members of the household were also argued to be 
relevant components of a group welfare function and to enter into 
the behavioural constraint set for individuals as well. It is
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necessary to recall these conceptual difficulties in this chapter 
as background to the discussion of income distribution data in Fiji.
Empirical data on the distribution of income in Fiji is scarce, 
and that which is available differs between sources in the chosen 
unit of account and in the practices adopted for measuring income. 
Four sources have been selected for the purpose of this chapter. 
Estimates of the nationwide distribution of income have been 
derived from Ward (1971) and Government of Fiji (1974b). An 
estimate of the distribution of income in urban Fiji has been 
derived from Government of Fiji (1974c), and an estimate of the 
distribution of income in one rural district of Fiji has been 
derived from Brookfield et. al (1977). In each case the data on 
income distribution was compiled as a by-product of a study designed 
primarily to collect data on other variables, such as employment 
or consumption expenditure. Under such circumstances the attention 
to detail given to the definition and the measurement of "income" 
is likely to have been less strict than that afforded to the main 
variables of interest in the particular study. Accordingly, the 
estimates which are presented below should be regarded at best as 
approximations to the underlying distribution that we wish to 
measure.
A description of the data on income distribution provided by 
each source is given in the next section. This description covers 
the definition of income, the chosen unit of account, and an 
assessment of the coverage of the sample surveyed. No attempt has 
been made to adjust the source data in order to achieve a greater 
degree of comparability of definitions. The income distribution 
estimates obtained will therefore be interpreted in terms of the 
particular definitions used by each individual source.
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Each of the estimates of income distribution is presented in 
the form of a Lorenz curve, and the equations for each Lorenz 
curve are calculated using a technique suggested by Kakwani and 
Podder (1976). This technique is well suited to the purpose at 
hand because the estimated equation fits grouped observations on 
income distributions very well. Further, the parameter estimates 
of the Lorenz curve equation readily translate into the properties 
of Lorenz curves discussed in the preceeding chapter with regard 
to skewness and the derivation of the Gini index. The Kakwani- 
Podder method for estimating the equation of the Lorenz curve is 
summarised in the third section of this chapter, and the results 
are discussed in section four.
8.2 Data Sources
8.2.1 Nationwide income distribution in 1968:
The source used for income distribution in Fiji in 1968 is 
Ward (1971) (his table on page 109, ibid). Ward’s data came from 
the Inland Revenue Department, National Accounts Report, and was 
based on individuals assessed for income tax. More than 21000 
individuals filed taxation returns in 1968 and their average 
taxable gross income was $1700. There are certain limitations to 
the use of taxation data for estimating income distribution in Fiji. 
The coverage of the data is extremely limited. On the basis of 
census enumerations and other data, the employed labour force of 
Fiji in 1968 was approximately 128000, which means that over one 
million employed individuals did not submit a taxation return. 
Further, the accuracy of individuals' taxation returns is often 
suspect. On income disparities between Indians and Fijians in
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Fiji, Ward made the following observation:
When account is taken of the differences in 
subsistence income and average family size between 
Indians and Fijians, the effect of slightly higher 
cash income on the average standard of living of 
Indians tends to cancel out and both racial groups 
probably enjoy a similar, though moderate income 
per head. This applies only to taxpayers, however, 
and takes no account of the fact that firstly, there 
were far fewer Fijian than Indian taxpayers and 
secondly, that because of the very wide differences 
between these two races in their way of life, 
consumption habits, etc, it is impossible to draw 
any conclusions about their relative standards of 
living. (Ward (1971) p.112)
8.2.2 Nationwide income distribution in 1973:
The 1973 Nationwide Unemployment Survey is the source for the 
income distribution estimate in 1973 (Government of Fiji (1974b), 
pages 409 and 430). This survey actually became a full-scale 
labour force survey, as described in chapter 6 above, and sampled 
25% of all households in Fiji. The sample was drawn in the same 
proportion from rural areas (14400 households), Suva urban area 
(4600 households), and the other twelve urban areas (4000 households), 
and fairly represented the distribution of population by race.
Data for the survey was collected from different households at 
different times between February and November 1973.
The income distribution estimate derived from this survey is 
based upon cash income received by wage and salaried employees and 
by own account workers who drew payment in cash (i.e. earnings 
after tax). From a total labour force estimate of 145076 persons 
we take out the openly unemployed (9704), the unpaid family helpers 
(12360) and the own account workers who drew payment only in kind 
(7196), to arrive at an estimate of cash income recipients of 
115816 persons. Ranking these by income received during the
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reference period provides the information needed to prepare an 
estimate of income distribution. The 115816 persons were ranked 
in discrete income groups and had an average annual cash income . 
of approximately $1450; but this figure is not directly comparable 
to the above estimate from Ward (1971). This is because one 
refers to income before tax and the other to income after tax, and 
also because one is based only upon taxpayers while the other is 
based upon all of the employed labour force.
8.2.3 Urban income distribution in 1973:
The Urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey for 1973 
(Government of Fiji (1974c)) enumerated 641 households in the six 
main urban areas of Fiji: Suva, Nausori, Lautoka, Ba, Nadi and 
Labasa. This represents between 7% and 8% of all urban households 
in Fiji. Of the 641 households surveyed, 44% were headed by 
Fijians, 50% were headed by Indians and 6% were headed by other 
races. These sampling proportions by race are very close to the 
racial composition of Fiji's total population, but the urban 
population composition actually has a higher proportion of Indians 
and other races and a lower proportion of Fijians. The objectives 
of the 1973 urban survey were to analyse cross-section family 
budgets for information on expenditure elasticities of demand for 
certain commodities, to determine the general pattern of expenditure 
of families living in urban areas, and to check on the continued 
validity of the commodity weights used to calculate the Consumer 
Price Index.
The estimate of income distribution was taken from Table 9 
(page 19, ibid). The estimated average annual income per urban 
household was $2800. This income was defined as follows:
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...the sum of earnings of all household members 
engaged in paid employment, property income, pensions, 
assistance, gifts, interest and dividends, lottery 
wins and other windfall gains. Also included as 
part of income were receipts from the sale of home 
produced goods actually consumed by the family, as 
well as the imputed rental value of owner-occupied 
housing. All items in income were taken or 
estimated as "gross", i.e. before deduction of 
direct taxes. (Government of Fiji (1974c) p.9).
8.2.4 Rural income distribution in 1975:
To the author's knowledge there is no available estimate of 
income distribution for all rural areas of Fiji. The most detailed 
rural study to date is that by Brookfield et. al. (1977) which 
provides information on income distribution for Taveuni District 
in the Eastern Islands. This survey enumerated 927 Taveuni 
households which represents between 6% and 7% of the total number 
of rural households in Fiji. However, the study cannot be 
interpreted as being representative of all rural Fiji for several 
reasons. The racial composition of the 927 households in the 
survey was 74% Fijian, 20% Indian and 4% Part European. The 1976 
Census shows a considerably higher proportion of Indian households 
in rural areas (48%). Indians tend to be concentrated in the 
sugar-growing areas of Western Viti Levu and Northern Vanua Levu, 
as well as the Rewa and Sigatoka Valleys, whereas the Fijian 
rural population is more widely distributed. There is also 
considerable variation in the capacity of the land to support the 
subsistence needs of local populations in different areas of Fiji. 
Taveuni, for example, is generally regarded as being very fertile 
among the Eastern Islands and the valuation of subsistence income 
there is accordingly relatively high.
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The data reported by Brookfield et.al. (1977) on household 
income in Taveuni District (Table 5.14 on page 220, ibid) was 
collected during parts of 1974 and 1975, but primarily the latter. 
It included cash income from wage employment, remittances, business 
enterprises, agriculture, fishing, livestock, handicrafts, as well 
as an estimated subsistence income equivalent. Wage employment 
opportunities provided approximately 45% of cash income received by 
Taveuni households. Their average household income including an 
imputed subsistence component was estimated to be $1360 per annum.
This figure is broadly comparable to the $2800 for urban Fiji.
Although one refers to income before tax and the other to income
after tax, the tax base is quite small and would account for a
minor part of the difference between the two figures. The two
figures also refer to different periods of time and inflation was
high in Fiji during the mid-1970's. One could escalate the urban
household income to 1975 prices using the Consumer Price Index
(since this is based on urban households' expenditure patterns) and
this would give an estimated average urban household income level
of approximately $3250 per annum in mid-1975, thus accentuating
the income gap between Taveuni District and urban Fiji. Both the
Taveuni and urban surveys refer to households as the unit of
account, and both include an imputed non-market component in
household income. Brookfield et.al. (1977) make the following
comment on rural-urban income differences in Fiji:
In 1974 the average industrial worker in Suva had an 
income of $1404 per year, and the United Nations 
sugar study (UNDAT, 1974) argued that households in 
the sugar industry should not receive less. Even 
allowing for subsistence income only some 30 per 
cent of Taveuni district households enjoyed an 
income above this figure. Moreover, the majority
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of these households had more than one adult male 
member. Among Indo-Fijians, and among estate 
dwellers, over 80 per cent of households were 
receiving less than $1400 per year. Taking the 
median cash income of Taveuni district households 
at $528 (Table 5.13), then on the basis of a 275 
day working year the median daily income (i.e. the 
income received by the mid-point member of the 
population, half earning less and half earning 
more) of a Taveuni household works out at only 
$1.92, while the arithmetic mean is $2.43. This 
compares most unfavourably with an average agricult­
ural wage for all Fiji of $4.34 in 1974, as supplied 
to the UNDAT sugar survey. Wage-earners on Taveuni 
estates received an average daily wage of $2.29, 
according to our data. (Ibid, p.224).
Income distribution estimates drawn from each of the above 
four sources are shown in Table 8.1. The estimates show the 
percentage of income (as defined) accruing to each decile of the 
relevant population (as defined). Quartile observations are also 
shown as well as the ninety-fifth percentile. By simple subtraction 
the latter indicates the proportion of income accruing to the 
richest five percent of the population. The estimates are put in 
the same format for ease of presentation, and any attempt to draw 
direct comparisons between them would need to bear in mind all of 
the foregoing discussion of concepts and definitions and coverage. 
The income shares shown in Table 8.1 were calculated from the 
equations of the Lorenz curves fitted to the source data using 
the Kakwani-Podder method discussed in section 8.3 below.
With the exception of the Brookfield et.al. study, each of the 
surveys reported frequency distributions of income for discrete 
income classes so that estimates of the cumulative frequency 
distribution had to be prepared in order to calculate the Lorenz 
curves. Thirteen income classes were used for the 1973 urban 
survey and the conventional procedure was adopted of treating the
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10 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.6
20 4.0 4.5 6.5 7.2
25 5.5 6.5 9.0 9.9
30 7.5 8.0 12.0 12.9
40 12.0 13.5 18.0 19.7
50 17.5 20.5 25.5 27.6
60 25.3 28.5 34.0 36.8
70 35.0 39.0 44.5 47.4
75 40.5 45.0 50.5 53.5
80 47.7 51.0 57.0 60.1
90 66.5 67.5 73.5 75.6
95 78.6 79.5 84.0 85.3
mid-point of each income interval as the mean income for households
in that class . This involved some distortion in the lowest income
class (downward bias) and highest income class (upward bias).
This problem is potentially serious for the two estimates of the 
nationwide income distribution in 1968 and 1973. The data which 
is reported in the original sources for these estimates is highly 
aggregated (four or five income classes) and some observations had 
to be interpolated. Nevertheless, the Lorenz curve estimates 
obtained were very good and, by preserving the observations which 
were available, very little adjustment to the interpolated 
observations was necessary. The Brookfield et.al. study reported 
income shares by decile groups which was most convenient for the 
estimation of the Lorenz curve in that case.
We turn now to a discussion of the Lorenz curve estimation 
technique.
8 .3  The Kakw ani-Podder method o f  Lorenz cu rve  e st im a t io n
Suppose income Y of a family is a random variable with 
probability distribution F(y). Assume that the mean of the 
distribution y exists and that Y is strictly positive. Then the 
first moment distribution function of Y is given by
. 1  yr
Fl ( y ) = ^  V g(y).dY ... (8 .3.. 1)
where g(y) is the density function. The Lorenz curve is the 
relationship between F(y) and F^(y) shown in Figure 1 below:
The egalitarian line is the line F̂  = F shown as the leading 
diagonal of the unit square. Kakwani and Podder then introduce a 




where tt is the distance of the ordinate from the origin along the 
egalitarian line, and n is the length of the ordinate from P 
perpendicular to the egalitarian line. We note that the following 
conditions will hold: F <_ F.|, 0<_n<_7r, 0 <_ ir £  / 2 . The equation 
of the Lorenz curve in terms of tt and n can now be written as
n = f  ( t t )
It can be shown that
(8.3.3)




d2n _ ~ V 2 < o
dlT2 " g(y)(y+y)3
F' = g(y) and F ^  = y.g(y)/y
.... (8.3.4)
.... (8.3.5)
Therefore, f(ir) has a maximum value at y = y.
Kakwani and Podder introduce symmetry of the Lorenz curve as 
was discussed in the previous chapter. It is a concept completely 
different from the idea of symmetry in a welfare function or in an 
income distribution function where one is unconcerned about who 
receives which particular income. Symmetry of f(tt) is defined here 
in terms of the shape of the Lorenz curve with respect to the 
negative diagonal drawn perpendicular to the egalitarian line. 
Definition: n = f(tt) is symmetrical iff 
f(tt) = f(/2-7f), all TT.
The Lorenz curve is said to be skewed towards (1,1) if 
f(tt) > f(/2-Tr), and skewed towards the origin (0,0) if
f(tt) < f(/2-Tr).
A particular functional form of (8.3.3) which satisfies the 
above restrictions, and which Kakwani and Podder show to fit many
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sets of grouped observations very well, is given by:
n = a*“ (/2-u)6 (8.3.6)
where a > 0 +  n 21 0 (i.e. the Lorenz curve lies below the
egalitarian line), and where
From the definition of symmetrical Lorenz curves above, (8.3.6) 
is symmetrical if a = 3 . It is skewed towards (1,1) if a < 6 
and skewed towards (0,0) if a > 3. Sufficient conditions for 
(8.3.4) and (8.3.5) to be satisfied (i.e. no points of inflexion) 
are 0 < a £  1 and 0 < 3 £  1.
Since (8.3.2) may be shown to provide consistent estimators 
of 7T and n (see Kakwani and Podder (1976), equation (8.3.6) may be 
linearised by taking logarithms of both sides as:
log n = log a + a log tt + 3 log (/2-it) .... (8.3.7)
which may be fitted by ordinary least squares after performing the 
transformations (8.3.2) on F and F^. The resulting parameter 
estimates for a 3 a and 3 may be checked for compliance with the 
above restrictions and analysed by conventional tests of 
significance.
A sufficient condition for two Lorenz curves to be non-
a,3 > 0 -*• { n = 0
intersecting is for the ratio a/ 3 to be the same for each and the 
value of a to be smaller for one than the other - then the curve 
with smaller a value lies everywhere inside the second curve.
263.
This is only a sufficient condition, and little can be said about 
Lorenz rankings only on the basis of these parameter estimates if 
a/3 is very different between the two curves. For some purposes 
this may be an unwanted extra restriction which further limits the 
usefulness of the Lorenz ordering (which is itself only partial), 
but it is not a serious restriction for the present purposes.
In terms of the types of inequality listed by Champernowne, a 
Lorenz curve skewed towards the origin would be typical of a 
distribution with inequality characterised by extreme wealth, that 
is type I inequality. Here the ratio a/3 would be significantly 
greater than unity. Conversely, a Lorenz curve skewed towards 
(1,1) would be typical of a distribution with inequality 
characterised by extreme poverty (that is, type III inequality), 
and would show a/3 < 1 significantly. If there was no tendency 
for incomes to be bunched in a narrow range (type II inequality) 
we would expect the Lorenz curve to be approximately symmetrical - 
that is, a t 3 .
Some authors have attempted to define a measure of inequality 
on the 'skewness' of the income distribution; but the discussion 
here is in terms of the general shape of the Lorenz curve and 
'skewness' of the Lorenz curve is not the same as the 'degree of 
inequality'. Three Lorenz curves of widely differing shapes, 
corresponding (for example) to the three types of inequality, may 
still have the same value of a given inequality index (say, the 
Gini index). Here we wish to recall the particular sensitivities 
of different indices to each of the three forms of inequality. In 
the previous chapter it was made clear that all inequality indices
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embody particular normative implications or, what amounts to the 
same thing, changes in any particular index reflect changes in 
inequality only in the sense in which that index is defined.
However, we also want the chosen index to be as 'objective' as 
possible so that normative judgements may be expressed in terms 
of an indicator which reflects most appropriately the observed facts 
of the situation.
Therefore, in view of Champernowne's findings outlined 
previously, and in relation to a Lorenz curve estimated by 
(8.3.7), it may be concluded that the Gini index has its 
strongest claim for being a relatively unbiased indicator of the 
degree of inequality when the Lorenz curve is close to symmetrical 
(i.e. a t 3). Otherwise, it would be more appropriate to choose 
alternative indices such as, for instance, Theil's entropy 
measure if a > $, or the standard deviation of the logarithm of 
income if a < 3 .
It will be shown below that Lorenz curves estimated for 
Fiji are very nearly symmetrical, and moreover, this property 
is consistently observed at different points in time and for urban 
and rural Fiji. For this reason we are particularly interested in 
the Gini index which may be computed from the parameter estimates 
of (8.3.7). The Gini index is shown geometrically in figure 8.1 as 
the area between the egalitarian line and the Lorenz curve, 
expressed as a ratio of one half the unit square. Its derivation 
from (8.3.6) is as follows:
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= 2a ( ^ ) 1+a+e B ( l + a , l + B )  . . . ( 8 . 3 . 8 )
where B is the widely tabulated Beta Function evaluated at 
(1+a, 1+3). This last step may require further elaboration. 










Let t = —  , and note that by doing so we have tt = 0 when t = 0, 
/2
and tt = when t = 1. Then the following will also hold:
dir - / l .  dt
TT0 = / F .  t01
(/? - w)e = (/? - /Zt)B = ( S z f .  (l-t)B
Then from 
G = 2 ' aTTa ( / 1 tt)̂ . dir,
o
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we have by substitution:
G - 2a (/2)at“(/2)B (l-t)B /2.dt
= 2a(/?)1+“+B it°(l - t)B.dt
= 2a(/2)1+a+B B(l+a> 1+S) ...Q.E.D.
In the computations below, the Beta Function was evaluated with 
reference to the related Gamma Function, where B(Z,W) = ^(z+wy^
= B(W,Z), (Abramowitz and Stegun (1972), chapter 6 by P.J. Davis).
8.4 Lorenz curves for Fiji
Table 8.2 shows the results of applying the Kakwani-Podder 
method of estimating the Lorenz curve equation for each of the four 
income distributions for Fiji which were discussed in section 8.2.
In addition to the Lorenz curve parameters, a, 3 and a, the 
ratio a/3 is shown as an indicator of the degree of skewness in 
the Lorenz curves. The Gini ratio is also shown as an indicator 
of the degree of inequality in the respective income distributions. 
The high values of R2 and low standard errors (in brackets) indicate 
that the chosen functional form fits the data extremely well.
From Table 8.2 it can be seen that although the ratio a/$ is 
slightly less than unity for each Lorenz curve, it is very close 
to unity in each case. This indicates that the Lorenz curves are 
very nearly symmetrical. It also indicates that a feature of 
inequality in Fiji is the inequality among the less extreme incomes.
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a/ß 0.9703 0.9885 0.9903 0.9689
R2 0.9999 0.9937 0.9996 0.9994
Gini Ratio 0.477 0.441 0.360 0.327
Note: Figures in brackets are standard errors.
There are some very rich individuals in Fiji, and there are some 
who are poor in an absolute sense, but there is no general 
tendency for income recipients to be bunched at either end of the 
income scale. In other words, there is no large class of extremely 
wealthy or of extremely impoverished households.
In view of this symmetry of the Lorenz curves, and for the 
reasons discussed in section 8.3 as well as in the previous 
chapter, it would appear reasonable to accept the Gini index as 
an unbiased indicator of the degree of income inequality in Fiji.
The measured Gini index is significantly larger for the nationwide 
income distributions than it is for either the urban or the rural 
distribution. The nationwide distributions both exhibit a 
moderate degree of inequality by world standards (see, for 
instance, Table 1.1), v/hereas the urban and rural income distributions 
exhibit a remarkably low degree of inequality.
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This observation on different Gini indices requires careful 
interpretation in terms of the definitions used in different 
surveys. This has been implied by the discussion in section 8.2 
with particular regard to the inclusion of non-market sector 
income: its valuation is important for the inequality comparisons 
made here. Brookfield et. al. show that the average level of 
cash income in Taveuni was approximately $669 per household at the 
time of their survey, and a Gini ratio computed from their 
distribution of cash income gives a value of 0.436, considerably 
higher than the 0.327 shown above. Clearly the inclusion of an 
imputed non-market income equivalent raises the incomes of 
households with low cash income and, ceteris paribus, reduces the 
degree of income inequality. It is not clear from the Brookfield 
Report how the imputed non-market income, amounting to over $700 
per household, was calculated. Neither is it clear from the 
1973 Urban Household Expenditure Survey how the imputed non-market 
income component in that case was calculated. For present 
purposes it is appropriate to discuss income inequality in rural 
areas and in urban areas with some estimate of non-market income 
being included in the measurement, and it was decided to accept 
the estimates made in the above sources.
This being said, the difference in the measured degree of 
income inequality between the nationwide income distributions on 
one hand, and the urban and rural income distributions on the 
other, has substantive meaning. It indicates that a further 
feature of income inequality in Fiji is the wide gap between 
average income levels in urban areas and average income levels in 
rural areas. It is worth explaining this conclusion in more detail.
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The nationwide income distribution may be regarded as a weighted 
average of the rural and the urban income distributions, with the 
weights being determined by the size of the population in rural 
areas as compared with urban areas, and by the amount of national 
income accruing to groups in rural areas as compared with urban 
areas. If, as appears to be the case in Fiji, the urban and 
rural income distributions both exhibit a similar (and low) degree 
of inequality, while the nationwide income distribution exhibits 
a very different (higher) degree of inequality, then it is clear 
that the amount of income accruing to households in rural areas 
(who comprise over 60% of the population) must be very different 
to that accruing to households in urban areas. The fact that 
such income differences exist has been established in section 8.2 
above and in chapter 6. The discussion here in terms of sectoral 
income distributions underscores this.
Lorenz curves from the income distributions discussed above 
are shown in Figures 8.2 and 8.3, which illustrate the points 
made about relative inequality. The Lorenz curve for the 
nationwide income distribution in 1973 lies everywhere inside that 
of the nationwide income distribution in 1968. The Lorenz curve 
for Taveuni District in 1975 lies everywhere inside that of the 
urban areas in 1973. Both of the Lorenz curves in Figure 8.3 are 
closer to the egalitarian line than those in Figure 8.2.
One may want to make a judgement about relative welfare in 
urban and rural areas based only upon Lorenz curve rankings from 
Figure 8.3. However, following Sen (1973), one would be more 
likely to make this a non-compulsive judgement. In view of the 
evidence presented above, one would then probably go further and
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reject the Lorenz curve ranking of welfare implied by Figure 8.3. 
Average household income in urban Fiji in 1975 was approximately 
two-and-one-half times the average household income in Taveuni 
(including a generous non-market component). This gap is so large, 
and the Lorenz curve difference so small, that the issue in this 
case is unequivocal.
PART IV
Patterns of Output and Consumption
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CHAPTER 9
Income Distribution in an Interindustry Framework
9.1 Introduction
The primary objective of this chapter is to evaluate through 
simulations the effects of income redistribution on the growth and 
structure of the Fiji economy. Growth and equity have been 
regarded by the conventional development theory as conflicting 
goals. The reasons for this were discussed in chapter one. Not 
only was a high degree of income inequality regarded as necessary 
for high rates of savings, capital accumulation and growth, but 
efforts to redistribute income to the poor were regarded as being 
counter-productive because the adverse effects on the savings 
ratio and on growth would leave little surplus from which to 
redistribute.
A less orthodox theory of the effect of income redistribution 
on growth is concerned with the composition of consumer demand 
and has become known as the "structuralist school" (see, for 
instance, I.L.O. (1970)). This school argues that low income 
groups mainly consume commodities which have a high labour content 
and/or a low import content. Such factor intensities are 
characteristic of traditional foodstuffs, textiles and simple 
domestic equipment. It is argued that high income groups consume 
more capital-intensive goods which typically are imported. Then 
a redistribution of income towards low-income groups would tend 
to increase employment levels and reduce import requirements.
This theory has attracted considerable attention in Latin American 
countries where it has been argued, from the so-called "two-gap"
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growth models (Chenery and Strout (1966), Vanek (1967), that the 
limiting constraint on growth is foreign exchange and not domestic 
savings capacity. Under such circumstances an import-reducing 
redistribution of income offers the possibility of faster economic 
growth.
It is difficult to state a priori whether the structuralist 
type of effects of income redistribution on growth will prevail 
over the savings effect in any given case. The question is 
largely an empirical one and several case studies have recently 
addressed themselves to it. These include Cline (1972),
Chinn (1973), Paukert et. al. (1974), Figueroa (1975), Ho (1976), 
Foxley (1976), and several others are reviewed in Cline (1975). 
Almost all of these studies conclude that the effect of simulated 
income redistributions on economic growth has been overemphasised 
in the past and is likely to be rather small. However, the 
direction of the growth effect varies from case to case and 
different studies report different employment and balance of 
payments effects. Some of these results are described below.
Each of the case studies uses an interindustry type of 
analysis, but each uses a different level of aggregation of 
consumption and production data, and different conceptual and 
statistical definitions. These would account for some of the 
differences in results, so that it is not clear to what extent 
different countries' economic structures do cause different 
responses to income redistribution policies. It is also noted 
that the range of policies which may be regarded as redistributive 
is very large, and each policy will have economic and social 
effects unique to itself. The common methodological denominator 
of the case studies is that there is a sense in which the
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distribution of income may be regarded as a variable in positive 
economics. This is because a given income distribution reflects 
(and is reflected by) a given pattern of domestic consumption and 
output. The case studies are interested in evaluating the effects 
on demand and output of a change in income distribution in 
isolation from the way redistribution is accomplished. These 
ceteris paribus conditions remain unspecified.
Cline's (1972) study for selected Latin American countries 
used family budget data to calculate the savings effect of income 
redistribution in terms of a Harrod-Domar growth relationship.
He used input-output relationships to calculate the import effect 
and factor use effects for Brazil (thirty-two industry input-output 
table for 1959) and import effect for Mexico (forty-five industry 
input-output table for 1960). His results showed that a 
redistribution of income to that observed in Britain would reduce 
the growth rates of both Brazil and Mexico by approximately 1%.
A similar redistribution showed a 0,66% fall in the growth rate 
of Argentina but had no significant effect at all on Venezuela's 
growth rate. Cline calculated that there would be no significant 
change in import requirements of Brazil or Mexico, but employment 
in Brazil was projected to rise by 6% as a result of the changed 
production composition.
Chinn (1973) confined his attention to urban wage and salary 
earning households in the Republic of Korea. He identified eight 
income groups from the 1964 household expenditure survey and 
examined the demand compositional effects of a redistribution of 
income using a sixteen industry input-output table for 1963.
His results indicated a decline in both imports and employment 
but these effects were extremely small.
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Another study confined to urban data is that by Figueroa
(1975) for Peru. His study simulated the effects on manufacturing 
employment and imports of income redistribution from rich to poor 
households in Lima using data for 1964-65. This study identified 
five income groups and nine manufacturing industries. The 
discussion of the methods of analysis is rather sparse, but the 
results indicate that a selective redistribution of 6% of Peru's 
national income would raise industrial employment in Lima by 3%.
Paukert et. al. (1974) used a sixty-four industry input­
output table for the Philippines for 1965, and identified ten 
income groups from the 1971 household income and expenditure 
survey. The study developed a static semi-closed input-output 
model (outlined and used in section 9.3 below) to assess the 
impact of twenty-two alternative income distributions on employment, 
imports, savings and growth potential for the Philippines. Their 
results showed a relatively strong increase in employment as a 
result of income redistribution to the poor because the shift in 
consumption pattern led to an increased demand for the products of 
labour intensive industries. Imports were projected to increase 
but by a small amount. The volume of private household savings 
fell considerably after redistribution to the poor. This savings 
effect was partly offset by increases in public sector savings 
(higher tax collections with expenditure assumed constant) as 
well as by higher corporate savings in the form of depreciation 
reserves. Overall total savings fell causing a decline in the 
rate of growth but again this growth effect was very small.
Ho (1976) used data from Taiwan for 1966 to examine the 
empirical content of the factor differential hypothesis in that 
country and to simulate the impact of income redistribution on
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growth. His static input-output model had seventy-six industries 
and identified thirty-one income groups from the nationwide survey 
of households. Ho found that consumption by low income households 
in Taiwan was more capital intensive than that by high income 
households because of higher consumption of services by the rich. 
This differential in consumption in terms of factor requirements 
tended to be confined to comparisons between the very rich and 
the very poor, while for the majority of middle income households 
the differences were not very great. For households in the same 
income class, consumption by urban households tended to be more 
capital intensive than that by rural households. Simulations of 
alternative income redistributions towards the low income groups 
yielded higher levels of employment and of total output.
Foxley's (1976) study for Chile began by defining a basic 
consumption threshold on the basis of data from the Santiago 
household expenditure survey of 1968-69. He then divided all 
households in Chile into two groups, those above and those below 
the threshold, and estimated consumption functions for each group. 
These consumption functions were incorporated into a dynamic 
linear programming model which maximised terminal year consumption 
subject to primary resource constraints and commodity balances 
from a fifteen industry input-output table. Redistribution over 
time was effected by increasing the rate of growth of consumption 
by households below the threshold more rapidly than that of the 
other group. The most radical redistribution assessed by Foxley 
achieved a doubling of consumption of the low income group in 
six years (an average real growth of 13% per annum). This was 
found to have almost no effect on the rate of growth of total 
output but did increase the level of employment slightly.
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Foxley cautioned that the insensitivity of the growth rate to 
redistribution could be due in part to his assumption of a constant 
savings ratio, but noted that the employment effect may be 
reinforced by complementary government expenditure programmes in 
education, health and housing.
The next section of this chapter outlines a generalised 
input-output model incorporating distribution of industry value 
added among size income groups and disaggregated consumer demand 
patterns by income groups. The model is static in the sense 
that it does not describe the time path of variables in its 
solution. It is described as "semi-closed", to distinguish it 
from the simple open input-output model in which all final 
demands are aggregated into a single exogenous vector. In the 
semi-closed input-output model, part of final demand is made to 
be a function of primary inputs rather than being determined 
exogenously. One of the most illustrative treatments of such 
models known to the author is by Miyazawa (1976), but lack of 
suitable data has prevented its empirical application for Fiji.
In one chapter of Miyazawa1s book he discusses income distribution 
in an input-output model which is closed to foreign trade. In 
another chapter he discusses trade without reference to income 
distribution. In Appendix A to this chapter both are synthesised 
in one model.
An alternative model of the same class has been developed by 
a research team at the I.L.O. (Paukert et. al. (1974), Skolka 
and Garzuel (1976)). This model has the important advantage of 
simplicity in design and is modest in its demands for data input. 
The model is described in section three and simulation results for
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Fiji are reported in section four. The Fiji database for the 
model is described in detail in Appendix B. The critical link in 
models of the type discussed in this chapter, which distinguishes 
them from other input-output models, is the system of consumer 
demand equations which translates changes in the distribution of 
income into changes in the pattern of household consumption 
demand. A substantial literature exists on the specification and 
estimation of systems of consumer demand equations. Data 
limitations have prevented me from taking full advantage of this 
rich field of research. Fortunately it can be shown that for 
present purposes a very simple specification of demand relation­
ships is adequate. Expenditure systems are reviewed in 
Appendix C where the latter point is defended.
9.2 General framework
One of the most important tasks of economy-wide planning 
models is to highlight the compatibility (or incompatibility) of 
alternative resource allocation programmes with given social 
objectives. Input-output models are particularly well suited to 
this task. All input-output models ensure the consistency of 
industry supplies with all demands for industry outputs through the 
fundamental balance equation:
_ n
0. + Nn  = z a.. Q. + C. + G. + K. + X.
t i j =1 U  \] i i i i
(9.1)
where i is an index of commodities (i=1, ..., m) 
j is an index of industries (j=l, ..., n) 
(h is gross domestic output of commodity j 
Mc is competing imports
279.
a.. are intermediate purchases coefficients of commodity 
i for industry j
C is final households consumption expenditure 
G is final government consumption expenditure 
K is gross fixed capital accumulation (including stocks)
X is exports.
There are several empirical problems which must be solved 
before an input-output model may be used for planning. Firstly, 
the level of aggregation should ideally be chosen to highlight 
the important issues for policy purposes; in practice the level 
of aggregation is determined on the basis of available data and 
the two criteria do not always coincide. It is also usually 
assumed that each industry produces one (or primarily one) 
commodity which may be used either as an intermediate input or 
as a component of final demand. There are then problems with the 
treatment of secondary products, although the ease of 
mathematical analysis is greatly simplified. There are differences 
between the producers' prices of a commodity and the purchasers' 
prices of the same commodity attributable to commercialisation 
margins, and several alternative methods of accounting for these 
are possible. Finally, the distinction between competing and 
non-competing imports is not always obvious in all cases, and even 
when they are separated the prices of competing imports are not 
always the same as those of the domestic substitute. Then 
problems of choice and substitution occur within the Leontief 
fixed-coefficient technology framework. These problems are 
discussed in U.N. Statistical Office (1973). In this section 
we assume that they have been adequately solved for a given
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model so as to concentrate upon the concept of consistency in an 
input-output model.1
The simplest consistency test is made by expressing all 
final demand elements in a single vector:1 2
F = C + G + K +  X - M c .... (9.2)
and setting this vector as an exogenous target for the economic 
system. The Leontief inverse matrix multiplier may then be used 
to calculate the direct and indirect output required from each 
industry to achieve the target final demand. In matrix notation 
we have:
Q - ( I - A ) -1.F .... (9.3)
Consistent estimates of factor inputs can most simply be 
derived in a static model by assuming Leontief production 
functions.3 Then
P = VQ (9.4)
where P is the vector of factor input requirements 
V is the matrix of factor productivity ratios.
1 For a discussion of several of these issues in the context of an 
applied simulation model see Dixon et.al. (1977) and Parmenter
(1976). For an evaluation of static input-output models in 
general see Taylor (1975), Manne (1974) and Usui (1972). Much 
of the discussion of consistency in this section is based on 
Clark (1975).
2 In the following analysis the assumed input-output structure is 
industry-by-industry where (i,j = 1 ..., n). The i, j 
subscripts are dropped and vector notation ~ is used to 
distinguish vectors from matrices.
3 Although this is not the only way. In 1953 Klein (1953) 
suggested interpreting the a^j coefficients as derived from a 
Cobb-Douglas production function, such that they should stay 
constant in value terms but not volume terms. Several more 
recent studies (cited by Taylor (1975)) have shown that the 
elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs and 
primary factors is non-zero, and that there is often scope for 
substitution between primary inputs. For an excellent treatment 
of substitution in a CES framework see Dixon et.al. (1977).
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Note that the vector of primary inputs P may include non­
competing imports, capital of various types, and labour 
disaggregated by various skills. The exact specification is 
quite flexible, depending upon the problem at hand and the 
availability of data on various inputs. Equations (9.3) and (9.4) 
may be written in partitioned matrix form as
~9_ = F~
-v~~! T T y
for which the solution is




y ~ -v ~ ï ï_ i _
« y "\V (Î-a' ) - Ï  ! Ï
F•
1__
1 ( 9 . 6 )
The static input-output solution written in this form 
demonstrates two things which are important for this chapter. 
Firstly, the Leontief inverse matrix multiplier (I-A)"^ appears 
in both the upper and lower parts of the inverted partitioned 
matrix on the right hand side of equation (9.6). They calculate 
the direct as well as indirect requirements of commodities and 
primary inputs, analogous to the concept of linkages between 
industries discussed by Hirschman (1958). This is particularly 
important for analysis of employment. For instance, Krishnamurty 
has shown that:
...industries and techniques which generate a 
relatively large direct employment might not 
generate a relatively large total employment, in 
the same way as activities which generate a 
relatively large total output might not generate a 
relatively large total employment. Thus a simple 
direct employment criterion or a simple output- 
linkage criterion in the choice of industry and 
technology could give misleading results. 
(Krishnamurty (1974), p.l).
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Secondly, because the northeast corner of the inverted 
matrix is a null matrix, there is no interaction between the 
commodity balances in the upper part and the factor employment 
calculations in the lower part. Since there is no specified inter­
dependence between them the unknowns Q and P may be calculated in 
sequence. In order to make all variables in the system mutually 
consistent, this open static model must be 'closed' by adding 
some feedback loop to link the northeast and southwest quadrants 
of the partitioned matrix.
The particular closed-loop specification adopted by the 
class of models considered in this chapter explicitly recognises 
the interdependence between the distribution of factor incomes and 
the pattern of expenditure on domestic output by households in 
different percentiles of the size distribution of income. For 
instance, the economy-wide size distribution of (disposable) 
income is regarded as being determined by both technological 
factors and institutional factors. Labour and capital inputs 
employed in each industry are (ultimately) owned by individuals, 
and each individual's income depends on the quantity of factors 
he owns, the current prices of those factors, and the industry in 
which the factors are employed. Then that part of the overall 
size distribution which is technologically determined is simply 
a weighted sum of the distribution of factor incomes (by size 
income groups) in each industry. Some of the factor incomes are 
appropriated by the State and redistributed to other households 
as direct payments to individuals who do not own productive 
factors, and as indirect benefits from 'public goods'. Then 
changes in the economy-wide distribution of income may occur 
because of changes in the output configuration (industry mix),
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the quantity of factors owned by different groups, factor prices, 
and tax and transfer structures. Variations in each of these 
may occur as a result of deliberate government policy or they 
may be the result of forces outside the control of the 
authorities. *+
Then it is necessary to recognise that low-income households 
typically have a different pattern of consumption expenditure than 
middle or high-income households. This is verified by budget 
studies in every case. The total consumption of each income 
group may be broken down into component parts using Engel curves 
or other forms of demand functions (see Appendix C). Once a given 
pattern of income redistribution is assumed, based on government 
policies or external forces which cause variations described 
above, then the system of Engel curves will calculate new levels 
of total consumption for each commodity. This variation in 
households final demand is fed back into the input-output system 
which generates new output and employment levels to satisfy that 
demand, and also changes the distribution of income again as a 
second-round effect. The final solution is obtained by an 
iterative procedure (for which it is possible to prove convergence), 
and the welfare effects of the change may be analysed as a 
redistribution effect, a growth effect, and an employment effect. *(i)
4 Some examples may include:
(i) output configuration varied in response to changes in 
consumers1 tastes, changes in world demand for traded goods, 
changes in government expenditure and capital works;
(ii) quantity of factors owned by different groups varied as 
a result of population growth patterns, education, 
purchase and sale of capital assets;
(iii) factor prices varied by market forces (supply and demand 
in a competitive environment) or variations in distortions 
of factor markets (monopoly/monopsony, exchange rate 
fluctuations, etc.); etc.
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In mathematical terms, the static semi-closed input-output 
model may be expressed as follows. The fundamental balance 
equation is rewritten as:
g = AQ + CY + D .... (9.7)
where A is a matrix of intermediate coefficients A..,
* si
C is a matrix of coefficients showing the consumption 
pattern of k income groups for n commodities 
D is a vector of final demands other than households' final 
consumption expenditure (i.e. D = F - C), 
and where industry value added is paid directly to households as 
income Y accruing to k income groups, thus:
Y = VQ (9.8)
and thus V is a (kxn) matrix of coefficients showing the 
distribution of value added in each industry among the income 
groups. Writing (9.7) and (9.8) in partitioned matrix form (and 
dropping the ~ vector notation) we have:
r  « "1 i-A «-c Q D
-:V- [ T Y 0
(9.9)
for which the solution is found by:
~Q_ I-A i -<T D
_Y_ trrd • ^ : 1___L (9.10)
To simplify notation for the expanded form of the solution, let 
the Leontief inverse matrix multiplier be given by B = (I-A) 
Then inverting the partitioned matrix of coefficients in (9.10) 
gives the solution in expanded form as:
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Q B C ( I - V B C ) - 1  VB • B C ( I - V B C ) ' 1" D
_ ( I - V B C ) - 1  VB j ( I - V B C ) _ 0_
The essential difference between (9.11) and (9.6) is that the 
null-matrix in the northeast corner of the partitioned inverse in 
the open model (9.6) has been replaced by the introduction of the 
feedback mechanism described above. Two aspects of the solution
(9.11) are important here. Firstly, note that B,V and C all appear 
in each part of the partitioned inverse. This ensures that the 
solution variables are mutually consistent. It also means that 
the solution variables (output by industries and income by size 
income groups) can no longer be calculated in sequence but are 
computed simultaneously. Secondly, although the existence of a 
non-negative Leontief inverse matrix multiplier (B) may readily be 
proven, the non-negativity of the other complex inverse matrices 
shown is more difficult to establish. We will return to this 
point later on.
Finally it is necessary to stress the distinction between 
the concept of 'consistency' in a model as developed above, and 
what we may think of as 'feasibility' of alternative actions.
The class of models described above imposes a discipline on the 
planner which Manne (1974) has described as logical consistency. 
Given the balance equation and the particular closed loop 
specification, then the solution is calculated as the deterministic 
outcome of the system. Because the number of industries and 
commodities and income groups is large, the solution could not 
be found by simple 'back of the envelope' calculations, even if 
the planner possessed an extremely intimate knowledge of the
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workings of his economy. Nevertheless, the internally consistent 
solution may not be at all feasible from a macroeconomic point 
of view. To quote Clark (1975), (pp.130-131):
A model produces feasible plans only if it includes
supply considerations in one of the following ways;
(a) By putting primary resource restrictions on
foreign exchange, initial capital stock, savings, 
labour supply, and so on, within an optimising 
model (static or dynamic, linear or nonlinear, 
programming model).... : (e.g. Foxley (1976));
(b) By being elaborated into a general equilibrium 
model in which both demand and supply adjustments 
are made in order to reach an equilibrium. 
Normally endogenous price determination is the 
equilibrating adjustment process; (e.g. Dixon 
et.al. (1977));
(c) By simulation studies using input-output models, 
coupled with close communication between model 
builders and the people in the economy who decide 
on and implement policy. In this case 
feasibility is in part a matter of judgement 
based on information transmitted outside the 
model.
To expand on the last point with particular reference to the 
model concerned with income distribution, we should recognise 
that the change in income distribution which initialises the 
process of adjustment to a new consistency solution is a matter 
outside the model presented above. This also presents a 
feasibility problem, which may be partly political and partly 
economic, and which is simply assumed to be solved before the 
model solution is computed. Thus, while the model may show the 
logical consequences of adopting certain policies whose initial 
redistributive effects are known, it does not provide a 
mechanism for choosing between alternative policies which may 
have the same final outcome, or for judging the feasibility of 
alternative policies in terms outlined by Clark above.
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9.3 The Paukert-Skolka-Maton-Garzuel model (PSMG)
As a member of the class of static semi-closed input-output 
models discussed above, the PSMG model brings household's final 
consumption expenditure into the matrix inversion which 
calculates mutually consistent output, employment and income 
patterns as functions of exogenous other final demands, without 
reference to the time-pattern of change in the solution variables. 
In this particular specification, however, the vector of other 
final demands is held constant, and the strict exogenous 
variables in the model are the hypothetical income distribution 
regimes which are imposed upon the model to simulate the effects 
on the economy of varying the income distribution.
The model shares an important limitation with regard to 
feasibility considerations as discussed in the previous section.
In between the generation of primary factor incomes in each 
industry of the economy on one hand, and the distribution of 
household income by size income groups on the other, there is a 
network of income flows - a mapping system which depends partly 
upon the number of employed persons per household, and on the 
income maintenance activities described previously. In the PSMG 
model this mapping system is not specified - it is simply assumed 
to exist. This prevents direct analysis of policy measures 
designed to make income distribution less unequal by altering, 
for example, the wage structure or the tax-and-transfer structure. 
It is difficult to model the effects of policies aimed specifically 
at, say, "households in the lowest quartile of the income scale" 
when the mapping process is not specified.
The PSMG model does show what the equilibrium structure of 
output and employment in the economy would look like if the
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distribution of household income was different, and assuming no 
change in the mapping system. The model is characterised by 
Leontief-type fixed-coefficient production functions, Keynesian- 
type consumption and savings functions, and Lewis-type excess 
supplies of labour. There are no other primary resource 
restrictions imposed upon the consistency solution, so that 
feasibility of the results in the macroeconomic sense is also 
simply assumed to exist (i.e. there is no divergence between 
aggregate savings and investment and there are no balance of 
payments limitations).
The model is formulated as a set of identities. The 
fundamental balance equation is the same as equation (9.7) in the 
previous section:
Q = AQ + CY + D .... (9.7)
Analgous to equation (9.8) income generation is given by:
Y = a Q .... (9.12)
~ V  ~
where Y is (scalar) value added accruing to households as income 
from the use of their factor services, 
a is a (Ixn) vector whose elements are the proportions of 
gross output in each industry accruing to households 
as factor income.
The stipulated income distribution in discrete income groups 
is found by dividing the total number of households into four 
groups (quartile grouping was dictated by available data); Y^ is 
the proportion of total household income Y accruing to group k 




'  T  * ( k - 1 . , 4) (9.13)
A redistribution of income is defined in a new vector J 
different from J such that income in each group after 
redistribution is given by:
J*
Y k = Y k ‘ j f  • ( k = 1 .................4 ) ..............0 . 1 4 )
A very simple form of consumption function is used in the 
model (but see below for further discussion of the consumption 
function). It is assumed that for each income group (k) the 
share of expenditure on each commodity is constant. Total 
consumption expenditure on the output of industry i is given by:
Ci "  ? i k  Y k ’
(i 1# •••» n ) ,
( k = l ,  . . . ,  4 ) ,
(9.15)
where c-k is a (Ixk) vector whose elements are the proportions 
of income of the respective income groups spent on 
domestic output of i;
Y^ is a (kxl) vector of income levels of the k income 
groups given by the income distribution equation:
Yk = J.Y .... (9.16)
Similarly, the savings function may be written as:
S = Ssk Yk .... ^9‘17^
where csk is a (Ixk) vector whose elements are the savings 
propensities of the respective income groups.
Imports are given by
M = a .Q. + c, Y. + D~mj ¿3 ~mk I k  m (9.18)
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where a . is a (Ixn) vector of import coefficients for 
~mj
intermediate uses
c . is a (Ixk) vector of import propensities for imported
consumer goods by each group k,
Dm is the (scalar) value of imports required for other 
final uses.
The expenditure and savings coefficients of each income group 
satisfy the adding-up condition: 
n
• ^  c i k  + cmk + c s k  = ■>’  ( a 1 1  k > (9.19)
Employment is also written using the simple fixed coefficients 
specification:
E = 5 p 9 (9.20)
where ag is a (Ixn) vector of average employment coefficients - 
this row vector may be expanded to a matrix of 
coefficients for disaggregating employment by skills.
The coefficients used in the above relations (9.7), (9.12), 
..., (9.20) may be arranged in a single square matrix, say B, as 
in Figure 9.1. The order of the matrices and vectors comprising B 
are shown in brackets. It should be noted that the av vector 
from equation (9.12) has been expanded to show u rows of primary 
inputs coefficients, the last row being the household income 


























The analytical representation of the complete model may be 
written in matrix form as:
B.Z = D .... (9.21)
where Z is a column vector of endogenous variables (the solution 
vector), and D is a column vector of exogenous variables (final 
demand other than household's consumption expenditure). This 
conveniently simple formulation may be solved with a single 
matrix inversion:
Z = B_ 1 .D (9 .22 )
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The data used in the basic version of the model is shown in 
Figure 9.2 and the data sources and methods are explained in 
Appendix B. Figure 9.2 illustrates the model format B.Z = D and 
the partitioning of the B matrix is analogous to that in 
Figure 9.1. A description or row heading for each row in 
Figure 9.2 unfortunately was omitted from the diagram because of 
lack of space - however the row headings are listed in Table 9.1 
which shows the basic consistency solution.
9.4 Simulation results for Fiji 1972
The vector of income distribution shares given in Figure 9.2 
(J = [-.09, -.17, -.25, -.49]) is the quartile distribution of 
income from the 1973 Urban Household Income and Expenditure 
survey upon which the consumption coefficients were based. It 
provides the income distribution for the basic consistency 
solution of the model.5 This basic consistency solution gives 
industry outputs, imports and incomes equal to their actual 1972 
values shown in the input-output table and national accounts for 
that year. The table of complete solution values for the basic 
consistency solution is shown in Table 9.1 and the validation of 
this solution is discussed in Appendix B (i.e. estimating domestic 
consumption coefficients for each income group, verifying the 
aggregate savings and investment balance, and so on). In order 
simulate the structure of the economy under a range of different 
income distributions the vector of income distribution shares (J)
5 Only the relative pattern of household expenditure in 1973 was 
used. The levels of all variables refer to the year 1972.
There is no data to enable the consumption expenditure patterns 
of rural households to be adequately incorporated in this study, 
(see Appendix B).
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Table 9.1 Basic Consistency Solution
Q 1 Sugar Cane
($'000)
22161
Q 2 Other Agriculture 16809
Q 3 Mining & Quarrying 7747
Q 4 Sugar Manufacturing 34361
Q 5 Other Food Manufact. 22903
Q 6 Textiles, Wood, Etc., 15458
Q 7 Cement, Etc., 5264
Q 8 Other Manufacturing 9539
Q 9 Elect., Gas, Water 5658
Q10 Building 26140
Qll Other Construction 13279
Q12 Distribution 58555
Q13 Restaurants, Hotels 21886
Q14 Transport 28961
Q15 Communications 3497
Q16 Banking, Insurance 8691
Q17 Private Services 21912




M Imports (c.i.f.) 132067
IT Indirect Taxes 31192
DT Direct Taxes 18358
DP Depreciation 10954
GS Govt. Op. Surplus 5449
S H/Hold Savings (Tot) 16856
Y H/Hold Income (Tot) 168117
Y4 Income (4th Quartile) 15131
Y3 Income (3rd Quartile) 28580
Y2 Income (2nd Quartile) 42029
Y1 Income (1st Quartile) 82377
E Employment 108632
Note: Q1-Q21 are gross outputs of each input-output industry 
(F$1000). The industry numbers are slightly different 
to those in the official input-output table (Government 
of Fiji ( 1974d)) because of the omission of the 
subsistence sector and the aggregation of "private non­
profit services" and "other services" into one industry. 
The indicator of employment is actually the wage and 
salary bill for the economy, also in F$'000. Refer to 
Appendix B for further notes.
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was replaced by different vectors (J*) and all other coefficients 
in the B matrix were held constant. The B matrix was inverted6 
with the new J* and multiplied by the constant D vector to obtain 
a corresponding consistency solution Z*.
Nine alternative income distributions were examined in the 
first version of the model.7 These distributions are listed in 
Table 9.2, in order of decreasing inequality measured by the Gini 
index, with their Lorenz curve parameters (corresponding to the 
analysis of chapter eight) and quartile income shares. The 
ranking of distributions in Table 9.2 is unambiguous because each 
distribution shown corresponds to one of nine non-intersecting 
Lorenz curves (see chapter seven). Put another way, a shift 
from one income distribution to the next may be achieved by a 
transfer of income-share from the richest quartile to the poorer 
quartiles, which is associated with a shift to a higher Lorenz 
curve. In this sense, each of the nine alternative income 
distributions (J*) could be generated artificially by such
6 It is not possible to prove mathematically that the inverse of 
a matrix with the structure of B does exist. Fortunately there 
were very few computational problems involved in inverting the 
B matrix.
7 The first version of the model refers to that used in Paukert 
et.al. (1974), and is the only version for which results are 
discussed here. Another version discussed by Skolka and Garzuel
(1976) adjusted the expenditure patterns of each percentile 
income group by an iterative procedure in the course of solution 
to simulate the effects of shifting preferences. Skolka and 
Garzuel reported lower sensitivity of their solution to 
simulated income redistributions than in the first version. 
Certain computational problems arose when the iterative version 
was tested for Fiji. In addition there are certain method­
ological problems involved in attempts to account for shifting 
preferences for which the author has not yet found a satisfactory 
solution (see Appendix C).
Table 9.2 Nine Income D istributions Imposed on the Model
Alternative Simulated Gi ni Lorenz Curve 1Parameters Quartile Income Shares
Income Distributions Index a a 8 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1. Philippines (1971) .494 .4779 .9151 .8971 .605 .219 .121 .055
2. Fiji (1968) .477 .4806 .9332 .9618 .580 .230 .130 .060
3. Fiji (1973) .441 .4283 .9055 .9160 .561 .236 .136 .067
4. Constructed .424 .4570 .9975 .9863 .541 .240 .150 .070
5. Constructed .381 .3711 .9142 .9127 .500 .250 .170 .080
6. Urban Fiji (1973) .360 .3343 .8602 .8686 .490 .250 .170 .090
7. Constructed .344 .3512 .9938 .9309 .480 .250 .170 .100
8. Australia (1968) .319 .2743 .7628 .8176 .455 .263 .182 .100
9. Taiwan (1972) .283 .2532 .8299 .8162 .437 .259 .186 .118
Note: Income distributions for Philippines, Australia and Taiwan are from Jain (1975). 
Income distributions for Fiji were discussed in chapter eight.
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rich-to-poor transfers. As they are listed in Table 9.2, the 
first corresponds to the observed income distribution of the 
Philippines in 1971; the second and third are Fiji's economy-wide 
income distributions in 1968 and 1973 respectively (recall 
chapter eight discussion of income distribution measurement in 
Fiji); the sixth is the same as that used in the basic consistency 
solution, Fiji's 1973 urban income distribution; and the eighth 
and ninth are, respectively, the observed distribution of 
Australia in 1968 and Taiwan in 1972. The remaining income 
distributions in Table 9.2 were artificially constructed on the 
basis of rich-to-poor transfers to fill in large shifts between 
observed distributions in the measured Gini index.8
The concept of income transfers between quartile income 
groups is useful for describing the size of the redistributions 
involved. For example, a shift from income distribution number 
six (the basic consistency solution) to income distribution 
number nine (Taiwan 1972) would require taking 5.3% of the national 
income away from the first, or richest, quartile and redistributing 
it as 0.9% to the second quartile, 1.6% to the third quartile, 
and 2.8% to the fourth quartile. This would indeed be a radical 
redistribution and one which would require a very careful 
interpretation of the ceteris paribus conditions described above.
A more modest redistribution is involved in a shift from income 
distribution number six to income distribution number seven.
8 Any number of alternative distributions could be constructed in 
this manner if desired. Those reported here are adequate to 
demonstrate the properties of the model and the direction and 
magnitude of the redistribution impact on variables of interest. 
It would be more interesting to test other redistributions if 
the mapping system which generates them could be specified but 
this is not the case.
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This redistribution was constructed by taking 1% of the national 
income away from the richest quartile and giving it all to the 
poorest quartile. Achieving a static redistribution of this 
amount would also be difficult, but would be less likely to 
strain the credibility of the ceteris paribus conditions. For 
this reason a modest redistribution may be regarded as more 
"feasible" in the sense outlined above.
Table 9.3 shows the impact of nine static income 
redistributions upon the gross outputs of the twenty-one 
input-output industries and upon some macroeconomic variables.
The results are expressed as the ratio of the solution values of 
variables obtained after redistribution to their values in the 
basic consistency solution. For example, imposing income 
distribution number one (Philippines 1971) on the model gives a 
ratio for employment of 0.9788, which means the solution value is 
2.12% lower than in the basic consistency solution. Since income 
distribution number six is the same as that used in the basic 
consistency solution, the ratio for all variables is 1.0000 in 
that case.
Given the assumptions of the PSMG model, the results shown 
in Table 9.3 indicate that if the income distribution in Fiji was 
more.unequal than that in the basic consistency solution then the 
outputs of almost all industries would be less in order to satisfy 
the given exogenous final demand and household consumption. The 
equilibrium levels of household income and of employment would 
also be lower. Conversely, if the income distribution was less 
unequal than that in the basic consistency solution, higher 
industry outputs and employment and income would be generated.
Table 9.3 Simulation Results for Nine Alternative Income D istributions.
1 2  3 4
Industry Results:
Q 1 Sugar cane
Q 2 Other Agriculture
Q 3 Mining, quarrying
Q 4 Sugar manufacturing
Q 5 Other food products
Q 6 Textiles, wood products, etc
Q 7 Cement, earthenware
Q 8 Other manufacturing















IT Indirect taxes 
DT Direct taxes 
DP Depreciation 
GS Govt, operating surplus 
S Household savings 
Y Household income 
E Aggregate employment
.9934 .9946 .9957 .9968
.9129 .9285 .9426 .9580
.9997 .9998 .9998 .9999
.9934 .9946 .9957 .9968
.9341 .9457 .9565 .9677
.9850 .9877 .9902 .9926
.9981 .9984 .9987 .9990
.9855 .9881 .9905 .9930
.9737 .9788 .9830 .9878
.9992 .9994 .9995 .9996
.9997 .9998 .9998 .9999
.9628 .9694 .9755 .9819
.9923 .9935 .9948 .9960
.9460 .9556 .9643 .9739
.9760 .9804 .9844 .9883
.9931 .9941 .9953 .9963
.9770 .9812 .9852 .9885
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
.9889 .9910 .9928 .9946
.9840 .9866 .9891 .9921
.9231 .9368 .9492 .9627
.9653 .9715 .9772 .9831
.9498 .9587 .9669 .9755
.9762 .9807 .9844 .9891
.9677 .9734 .9787 .9842
.9761 .9806 .9846 .9885
1.4193 1.3445 1.2761 1.2037
.9719 .9769 .9815 .9863
.9788 .9826 .9861 .9897


























































































There are some interesting differences between input-output 
industries in the degree of sensitivity of their gross outputs to 
income redistribution in this model. The discussion to follow is 
simplified by restricting our attention to two income distributions, 
say, to income distribution numbers seven and nine (the modest 
and radical redistributions described above). The group of 
industries which demonstrated the highest sensitivity to income 
redistribution is represented in Table 9.4 below, with the 
percentage change in their gross outputs from the basic consistency 
solution given for redistribution seven and for redistribution 
nine.
Table 9.4 Percentage increase in gross outputs of selected 
industries in Fiji, redistributing from 
Gini = 0.360 to:
Gi ni = 0.344 Gi ni = 0.283
%  %
Q  2 Other Agriculture 1.20 5.00
Q  5 Other Food Products 0.99 4 . 4 6
Q12 Distribution 0.55 3.93
Q14 Transport 0.75 3.12
Q21 Dwellings Ownership 1.09 2.20
Each of these industries disposes a high proportion of its 
output to households' final domestic consumption expenditure.
The propensity to consume the outputs of these industries was 
found to be much larger for poor households than for rich 
households. Therefore, a redistribution of income generated 
relatively higher output response from these industries than from 
other industries. Table 9.4 also indicates that different 
industries would expand at different rates depending upon the 
particular pattern of income redistribution chosen. For instance, 
the radical redistribution shown provides gains for the second
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and third quartiles as well as the poorest fourth quartile, whereas 
the other redistribution provides only for a modest gain in the 
income share of the fourth quartile. This accounts for part of 
the different relative industry effects, in addition to variations 
in the marginal propensity to consume different outputs at 
different income levels.
Some other industries which sell a high proportion of their 
output to households' final domestic consumption (for example, 
"health" and "textiles, wood products, printing") showed much 
lower sensitivity to income redistribution, mainly because their 
average and marginal consumption propensities were found not to be 
very different between income groups. Industries which cater to 
exports ("sugar manufacturing" and "mining"), or which cater to 
capital formation ("building" and "construction"), and others 
which do not directly satisfy household consumption, were almost 
completely unaffected by the simulated redistributions of income 
among households.
Turning to the results for the macroeconomic variables it is 
convenient once again to restrict our attention to one or two 
redistributions. Consider a shift from income distribution 
number six to income distribution number seven, and recall that 
this involves a simulated redistribution of 1% of the national 
income from the richest quartile to the poorest quartile. This 
redistribution caused household savings in the model to fall by 
6.07% or $1,023 million. Household consumption expenditure 
increased by $1,023 million, a 0.68% rise. Approximately two- 
thirds of this increase in consumption would be spent on 
domestically produced consumer goods and services, and the 
remainder would go to imports and taxes. The increase in
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households' demand for domestic output also induced higher 
aggregate employment, income and materials imports. The increased 
employment effect of 0.31% would amount to approximately 420 jobs 
with given wage rates, and the corresponding increase in household 
income would be 0.41% or $0,689 million. The total increase in the 
economy's imports of 0.51% or $0,673 million is the sum of direct 
and indirect imports required to satisfy the higher consumption 
demand.
The impact of income redistribution on the rate of growth is 
best examined in the context of the familiar two-gap model of 
growth (Chenery and Strout (1966), Guest (1975)). This model 
postulates that foreign capital inflow can act either as a 
supplement to domestic savings or as a supplement to foreign 
exchange. For a developing country which conforms to the model 
and for which capital inflow is of the form satisfying the implied 
requirements, it can be shown that the impact of foreign capital 
inflow on the growth rate will be different depending upon which 
resource, savings or foreign exchange, is the dominant constraint 
on growth. Put another way, the planned growth rate of the economy 
implies a certain level of investment and a corresponding level of 
imported equipment and materials. The planned investment must be 
financed by domestic savings plus foreign capital inflow. The 
planned imports must be paid for by exports plus foreign capital 
inflow. These two resource gaps to be filled by foreign capital 
inflow may differ ex ante, but will adjust to equal the amount of 
foreign capital actually forthcoming ex post. If the planned 
growth rate of the economy is to be achieved, there must be 
adequate foreign capital to fill the larger of the two resource
gaps.
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The cost of redistributing 1% of the national income from 
the richest quartile to the poorest quartile can now be seen in 
terms of an increased requirement for net foreign capital inflow. 
With exports held constant in the exogenous D vector, the current 
account balance was found to deteriorate as imports of goods and 
services rose by 0.51% or $0,673 million. This represents an 
increase in the foreign exchange gap. The savings gap also 
increased by the same amount, preserving the ex post identity: 
investment was held constant in the exogenous D vector, household 
savings fell by $1,023 million, but other sources of domestic 
investible finance (i.e. government tax revenues, operating 
surplus of public enterprises, and depreciation reserves) 
increased by a total of $0.35 million, as can be easily verified. 
Therefore the net rise in the savings gap was $0,673 million.
If additional foreign capital inflow was forthcoming to meet 
this increase in the resource gap then the planned growth rate 
would not be frustrated by a lack of finance. Income 
redistribution to the poor would create no further macroeconomic 
adjustment problems and the 1.66% increase in the level of 
household income shown above would be realised. If the required 
foreign capital inflow was not available, the effect of income 
redistribution on the planned growth rate would depend upon 
which of the two resource gaps was locally dominant and upon the 
extent of the resource shortfall. These conditions determine the 
nature of the adjustment process to a new equilibrium growth 
rate (Vanek (1967), Guest (1975)). The simulation model does not 
permit an assessment to be made of the dominant resource gap so, 
following Paukert et. al. (1974), it is assumed that the 
appropriate adjustments take place.
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Nevertheless it is of interest to consider the significance 
of the increase in the resource gap. Macroeconomic forecasts 
for the period 1975-1980 shown in an Appendix to Fiji's Seventh 
Development Plan indicate that the ex ante savings gap would be 
consistently larger than the ex ante trade gap. These forecasts 
are shown below and would be consistent with a planned G.D.P. 
growth rate of 7.3% per annum.
Table 9.5 Ex ante resource gaps (F$million), constant 
1975 prices)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Savings gap 24.8 54.4 56.7 64.6 73.9 77.4
Trade gap 14.9 44.3 46.0 54.0 61.3 69.5
(Source: Government of Fiji (1975) Table C.4 page 258).
The additional $0,673 million of foreign capital inflow 
(in 1972 prices) required as a consequence of redistributing 1% of 
Fiji's national income (approximately $2.3 million in 1972 prices) 
is not an insignificant amount. It represents 2.8% of the 1972 
resource gap. Escalated to 1975 prices it represents almost 4% of 
the forecast savings gap in 1975 shown above. The ability of the 
Fiji Government to attract this additional capital inflow and to 
pursue appropriate macroeconomic adjustment policies are two 
important issues related to the feasibility considerations mentioned 
earlier and which are outside the scope of the consistency 
framework used here.
In summary, a redistribution of 1% of Fiji's national income 
from the richest quartile to the poorest quartile would represent 
a transfer of $2.3 million in 1972. The simulated effect of such
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a redistribution was
(i) to increase the level of aggregate consumption expenditure 
by 0.68% or $1.02 million;
(ii) to increase the levels of output in each industry by varying 
amounts (up to 1%) to meet this increased demand;
(iii) to increase the level of employment by 0.31% (equivalent to 
approximately 420 jobs);
(iv) to increase the level of total household income by 0.41% or 
$0.69 million;
(v) to increase the required foreign capital inflow by 2.8% or 
$0.67 million.
Provided that the latter was judged to be manageable there 
need be no reduction in the rate of growth of the economy. These 
results would tend to support the broad conclusion reached by 
other studies that the economic impact of simulated income 
redistributions is rather small. The effect of a modest 
redistribution of income in Fiji would appear to be beneficial in 
terms of the criteria for judging welfare gains discussed in 
chapter 7.
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APPENDIX A: Miyazawa's model
Consider an economy closed to foreign trade (we introduce 
international trade later). The balance equation is written
Q = AQ + f ...(A.1)
where Q is (nxl) vector of gross outputs
A is (nxn) matrix of intermediate coefficients 
f is (nxl) vector of final demand; sum of household 
consumption (E), investment (K) and current government 
expenditure (G).
The consumption function is written
E = C + CY ...(A.2)
where E is (nxl) vector of households consumption expenditure 
C is (nxl) vector of basic consumption 
C is (nxk) consumption coefficients matrix 
Y is (kxl) vector of income accruing to k income groups:
Y = VQ ...(A.3)
where V is (kxn) matrix of value added generated by each of n 
industries accruing to k income groups in each industry.
(Note: estimation of this V matrix for Fiji was not possible 
from published data - this was the major reason for not 
using Miyazawa model for analysing static consistency of 
income distribution).
The balance equation may now be rewritten as:
Q = AQ + CVQ + d ...(A.4)
where d is (nxl) vector of exogenous final demand; sum of basic
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consumption (C), investment K, and current government 
expenditure (G). (i.e. d = f - E + C)
Solving (A.4):
Q = (I - A - c v r ^ d  ...(A.4)'
(A.4)1 may be written alternatively as follows:
(i) Q = (I - A - C V ) _ 1 . d
(ii) Q = B ( I  -  C V B ) _ 1 . d  ■
(iii) Q = B ( I  + C K V B ) . d
...(A.4)'
where B = (I-À)'1, K = (I-L)'1, L = VBC. 
To show (i) = (ii) in (A.4)':
(I-A-CV)'1 = ([I - CV {I-A)-1](I-A)~1 ...(A.5)
= (I-A)'1 [I-CV(I-A)"1]'1 
= B(I-CVB)'1
1
Call (I-CVB) the "subjoined inverse" - the advantage of this 
expression is that it reflects the effect of endogenous changes 
in each income-group's consumption expenditure, as distinct from 
the inverse reflecting only production activity (B).
Q = (I-A-CV)’1.d
= B(I-CVB)"1.d (i) = (ii), Q.E.D.
To show (ii) = (iii) in (A.4)1:
Define: L = VBC , K = (I-L)"1
and note I is (kxk) identity matrix in this definition).
Then by definition K(I-VBC) = I.
Premultiply this latter expression by C and postmultiply by VB:
CK(I-VBC)VB = CVB ...(A.6)
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L.H.S. of (A.6) may be written as:
CK{I-VBC)VB = CKVB - CKVBCVB 
= CKVB(I-VBC)
Now subtract both L.H.S. and R.H.S. of (A.6) from the (nxn) 
identity matrix:
I - CKVB(I-VBC) = I-CVB
I = (I+CKVB)(I-CVB)
.-. (I-CVB)'1 = (I+CKVB) ...(A.7)
/. Q = B{ I-CVB)~1. d
= B(I+CKVB).d (ii) = (iii) , Q.E.D.
The economic meaning of K and L is as follows. Consider the 
income propagation effect of any income group (x) on another 
group's (w's) income:
Step 1: Increase output of each industry = B.d 
Step 2: Increase income of group x = V BdX
Step 3: Increase consumption of group x = c v Bd
x x ~
Step 4: Increase output of each industry due to additional 
consumption of group x = Be v BdX X ^
Step 5: Increase income of group w due to additional income of
group x = v Be vv Bd 3 r w x x „
Now, a coefficient showing how much income for group w is 
generated by a one unit increase in income for group x (any w, x) 
is given by:
= Step 5 
wx Step 2
v Be vv Bd w x x ~
~v Bd x ~
v Be w x
...(A.8)
A matrix of all such coefficients would have dimensions (kxk) and
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may be called "the matrix of inter-income-group coefficients 
Thus:
L = VBC ...(A.9)
The propagation process in matrix form would be as follows:
First round: = Bd
Second round: Q2 = BCVBd = BCVQ^
Third round: Q, = BCVBCVBd = BCVQ2 = (BCV)2Bd
m-1m-th round: Q = BCVQ , = (BCV) .Bd~m ~m-1 ~
= BC(BCV)m"2VBd
= BCLm'2VBd
The total propagation process gives
Q = E Q = Bd + BC ( E Lm'2)VBd ...(A.10)
~ m=l '“m ~ m=2 ~
m-2Now if E Lm“" (i.e. E Lm) is convergent, then we can write 
m=2 m=0
E Lm = I+L+L2+L3+... = (I-L) 
m=0
/. Q = B(I+C(I-L)-1VB)d 
= B(I+CKVB)d
- 1 ...(A.11)
where K = (I-L)’1 ...(A.12)
(Note: this again demonstrates (ii) = (iii) in (A.4)1).
Thus, if L = VBC is an array of coefficients showing the 
interrelationship among income-groups in the process of propagation 
resulting from each income-group's consumption expenditure pattern,
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then K = (I-L)”1 may be called the "inter-relational multiplier 
of income groups". Note that the column sums of matrix L equal 
the total consumption coefficient of each income-group:
L = ij* VBC = i ‘ (I-A)BC = V  C ...(A.13)
where i£, i^ are summation vectors of order k and n respectively 
(i = (1, 1, 1, ..., 1)).
Finally, we project equilibrium output into equilibrium income: 
from (A.3) , Y = VQ ,
substitute (A.4)'(iii) for Q
Y = VB(I+CKVB)d 
= (I+VBCK)VB£
= (I+LK)VBd ...(A.14)
but (I+LK) = K , (because (I-L)K = I
or K-LK = I
K = I+LK)
So (A.14) becomes:
Y = KVBd ...(A.15)
KVB is (rxn) matrix which may be called the "multi-sector income 
multiplier in matrix form", or simply the "matrix multiplier of 
income formation".
(Note: (A.15) may be derived alternatively as follows:
- Income generated by exogenous expenditure = VBd
- Income generated through endogenous demand as a function 
of income = VBCY
.*. Total income generated Y = VBCY+VBd
= {I-VBC)_1 VBd 
= KVBd
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In partitioned matrix form, Miyazawa's model may be written as 
fol1ows
From Q = AQ^CY+d
and Y = VQ+g
(where g is exogenous income), we have:
Q













1-A | -C d






KVB ! K—  i — _  g__
...(A.16)
In Miyazawa's first chapter explained above, there is no 
international trade. His chapter 3 does open the static input­
output model to trade but does not consider income distribution. 
Extension of the model outlined above to include imports and 
exports is relatively straightforward. Exports may be included 
as an additional component of exogenous final demand vector d. 
Since capital formation is exogenous in the static model, the 
imported capital goods may be deducted from total requirements 
for capital formation, so that investment component of d refers 
only to domestic capital formation. Imports of raw materials for 
current intermediate production may be accounted for by a (nxn) 
matrix of coefficients (M ) showing the amount of imported 
commodity i required to produce a unit of domestic output j.
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Households expenditure on imported consumer goods may be accounted 
for in a (nxk) matrix of coefficients (Mc) showing the amount of 
imported commodity i purchased per unit of expenditure by income 
group w. The balance equation for domestic output may then be 
written as
Q = AQ+CTVQ - MCVQ - MRQ+d
where is (nxk) matrix of consumption coefficients of households 
in k income groups for both domestic and imported 
consumer goods
d is (nxl) vector of domestic components of exogenous final 
demand.
Note that CTVQ-MCVQ = (CT-MC)VQ = CVQ 
T Cwhere C = C -M = domestic commodities consumption coefficients, 
as before.
,\ Q = AQ+CVQ-MRQ+d 
Q = (I-A-CV+MR)"1.d 
Now define B = (I-A+MR)"'*'
Then (A.18) may be alternatively





(ii) Q = B(I-CVB)_1d (A.18)'
(iii) Q = B(I+CKVB).d
The proofs (i) = (ii), (ii) = (iii) for (A.18)' are the same as 
for (A.4)', always remembering that B = (I-A+M)"1 is different 
to that for the economy closed to foreign trade, and where again 
L = VBC, K = (I-L) Note that with the consumption coefficient 
matrix reflecting only that consumption of domestically produced
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output, the matrix of inter-income group coefficients (L = VBC), 
and hence the interreiational multiplier of income groups 
(K = (I-L) only allows transmission of effects from one income 
group to another to the extent that such consumption expenditure 
generates domestic incomes and outputs, which is as it should be 
- imports of consumer goods are properly regarded as a leakage 
from the system. Equilibrium income is still given by Y = KVBd 
(where B includes raw material impprts necessary to sustain 
production).
APPENDIX B : Fiji Database for PSMG Simulation Model
The purpose of this Appendix is to explain the organisation 
of data that was required to produce Figure 9.2. The main data 
sources used were the 1972 Input-Output Table, the 1972 Trade 
Report, the National Accounts and the 1973 Urban Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey. All values refer to the year 1972 and are 
expressed in Fiji dollars.
Modification of the Input-Output Table:
The published twenty-three industry Input-Output Table was 
slightly modified in this study. The industries "other private 
services" and "private non-profit institutions" were aggregated 
into one industry called "private services". The "subsistence" 
sector, which has no linkages with other industries in the table, 
was excluded. Its total imputed output was $31.1 million in 1972. 
However, "ownership of dwellings", which had an imputed value of 
output sold to households' final consumption expenditure of 
$13.4 million, was retained in the study. A value of $0.9 million 
was taken from deliveries by the "building" industry to household
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consumption and was added to the exogenous D vector. These 
adjustments were made to facilitate the estimation of the household 
consumption pattern and its operation in translating quartile 
income changes into changes in effective demand for industry 
outputs.
All components of final demand, except households' final 
consumption expenditure, were aggregated to form the exogenous 
D vector. These included gross fixed capital formation, exports, 
changes in stocks, consumption expenditure by tourists and 
government final consumption expenditure. The inter-industry 
coefficients and primary input coefficients were taken directly 
from the 1972 Input-Output Table.
Estimation of household income
In order to estimate the amount of income generated in each 
industry which accrued directly to households it was necessary to 
adjust each industry's value added for commodity taxes, company 
taxes and depreciation. The total factor income which accrued to
households was estimated as follows:




Gross operating surplus of companies 34005
Gross income unicorporated enterprise 50968
Less:
Direct taxes paid by companies 7139
Direct taxes unicorporated enterprise 7395
Depreciation reserves 10954
Property/entrepeneurial income available 59485
Total household income (before personal tax) 168117
This calculation was made for each industry and the resulting 
income estimates were expressed as coefficients of gross industry 
outputs. The value of property and entrepeneurial income available
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Table B.l Derivation of Household Income Estimates by
Input-Output Industries
Operating Company Deprec- Company Gross Household
Industry Surplus Tax iation Income Wages Income
- l i L  .. (b) (c) Net (d) (e) (f)
1. 5540 487 741 4312 7313 11625
2. 4266 361 583 3322 7683 11005
3. 1552 145 274 1133 2820 3953
4. 2595 675 993 927 4969 5896
5. 2820 955 992 873 1991 2864
6. 3282 596 740 1946 3628 5574
7. 1200 184 342 674 830 1504
8. 1124 290 139 695 2177 2872
9. 64 16 10 38 1389 1427
10. 2554 245 255 2054 8901 10955
11. 151 13 83 55 6365 6420
12. 28111 7587 1963 18561 12182 30743
13. 4306 579 843 2884 3909 6793
14. 5438 611 2175 2652 7692 10344
15. - - - - 1196 1196
16. 1385 257 63 1065 2801 3866
17. 6762 1533 407 4822 7571 12393
18. - - - - 12057 12057
19. 23 - - 23 9212 9235
20. 359 - 351 8 3946 3954
21. 13441 - - 13441 - 13441
TOTAL 84973 14534 10954 59485 108632 168117
(a) Op. surp. of companies and gross income of unicorporated 
enterprises (excluding subsistence agriculture)
(b) Direct tax on companies and unicorporated enterprises
(c) Consumption of fixed capital by companies
(d) = (a) - (b) - (c). Company income available for distribution 
to shareholders
(e) Gross compensation of employees
(f) = (d) + (e). (Before personal income tax).
for distribution to individual shareholders was assumed to be 
distributed to Fiji residents. In fact an amount of $9.1 million 
of property and entrepeneurial income was paid to overseas 
residents in 1972, and a further unknown amount would have been
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retained company earnings. The value of household income was 
therefore overestimated to some extent but it was not possible to 
allocate this overestimate among industries.
Employment coefficients
The coefficients for "compensation of employees" were assumed 
to reflect the relative labour intensity of industries. Interest 
lies in predicting changes in employment as a result of income 
redistribution. The percentage change in each industry's wage 
bill corresponds to the percentage change in employment under 
fixed wage rates, fixed labour-output ratios, and a constant 
mapping system which translates the generation of factor incomes 
into a pattern of household income distribution.
Income distribution shares:
This is explained in section 9.4.
Allocation of expenditure by quartile groups
The Input-Output Table shows households' final consumption 
expenditure on domestically produced output by supplying industry, 
as well as the total value of imported consumer goods and the 
total indirect taxes and import duties paid on consumer goods. 
Transport and commercialisation margin on consumer goods is also 
shown. For the simulation model it was necessary to disaggregate 
these expenditures by quartile income groups. The 1973 Urban 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey was used as the basis of 
this disaggregation. The survey shows expenditure of 641 urban 
households by quartile income groups on various commodities - it 
makes no distinction between imported commodities and domestically 
produced commodities, and does not identify distribution mark-ups 
separately.
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A key for mapping imports of final consumer goods from the 
Standard International Trade Classification (used in the Trade 
Report) into the commodity divisions of the System of National 
Accounts was given in Government of Fiji (1973a). Using this key 
it was possible to estimate the industry-composition of total 
consumption expenditure (domestic plus imported plus mark-ups) 
from the National Accounts and to compare this with the Household 
Expenditure Survey. It was necessary to devise a key for mapping 
the commodity list from the Household Survey, and that from the 
National Accounts, into the industries of the Input-Output Table. 
This key is shown in Table B.2, and the allocation of resident 
households' consumption expenditure by imports, domestically 
produced output, indirect taxes and mark-up is shown in Table B.3. 
The Industry composition of domestically produced consumer goods 
was obtained from the Input-Output Table. The industry 
classification of imported consumer goods was derived from the 
Trade Report; the total value of imported consumer goods for 
resident households differs from that shown in the Input-Output 
Table by $0.16 million. The values of import duties and indirect 
taxes were derived from the National Accounts after adjustment 
for indirect taxes paid by tourists; their combined total 
exceeded that shown in the Input-Output Table by $0.44 million.
The value of transport and distribution margin derived from the 
National Accounts was also adjusted for mark-up on tourist 
expenditure and the value shown in Table B.3 is $0.43 million 
greater than the $20.26 million shown in the Input-Output Table.
Table B.3 also shows a comparison of the relative weights 
for residents' consumption expenditure (in purchasers' values)
Table B.2 Napping of commodity classification in the National Accounts and Household Expenditure Survey




3. Mining and quarrying
4. Sugar manufacturing
5. Other food manufacturing
6. Textiles, wood, printing, 
rubber and plastic products
7. Cement products
8. Other manufacturing
S.N.A. Commodities Household Survey Commodities
(1.1.6) Fruit and vegs;
(1.1.7) Potatoes, manioc, tubers.
(1.1.8) Sugar
(1.1.1) Bread & cereals; (1.1.2) Meat; 
(1.1.3) Fish; (1.1.4) Milk, cheese, 
eggs; (1.1.5) Oils & fats;
(1.1.9) Coffee, tea, cocoa;
(1.1.10) Other foods, preserves, conf­
ectionery; (1.2)(1.3) Beverages;
(1.4) Tobacco.
(2.1) Clothing; (2.2) Footwear;
(4.1) Furniture, fixtures, carpet, etc;
(4.2) Household textiles; (4.2) Household 
textiles; (4.4) Glassware, tableware;
(4.5) Household operation.
(3.2.3)(3.2.4) Fuels; (4.3) Heating and 
and cooking appliances, refrigerators etc;
(6.1) Personal transport equipment;
(7.1) Equipment and accessories;
(8.1) Personal care and effects;
(8.2) Goods n.e.c.
(1) Fresh fish; (3) Fruit and vegs.
(4) Sugar
(2) Eggs; (5) Baking products, pulses 
and cereals; (6) Meat and canned fish; 
(7) Milk, cheese and butter; (8) Oils 
and fats; (9) Confectionery;
(10) Beverages; (11) Other food;
(12) Tobacco.
(14) Clothing and footwear;
(16) Furniture and furnishings
(15) Kerosene; (17) Cleaning materials; 
(18) Pottery & glass; (19) Other 
household articles; (25) Petrol; and 
80% of (29) Toiletries and medicine; 
(31) Other.
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(Table B .2 continued)







16. Banking and insurance






21. Ownership of dwellings
(3.1.2) Water; (3.2.1) Electricity;
(3.2.2) Gas.




(8.5) Financial services n.e.c.
(4.6) Domestic services; (6.2) Operation 
of personal transport equipment;
(7.2) Entertainment, recreation, 
cultural; (7.3) Books, magazines;
(8.6) Services n.e.c.
(7.4) Education
(5) Medical care and health expenses 
(3.1.1) Gross rents *
(20) Electricity, water.
(13) Meals.
(26) Public transport 
(32) Postage and telephone
(21) Household insurance
(23) Domestic services; (27) Vehicle 
maintenance; (28) Licences;
(30) Stationery and books; (33) Repairs 
and recreation; (36) Subscriptions
(24) City and town rates
(34) School fees
(35) Medical fees; 20% of (29) Toiletries 
and medicine.
(22) Rent
* Note: This mapping was devised with reference to International Standard Industrial Classification.
3 2 0.
Table B,3 Residents1 Consumption Expenditure 1972 ($*000)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)





7759 2921 2740 13420 90 85
1491 40 391 1922 13 n
5. 13240 18478 4033 5533 8121 49405 333 305
6.
7
3713 8312 3227 5467 20719 140 152
8. 122 9229 3097 345 3853 16646 112 72




13. 7582 7582 51 18
14. 8383 8383 57 48
15. 413 413 3 2
16. 569 569 4 2
17. 7005 372 7377 50 42
18. 360 360 2 9
19. 4925 4925 33 41
20. 1143 208 16 117 1484 10 3
21. 13441 13441 91 166
Tot. 71646 39560 10373 5878 20689 148146 1000 1000
(a) in basic values ( b )  c. i.f. landed cost (c) transport and
commercialisation margin (d) in purchasers values (National 
Accounts) (e) weights from National Accounts and Household Survey.
between the National Accounts and the Urban Household Survey 
(using the key from Table B.2). Although some error would be 
introduced through aggregation of commodity groups in Table B.2, 
the differences in weighting may be taken as a guide to the bias 
involved in relying on urban expenditure patterns. The weights 
do not appear to be very different, except that urban households 
appear to spend relatively more on rent and electricity (as would 
be expected).
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Finally, the household consumption expenditure as shown in 
the Input-Output Table was disaggregated by quarti le income 
groups using the distribution shown in the Household Expenditure 
Survey and the key from Table B.2. The results are shown in 
Table B.4. The total values of the distribution margin, imported 
consumer goods, and indirect taxes (including import duty) were 
each allocated to quarti le groups in the same proportion as total 
household expenditure.
Table B.4 Allocation of household income and expenditure by 
quartile income groups 1972 ($F1000)
Industry Qi Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
1. Sugar cane
2. Other agriculture 2310 1982 2103 1364 7759
3. Mining, quarrying
4. Sugar manufacture 433 377 374 307 1491
5. Other food manuf. 4732 3207 3041 2260 13240
6. Textile, furnit,etc 1811 947 581 374 3713
7. Cement, earthenware
8. Other manufactures 54 32 22 14 122
9. Elect., gas, water 629 440 311 120 1500
10. Building
11. Other construction
12. Distribution 8047 5035 4275 2903 20260
13. Hotels, restaurants 3847 1779 1229 727 7582
14. Transport 2235 1922 2493 1733 8383
15. Communication 195 130 53 35 413
16. Banking 383 80 58 48 569
17. Private Services 4398 2395 1178 864 8835
18. Govt, services 199 123 26 12 360
19. Education 1416 830 522 327 3095
20. Health 476 220 289 158 1143
21. Dwellings 5433 3294 2902 1812 13441
Total Domestic 36598 22793 19457 13058 91906
Imports 15816 9850 8409 5644 39719
Duty, indirect tax 6296 3921 3348 2247 15812
Direct tax 2059 1051 714 0 3824
Savings (residual) 21608 4414 -3348 -5818 16586
Total Income 82377 42029 28580 15131 168117
Income Share .49 .25 .17 .09
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Total household expenditure was distributed much more evenly than
total household income in the Household Survey:
Income Expenditure
Share (%) Share (%)
First Quartile 49 40
Second Quartile 25 25
Third Quartile 17 21
Fourth Quartile 9 14
Direct personal income tax was also estimated as basic tax, 
which is payable at 2.5% of taxable income over a certain threshold. 
It was assumed that only the first three quartiles were liable to 
basic tax and that their estimated household incomes were also 
their taxable incomes. The estimate of direct personal income 
tax of $3,824 million compares closely with Internal Revenue 
Department estimates:
F$'000
Total collections (I.R.D.) 18328
less Direct tax paid by companies 7139 
Direct tax unincorporated ent. 7395 14534
Personal income tax 3794
Households' saving by quartile income groups was then 
estimated as the residual after deducting all expenditures and 
taxes from the income of each group. With household income 
distributed more unequally than household expenditure, the 
estimated cross-section savings function showed a remarkably high 
marginal propensity to save of 0.424. This was associated with 
the very high dissavings of the poorer two quartiles. The 
aggregate average savings propensity derived from Table B.4 was 
0.099; estimated aggregate household savings of $16,586 million 
compared closely with other estimates from the National Accounts.
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For instance, the savings gap (investment less savings) should 
equal the trade gap (imports less exports) ex post. This is 
verified below for 1972:
Imports of goods and services (N.A.) 144200
Exports_of goods and services (N.A.) 119900
Trade gap 24300
Net investment (N.A.) 40605
Savings (est.) 16856
Savings gap "23749
The values in each column of Table B.4 were expressed as
coefficients of the corresponding quartile income level for use 
in the simulation model.
APPENDIX C Systems of Consumer Demand Equations
Input-Output models of the type discussed in this chapter 
are designed to translate changes in the distribution of income 
into changes in the pattern of demand for industry outputs. The 
connection is intuitively clear when one observes that the 
market baskets of rich households are different from those of 
poor households, so that a change in the distribution of income 
will change the pattern of aggregate consumer demand. The 
empirical estimation method used to determine a system of consumer 
demand equations for each industry output is very important 
to the interpretation of the simulation results.
The estimation of systems of consumer demand equations is one 
area of applied economics which has produced a voluminous literature, 
since the mid-1960's in particular (see, for instance, the review 
by Barten (1977)). Several different econometric specifications 
have been developed, most often from the utility maximising models
324.
of microeconomic consumer behaviour. It is not intended here to 
review the several different types of systems (excellent 
references on which this Appendix draws heavily are Phiips (1974), 
Powell (1974) and the survey by Brown and Deaton (1972)). Rather 
it is intended to briefly explain the role of demand theory in 
applied consumption analysis and to explain the reasons for 
adopting a very simple specification of the demand equation system 
for the simulation model of this chapter.
Applied consumption analysis has used neoclassical demand 
theory in the past as a means of reducing the number of parameters 
to be estimated (thus simplifying the model), and in order to 
facilitate the economic interpretation of empirical results.
From the theory of consumer demand, the representative consumer 
is supposed to maximise some twice differentiable utility 
function
u = f(x1# x2, ..., x ) 
subject to a budget constraint
y = z pi x, (i = 1, 2, ..., n)
i
where y is income (assumed equal to total expenditure) 
p. is price of commodity i 
x.. is quantity purchased of commodity i 
u is an index of a preference ordering.
(Problems of aggregation across commodities and consumers are 
considered below). The solution to this constrained maximisation 
problem gives a system of n demand equations showing optimal 
consumption of each commodity for given prices and income
x01 V).
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Any set of demand equations that is derived by constrained 
maximisation of a well-behaved utility function will satisfy 
three restrictions:
(i) homogeneity of degree zero in all prices and income,
(ii) symmetry of the matrix of compensated cross-price 
substitution effects, and
(iii) the adding-up of expenditures on each commodity will sum 
to total income.
By specifying the particular class of utility function, and then 
deriving the set of demand equations which follow from the 
constrained maximisation of that class of utility functions, it 
is possible to derive further restrictions on the sign of the 
income derivative and price derivatives, and even on their absolute 
values. This provides for more efficient parameter estimation in 
applied work. For example, Stone's (1954) linear expenditure 
system is derived from a class of utility functions that is 
directly additive (a special case of strong separability whereby 
the utility derived from consumption of good i is independent of 
that of any other good j). The Rotterdam system (Barten (1964), 
Theil (1967)) is derived from a weakly separable class of utility 
functions in which there is assumed to be independence only 
between major commodity groups. The importance of separability is 
that it obviates problems of aggregation across commodities.
It can be shown that particular restrictions are implied by 
the adoption of one type of system in preference to another. 
Therefore it is reasonable to ask whether it can be stated a priori 
that one particular system is preferable to another. One would 
also want to know whether the lack of adequate data might force 
the adoption of one type of system irrespective of its relative
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advantage. Examination of the former question will give an 
indication of the cost involved in adopting a "second-best" method 
because of inadequate data.
Parks (1969) has examined three systems of demand equations: 
the linear expenditure system of Stone (1954), Houthakker's (1960) 
indirect addilog system, and the differential logarithmic system 
of Theil (1967) and Barten (1964), (1967). Each of these systems 
is based upon the constrained maximisation of a utility function 
and each satisfies the three general restrictions listed above. 
Different sets of parameters are estimated by each system and the 
parameters are restricted in different ways by the theory. Parks 
concluded that the theoretical properties of the models fail to 
provide a basis for selecting the "best" model. He then proceeded 
to compare the empirical performance of the three systems with what 
he called the "naive model". This naive model is the same demand 
equation system used in the PSMG simulation model in this chapter 
(i.e. constant budget shares), but expressed in time series.
That is:
Vit - “it yt
where V.^ is expenditure on commodity i in period t and W.^ is the 
predicted (constant) expenditure share of commodity i. Parks' 
comparison of the models was made on their ability to fit Swedish 
demand data for the period 1861-1955. His results are listed
below:
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Comparison of Demand Models on the Basis of Fit to the 
Sample Data
Values of 1_P2 = yTK Lt=l (yt-yt )2/zi=i(v y > 2







Agriculture .06545 .02195 .02969 .01874 .01815
Manufacturing .00259 .00158 .00176 .00141 .00140
Transport .01396 .00722 .01331 .01483 .01744
Commerce .00078 .00054 .00064 .00048 .00052
Domestic Service .01645 .00795 .00934 .00964 .00826
Housing .01248 .00207 .00171 .00184 .00123
Public Services .00803 .00538 .00823 .00775 .00697
Imports .08535 .05156 .07359 .07379 .07558
Source: Parks (1969)
Parks was careful to re-evaluate the estimation procedures 
involved in each model so as to enable a similar empirical 
treatment, but recognised that his estimates based on the linear 
expenditure system without trend and the indirect addilog system 
are both disadvantaged in terms of the number of parameters 
involved. Nevertheless, the present author has drawn some comfort 
from the observation that the proportion of unexplained variation 
in the naive model is only serious for agriculture (.065) and 
imports (.085), and that all models show relatively high values 
of 1-R2 for imports in any case.
In a recent paper, Barten (1977) noted that the profession is 
still far from a consensus on the issue of the ideal functional 
form. Under the present state of the art the nature of available 
data prevents a clear decision about the empirical superiority 
of any particular choice. The criteria which tend to be used 
instead include convenience, generality and theoretical relevance
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(the latter being also contentious).
A more fundamental problem arises in connection with 
aggregation across consuming households. The neoclassical demand 
theory is written in terms of the individual consumer. However 
it can be shown that even if each consumer behaves according to 
the axioms of the theory, the aggregate behaviour of all consumers 
may not do so. The usual approach in empirical work is to divide 
aggregate expenditure data by the population and to interpret the 
results as if they were given by one utility-maximising consumer 
possessing average per capita income. Gorman (1959) has shown 
that if income distribution is constant then this may provide a 
reasonable simplification, but since income redistribution is at 
the centre of our problem this is of little comfort. Dixon (1975) 
has applied the theory of joint maximisation to solve the problem 
of aggregation across households in consumer demand theory.
His approach uses constant household weights which is also not 
sufficient for questions of varying income distribution. The 
author does not yet know whether the joint maximisation algorithm 
can be solved with variable household weights.
Let us now consider the Engel curve, which is a special case
Pi
of the demand equations discussed above (i.e. x. = g(—  , y) but
Pj
with relative prices constant). The Engel curve for each commodity 
shows its demand response to income variations. It would appear 
to be a simple matter to multiply response parameters derived 
from an Engel curve by the new income levels arising from a 
redistribution (at each income level), and summing the result over 
all households to find a new level of demand for each commodity 
(i.e. a new pattern of aggregate consumption).
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The estimation of Engel curves usually proceeds using data 
obtained from surveys of household income and expenditure 
collected over a short period of time and from households of 
widely different income levels. The advantage of such data over 
time-series data for the above purpose is that the income- 
consumption relationship can be studied in isolation from 
movements in relative prices. It is then apparent that the 
application of demand theory is very much simplified by the absense 
of relative price variation - in particular, both the homogeneity 
restriction and the restriction implied by the symmetry of 
compensated cross-price elasticities are redundant. This will 
not, however, reduce the desire to provide a firm theoretical 
foundation to the analysis of the consumption system.
Recall that a demand system of the type discussed above is 
derived from a utility function with given preference ordering.
At the aggregate level this implies the assumption that each 
individual has the same utility function. The implications of 
such an assumption have been discussed in chapter 7. Here it is 
noted that if preferences change then the demand system must be 
redefined. Therefore an empirical study which tries to estimate 
the parameters of a given demand system must implicitly assume 
that the utility function underlying it is constant over the 
sample space. The econometrician's approach to this problem is to 
try and net out of the consumption-income relationship all 
variations in factors which might have a significant effect on 
preferences. If one was being strict in the use of household 
budget data, one would estimate the Engel curve for households 
of the same cultural background, social status, place of residence, 
and so on. It is most important to account for variations in the
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size and age composition of households (usually by adopting some 
adult-equivalent scale of consumption).
For Fiji the most obvious factor to be netted out of the 
Engel curve relationship would be the variations in household 
consumption patterns that are associated with the race of the 
household head (Fijians and Indians). It would also be recognised 
that the consumption patterns of urban dwellers are different 
from those of rural people, particularly with regard to food, 
shelter and fuel which may be provided without recourse to the 
market-place. The 1973 Urban Household Expenditure Survey 
(on which the consumption coefficients for the simulation model 
were based) did collect information on non-market consumption of 
the households surveyed. The Survey collected information from 
households of Fijian, Indian and other races roughly in proportion 
to the population of each, and the age/sex composition of the 
sample was shown to conform to the national population distribution. 
However, the tabulation of data as published in the Survey report 
is too aggregated to enable these factors to be taken separately 
into account. The present author did not have access to the 
detailed Survey returns.
As noted earlier in the chapter, observations of commodity 
expenditure by quartile income groups are shown in the published 
report. On the basis of these observations an attempt was made 
to fit several alternative functional forms of the Engel curve.
This followed the approach to Prais and Houthakker (1971) and 
amounted to an empirical exploration of various theoretically 
plausible relationships including a linear function, a double 
logarithmic function, a semi-logarithmic function and a hyperbolic 
function. Very good statistical fit was achieved by the double
logarithmic form, implying a constant income elasticity cf demand 
for most commodities. However the detailed results are not 
reported here because this exercise was inadequate for use in 
the simulation model. The reason is that the "extraneous" 
factors could not be separated, thus the estimated elasticities 
would be biased (seriously biased in the author's opinion) and 
the error term would also contain systematic bias. These 
econometric problems arose from my inability to account for 
variations in preferences over the sample space. The estimates 
would also be inefficient because of the small number of 
observations. In the event, the "naive" system of consumer demand 
relationships was the best available model for use in the 
simulations of income redistribution.
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